


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Current History

JANUARY, 1985

VOL. 84, NO. 498

Unsettled foreign policy issues continue to dominate the Middle East. Israel's inward turn to deal with its economic crisis, the stalemated Iran-Iraq War, ongoing unrest in Lebanon, and the reappearance of Soviet diplomatic initiatives reflect the state of United States policy in the region. "The United States has wavered in its resolve; it has become confused about what it wishes to accomplish, and the administration has consistently given priority to lulling the American electorate. Even as its second term begins, the administration is uncertain about whether continued involvement in Lebanon can produce important political solutions or whether American involvement will increase the vulnerability of the United States to further murderous and humiliating attacks."

United States Policy in the Middle East

BY LEONARD BINDER

Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago

DESPITE persistent efforts to minimize the significance of the continued United States presence in Lebanon, United States involvement in the Lebanese miasma continues to be the focal point of Middle East policy as it has been since the Israeli invasion of June, 1982. It has become impossible to hide the embarrassment of the administration and to avoid the conclusion that the United States appears to be falling deeper and deeper into failure in Lebanon. Some observers have been led to draw hasty conclusions regarding the impact of Lebanese events on United States interests in the region as a whole, while others have insisted upon the relative insignificance of Lebanon in the general scheme of things. There is a good deal of exaggeration on both sides of this rather indirectly addressed issue; similar exaggeration marks discussion of the deeper meaning and portent of the September 20, 1984, bombing of the United States embassy annex in East Beirut. However, there is no denying that a kind of caution, if not fully fledged passivity, has come to characterize United States policy in the entire region from Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf to Morocco and the Western Sahara.

The bombing of the embassy annex occurred during the American presidential campaign, and it may even have been intended to influence that election. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that discussion of the bombing has encompassed a wider context than Lebanon. The terrorist act itself has been taken as a paradigm of Middle Eastern political life in general; alternatively, the bombing has been treated as proof positive of the incorrectness of our entire regional policy. Thus some

have argued that it makes no difference what policy the United States pursues, because its opponents are driven by an irrational and fanatical religious impulse, while others argue that specific policy changes will lessen anti-Americanism and reduce attacks on our personnel and installations, at least, if not on our interests. All seem to agree, though, that the bombing attack was related to the continued presence of Israeli forces in south Lebanon and the American attitude toward that situation.

The continued Israeli occupation of parts of south Lebanon is only one of the obstacles faced by President Amin Gemayel's government in its effort to reestablish its sovereign authority. The Syrian occupation, the division of the country into confessional enclaves, the prevalence of rival, trigger-happy militias wherever the Syrians lack direct control, the continued intransigence of extremist groups within several of the religious communities, the confusion of political leadership among the Palestinians, and the continued overt and covert intervention of foreign powers also contribute to the agony of the Gemayel government. These problems are unlikely to be resolved by an Israeli withdrawal.

There is strong evidence that the Israelis would like to withdraw their forces from south Lebanon, although it is not at all certain that they will actually do so under foreseeable conditions. But knowing that the Israelis would like to withdraw and that they are willing to acquiesce in a continuing Syrian occupation, the government of Syrian President Hafez Assad has been inclined to find out just how favorable a bargain can be struck through the ongoing process of tacit negotiations, which

are to lead to a tacit agreement between the Israelis and the Syrians. Since the Israelis (and the Americans) have clearly tipped their hand, it seems rational that Assad should continue to hold out, should continue to apply military pressure by encouraging or at least permitting terrorist acts, and should continue to seek side benefits in the form of commitments from sectarian leaders within Lebanon.

After Lebanon unilaterally abrogated the May 17, 1983, agreement providing for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, it appeared that both the Gemayel government and the administration of United States President Ronald Reagan had come to the conclusion that an accommodative arrangement with Syria would be the best possible solution for Lebanon. It was hoped, if not expected, that Syria's Assad would proceed with prudence and restraint, encouraging the various confessional communities to agree to a compromise providing for both constitutional change and the unification of the country under a single political authority and a single security force. Presumably, Assad would ask for no more than the continued presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon and the close coordination of Lebanese policy with Syrian interests. If Lebanon could survive as a separate if not independent political entity and if the civil and property rights of all citizens could be protected to some degree, then the result might be better than either the civil war or the current confusion. Some Israeli strategists would rely much more comfortably on such a tacit arrangement if Assad would affirm his intention of preventing any military or terrorist provocation against Israel's northern border.

Both Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Lebanese Minister for the South Nabih Berri have asked the United States to mediate between Israel and Syria. But even though the Reagan administration has consistently attempted to cast itself in the role of mediator or honest broker, United States Secretary of State George Shultz has expressed his reluctance to become involved until the Syrians show a greater willingness to compromise. The United States shows no intention of applying pressure on Israel to withdraw; and it remains unclear whether Shultz's reluctance is meant more to goad Syria or Israel.

Syria has shown little impatience with the current situation. Still, Syria has not been able to bring about the political unity in Lebanon that would legitimate its continued dominance of Lebanese politics. The militia leaders in the various regions not occupied by Syrian forces are apparently reluctant to allow any strengthening of the Gemayel government or any intrusion of the Lebanese army into their respective territorial enclaves. To some extent, the continued presence of Israeli forces in south Lebanon strengthens the resistance of Druse leader and government minister Walid Jumblat and Shiite leader

Berri to the sort of arrangement preferred by Assad and Gemayel. On the other hand, any suggestion that the Druse or Shiite leaders are collaborating with the Israelis leaves them vulnerable to denunciation, terror attacks, and Syrian collusion with rival confessional leaders.

The Israelis might have preferred to withdraw from south Lebanon as they did from the Shouf Mountains, making some sort of secret or tacit arrangement allowing the Druse to assert dominance within that enclave in return for guaranteeing the exclusion of Palestinian forces. There are many reasons why the Israelis have not been able to make similar arrangements with the Shiites of south Lebanon, not the least of which is that there is no single dominant and unchallenged Shiite leader in the Jebel Amil enclave. The Israelis are worried that Berri may not be able to gain and maintain effective control over the southern region, and they are concerned that the Druse will lose their territorial autonomy if a Shiite buffer is interposed between the Shouf Mountains and Israel's Galilee region. Moreover, the Israelis, the Shiites, the Druse, and King Hussein of Jordan are all apprehensive about Syrian plans for the Abu Musa wing of the Palestinian movement.

Syria's Assad is not likely to tip his hand on any of these questions, although he may be willing to commit himself to preventing incursions into Israeli territory in return for an unconditional Israeli withdrawal. Hussein's recognition of Egypt in September, 1984, reflects his belief that armed struggle is likely to remain a central element in the politics of the Palestinian movement. If Syria is forced to prevent a return of armed Palestinians to south Lebanon and if collaboration with President Gemayel depends upon restraining Palestinian political activity elsewhere in Lebanon, Syria will probably seek to reaffirm its support for the Palestinian movement by pressuring both Hussein and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasir Arafat to take a more militant stand elsewhere. Hussein has obviously seen the handwriting on the wall and, like other leaders in the Middle East, has not waited for an initiative from Washington. Jordan's Hussein is trying to construct an Arab alliance that can produce a "moderate" compromise on the Palestinian question while providing for American, Egyptian, (tacit) Israeli, and possibly Iraqi support against any eventual Syrian pressure. Since some Israelis believe that it is possible to cut a deal with Syria at the expense of the Palestinians, it is not at all clear that Israel would prefer to explore the revived "Reagan plan" of September, 1982, with Jordan rather than stage an apparently unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon.*

AMERICAN FRUSTRATION

In the last months of 1984, it was clear that the United States had not taken and perhaps could not take the initiative in the Middle East, despite the fact that the Reagan administration believed that the Israeli invasion of 1982 afforded it an unparalleled opportunity to take

*Editor's note: An excerpt of the Reagan plan appears in *Current History*, January, 1983, p. 33.

such an initiative. Even though the United States officially deplored the Israeli invasion, it welcomed the new situation. Since that time, it has become clear that American policies have failed and that the physical presence of United States officials and American diplomatic involvement made the United States vulnerable to the initiatives taken by others in the region. The United States has wavered in its resolve; it has become confused about what it wishes to accomplish, and the administration has consistently given priority to lulling the American electorate. Even as its second term begins, the administration is uncertain about whether continued involvement in Lebanon can produce important political solutions or whether American involvement will increase the vulnerability of the United States to further murderous and humiliating attacks.

Underlying American frustrations in Lebanon is a long-standing if low-key dispute about whether United States policy should be directed from Washington, D.C., or from the United States embassy in Beirut. Viewed from the banks of the Potomac, the conflict in Lebanon is a local brawl that American officials should be able to settle because they can pay off all sides. From the embassy's point of view, a minor misstep could well plunge Americans into the very heart of the brawl. From the perspective of Washington, American involvement in Lebanon can be justified only if costs incurred in Lebanon can be recouped with profit elsewhere in the Middle East. But American efforts to integrate a Lebanese solution into a general regional policy have made it clear that Damascus, Jerusalem, Cairo, and Riyadh have very different views on the matter. At various times over the last two and a half years, the United States has attempted to pursue policies that reflect the thinking of one of these capitals, only to run into firm resistance among the others and on the ground in Lebanon.

The Reagan administration at first believed that linking the restoration of the sovereign authority of Lebanon to a "comprehensive solution" of the Palestine question by means of the Reagan plan would stabilize a pro-Western government, would distance the United States from complete identification with Israeli policy, would strengthen the regime of King Hussein, would force Arafat to cash in his chips when they were worth least, and would teach a would-be Soviet ally a bitter lesson. It is impossible to know whether this program might have been successful had the American hand been played differently. In any case, opponents of parts of the plan seized upon various American moves and turned them into serious liabilities.

The Reagan plan seems to have been announced prematurely, linking an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon to a plan for the disposition of the West Bank that probably strengthened Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's baleful influence on Israeli military policy. The decision to return the United States Marines to Beirut after the massacres in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps indi-

cated that the United States assumed some of the responsibility for the Phalangist acts of commission and the Israeli acts of omission. But the presence of the Marines was not and could not have been justified as protecting the Palestinians. The United States made a grave error when it linked the stationing of the Marines around the Beirut airport to the stabilization of the Gemayel regime and the rebuilding of the Lebanese army. The United States assessment of American abilities and of the situation in Lebanon was grossly incorrect, and it does little to soften this judgement to claim that the United States had received assurances from Damascus. The administration's third important mistake was in taking major responsibility for the aborted May 17 treaty between Israel and Lebanon, and its fourth mistake was deciding to engage American naval guns in the defense of Lebanese government positions at Suk al-Gharb.

Although American policy in Lebanon was a failure and the repeated attacks by the Islamic Jihad terrorists were humiliating, the United States continued to hold a position of substantial strength in the region. United States efforts to establish a dominant position failed, however; and there is convincing evidence that the United States has lost the initiative in the Middle East. Among the most indicative events were Israel's unilateral decision to withdraw from the Shouf Mountains and to make its own arrangements with Walid Jumblat, tacit approval of the unilateral abrogation of the May 17 treaty by the Gemayel government and the related understandings between the governments of Syria and Lebanon, the rapprochement among Arafat, Mubarak, and Hussein after Arafat's ouster from Lebanon, Jordan's recognition of Egypt, and even the purported unification agreement between King Hassan II of Morocco and Muammar Qaddafi of Libya. Not all these events reflect anti-American influences, nor can they be said to run contrary to a policy which, at the very least, has not yet been enunciated. But the timing of these events was tied to the belief that the United States would not act vigorously on the eve of a national election, either in a positive sense or in the negative sense of punishing initiatives that had not been coordinated by American policymakers.

Once again American policy in the Middle East is being determined in a fragmentary manner through its allies, each of whom acts in terms of its most immediate interests. At the moment, this fragmented policy does not threaten the vital interests of the United States even if it has resulted in a sorrowful and probably needless loss of life. When the United States tried to force the issue in Lebanon it failed, just as it has thus far failed to force the Palestine issue or the Libyan issue. This is not to argue, however, that the United States presence in some form has no impact on the policies followed by Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Morocco, and others. It is generally understood that some sort of extreme threat to American interests might lead to a vigorous military intervention. But barring such an unlikely occurrence

(now that the Iranian offensive in Iraq has been stopped), United States action is largely limited to making marginal shifts in the balance of regional power by distributing military and economic support.

POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL

Israel remains the major recipient of American military and economic support. Even though the United States has been less than overjoyed at the uncertain outcome of the Israeli elections, American policymakers are apparently more concerned about Israel's economic situation than about the continued Israeli occupation of Lebanon, Israeli relations with Jordan and the Palestinian movement and relations with Egypt, or even the threat of war between Israel and Syria. It is possible that the increasing warmth developing between the Reagan administration and the new Peres administration is a contrivance of the American election. Yet there may be more to it. Some observers believe that a significant improvement in the Israeli economic situation is a prerequisite for any possible Israeli concessions on the Palestinian question and that such improvement will probably make it easier for Peres to convince his coalition colleagues to support him in his inclination to seek a compromise solution. Peres is doubtlessly more favorably inclined toward the Reagan plan than are the leaders of the Likud bloc. Moreover, the logic of the coalition arrangement in Israel seems to point toward the achievement of some substantial progress toward peace before Yitzhak Shamir resumes the position of Prime Minister.

While the continued occupation of south Lebanon is a difficult military burden for Israel, the withdrawal of Israeli forces will entail new and different military burdens. Even if the United States and Israel disagree on what might be a reasonably prudent margin of military safety, the United States recognizes the importance of Israeli military strength to the maintenance of American influence in the Middle East. Indeed, the continued decrease in the price of petroleum, the declining threat of large-scale warfare in the Persian Gulf, and the increasing effort of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries to appear neutral seem to have reduced the penalties against the United States for being too supportive of Israel. United States Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's visit to Egypt, Israel and Jordan in mid-October, 1984, seems to have set a new tone in American policy in the Middle East.

Despite Israel's vulnerability, it was unlikely that the United States would press Israel for concessions to the Arab states just before an American election. It was more likely that the United States government would demonstrate its generosity. Columnist William Safire suggested that the Peres visit to the White House was a command performance for which the Israeli Prime Minister received little more than promises. In contrast, the Weinberger visit was accomplished in a relatively low-key manner and apparently produced tangible benefits for

Israel. Since Secretary Weinberger has usually emphasized the importance of the moderate Arab states to American policy and has often exasperated Israel's Likud government, all sorts of significance may be attributed to his visit. Perhaps of greatest importance, it was Weinberger who undertook the trip while Secretary Shultz continued to deny that the United States would take the initiative in arranging an agreement between the Syrians and the Israelis. There will probably be a heated debate within the administration over how much initiative the United States should take and how much pressure should be applied on Israel. Huge commitments to Israel have already been made or acknowledged, and sooner or later they will have to be justified by a closer coordination of policy and by measurable progress in achieving peace in the region.

POLICY IN EGYPT

United States involvement with Egypt is second only to its involvement with Israel. The level of American assistance to Egypt is almost as high as the level of aid to Israel, and aid to the two countries is tied together; the United States is involved as a full partner in the Camp David agreements and, hence, in the peace process between Israel and Egypt. Further, the United States derives great benefits from its friendship with Egypt, quite apart from the very important question of Arab-Israeli relations. Even though Egypt is cautious about how overtly it expresses its close association with the United States, it has virtually become a strategic American ally. Egypt has been aiding Iraq in its war with Iran.

The precondition for the successful application of Egyptian leverage in the Middle East context is that Egypt must be militarily strong; and because of Egypt's staunch adherence to its peace agreement with Israel the United States has been able to maintain a high level of both military and economic assistance to Egypt. Nevertheless, United States-Egyptian relations have not been uniformly smooth. Egyptians are unhappy about the fact that they receive less assistance than Israel. Compared to Israel, there are more strings attached to the use of both military and economic American aid. The Egyptians do not want the United States to reward them for making peace with Israel. Instead, they would like the United States to support the expansion of Egyptian influence in the region and among the Arab states in particular. They want American and Israeli support for their regional leadership even if that entails wringing some concessions from the Israelis.

Egypt does not want merely to return to the Arab fold
(Continued on page 35)

Leonard Binder is a past president of the Middle East Studies Institute and a fellow of the Center for Advanced Study on the Behavioral Sciences. His latest book is *In a Moment of Enthusiasm* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

"Iranian leaders believe that the export of their revolution is necessary for the survival of the Khomeini regime. Above all, that survival must be protected in the Persian Gulf regions, where the superpowers and the regional states are trying to destroy the Iranian regime because they regard it as the principal threat to their interests."

Iran's Islamic Revolution and the Persian Gulf

BY R. K. RAMAZANI

Harry F. Byrd Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia

IN no other region of the world is the Islamic resurgence so deeply conditioned by Iran's efforts to export its "Islamic Revolution" as it is in the Persian Gulf.* The outbreak of the first major act of political violence in the region, the multiple bombings in Kuwait in December, 1983, followed by the Iranian capture of part of the Majnoon Islands inside Iraqi territory in February, 1984, and the start of the tanker war in earnest in April seemed to intensify the Arab fear that Iran would export its revolution to their societies. Kuwait has expelled more than a thousand Iranians, and all the Gulf Arab regimes have been tightening internal security and strengthening external defense.¹

The phrase "export of the Islamic Revolution" is not simply a revolutionary slogan; it is a cardinal principle of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The conception of an "Islamic world order" is rooted in the idea of world order within the *Imami* or Twelvers' Shiite cultural tradition as interpreted by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. From his perspective, the existing world order is imperfect, but it will be perfected on the appearance of the Twelfth Imam, variously called Messiah (*Mahdi*), or "Master of the Age" (*sahib-i zaman*). The Messiah will create justice and equity in the world because, in Khomeini's words, he alone will be able to establish a "world government of God."

The imperfection of the existing world order, however, does not merely reflect the absence of the Messiah; it stems from two other sources. First, Khomeini believes

that the Western concept of the "nation-state" is philosophically flawed because it is the creation of man's "weak mind." Second, he believes that the existing international system is essentially iniquitous partly because the superpowers arrogate worldly power to themselves at the expense of the masses of the people. From this populist standpoint the existing international system is divided into two camps: the camp of the "oppressors" (*mustakberin*), which is led by both the United States and the Soviet Union—the "Great Satan" and the "Lesser Satan," respectively—and the camp of the "oppressed" (*mustaza'fin*), consisting mainly, but not exclusively, of the people of the Islamic and third world nations.

Until the appearance of the "expected Messiah," the supreme jurisprudent (*faqih*) has the obligation to pave the way for the ultimate establishment of the Islamic world government under the Messiah. Except for those powers that belong to the infallible Imam, in Khomeini's view all legitimate religious and temporal authority belongs to the supreme jurisprudent, who should rule until the Messiah appears. The Iranian Revolution has resulted in the establishment of such a rule in "a country which," in Khomeini's words, "wishes to establish divine justice in the world, first of all in Iran itself"; then, "the way will be opened for the world government of imam mahdi" once the governments of the meek are established.²

As the first country in the world in which the supreme jurisprudent actually rules, Iran should lead the way toward the establishment of the "governments of the disinherited" in all other states of the world.

In Khomeini's words, "Islam is a sacred trust from God to ourselves and the Iranian nation must grow in power and resolution until it has vouchsafed Islam to the entire world." In the view of Prime Minister Mir Hussein Mousavi, Iran is trying to establish a "new system of values" that stems from the ideology of Islam and is at the same time aiming at "the liberation of mankind." Given Khomeini's two-camp view of the existing iniquitous international system on the one hand, and of Iran's sacred mission to liberate mankind on the other,

*I wish to acknowledge the research support of the Center for Advanced Studies at the University of Virginia.

¹In a research tour of 28 cities around the world in 1984, this author discovered the widespread Iranian influence on the Islamic resurgence—all the way from Marawi in the Philippines to Manama in Bahrain, and beyond. But by contrast with all previous research visits to the Gulf since the Iranian Revolution, I also found the Gulf Arab regimes increasingly alarmed by the potential impact of Gulf events on Islamic resurgence within their own societies.

²See R. K. Ramazani, "Khumayni's Islam in Iran's Foreign Policy" in Adeed Dawisha, ed., *Islam in Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 17.

Khomeini believes that conflict between Iran and "the arrogant powers" becomes inevitable. In his words,

We must settle our accounts with great and superpowers, and show them that we can take on the whole world ideologically, despite all the painful problems that face us.³

As the "redeemer nation" (my appellation), Iran must export the "Islamic Revolution" not merely to pave the way for the ultimate establishment of "the world government of imam mahdi," and the "liberation of mankind," but also to protect Islamic Iran against a hostile world. "We should try hard to export our revolution to the world," commands Khomeini, who adds,

We should set aside the thought that we do not export our revolution, because Islam does not regard various Islamic countries differently and is the supporter of all the oppressed peoples of the world. On the other hand, all the superpowers and all the powers have arisen to destroy us. If we remain in an enclosed environment we shall definitely face defeat.⁴

The doctrine of the export of the Islamic Revolution aims simultaneously at three interconnected goals in Iran's foreign policy: (1) paving the way toward the eventual establishment of the world government of the Messiah, (2) promoting populist, independent Islamic governments in other states and, above all, (3) protecting the first and only such state and government in Iran. Without succeeding in efforts toward the last goal, Iran will fail to achieve the other two goals.

To export its revolution, Iran wants other nations to meet two principal conditions. First, they must establish "true Islamic governments," which means governments ruled by anti-monarchical, pro-Iranian religious leaders, governments "similar" to, not identical with, Iran's. Second, they must attain "true independence," which means that they should conduct an anti-Western and anti-Soviet "Islamic" foreign policy. Khomeini believes that only Iran is truly nonaligned. Hence, it is a mistake to think, as some analysts do, that Iran is trying to maintain a position of "equidistance," or "negative equilibrium," as Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq attempted, between the superpowers. Such a principle implicitly accepts these "arrogant powers" as legitimate actors in world affairs, whereas Khomeini emphatically rejects them.

Since Iran alone has met these essential conditions of "true Islam," the Iranian government represents "Islam of the Oppressed" (*mustaza'fin*) and all other governments

represent "Islam of the Oppressors" (*mustakberin*).⁵ The governments of the Gulf region fall into the latter category partly because of their subservience to the United States. Khomeini hopes that the Gulf Arab leaders "will be awakened" by his warnings to "an Islamic humanitarian consciousness" like the "heroic nation" of Iran.

To be truly Islamic, however, the Gulf Arab governments must meet one additional condition—they must acknowledge Iran's leadership in maintaining security in the entire Gulf region. Formerly, the Shah's *Pax Iranica* inspired the idea of Iran's "security perimeter" (*harim-i amniyyat*) in the Gulf region; today, Khomeini's *Pax Islamica* guides Iran's "security umbrella" (*chatr-i amniyyat*). Despite the apparent similarity between the two bids for Iranian preeminence in the Gulf, Khomeini aspires to Iran's religious as well as political supremacy. In both cases, however, Iran's perception of its historical and geographic primacy in the Gulf, particularly at its entrance at the Strait of Hormuz, reinforces its drive for leadership in the region. In the words of the Speaker of the Majlis (legislature), Hojatolislam Hashemi Rafsanjani,

He who holds the key to the Strait of Hormuz is in fact strangling the enemy and he will press on the enemy's throat when it is in his interest to do so.

How does Iran try to export its revolution? Khomeini says categorically that "swords" should not be used for the export of the revolution. If such a policy guide is interpreted as ruling out resort to "offensive wars" for exporting the revolution, it is compatible with Shi'ite legal thought, which prohibits all such wars, the declaration of which is the prerogative of the infallible Imam. The supreme jurisprudent has the right to declare only a "defensive war."

But in practice the problem becomes what constitutes "self-defense." Khomeini defines the "self" not only in terms of Iran as a territorial state or what he calls the "homeland," but also in terms of "Islam." For example, he says that Iran is fighting Iraq "in the defense of Islam." But since the boundaries of Islam extend far beyond those of Iran, what constitutes Iran's "self-defense" becomes highly ambiguous. At first, Iran's military operations against Iraq were clearly defensive; they were aimed at driving the invading Iraqi forces off Iran's soil. But when Iranian forces crossed the international frontier on July 13, 1982, and carried the war into Iraqi territory, Iran's war efforts could no longer be regarded as simply a matter of defending the Iranian territorial state. Furthermore, because Iran uncompromisingly insists on the removal of Iraq's President Saddam Hussein from power as a precondition to a negotiated peace settlement, it is widely believed that Iran's continuation of the war since July, 1982, has aimed at exporting the revolution to Iraq.

Short of war, does Iran use coercive policy instruments to export revolution to the other Gulf states? Three cases may provide a clue. First, in 1979, a leading Iranian

³Author's translation from a collection of Khomeini's speeches entitled, *Sukhan-raniha-ye Iman khumayni Dar Shish Mahi-ye Avval-i 1359* (Teheran, 1359 [1980]), p. 8.

⁴See Ramazani, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

⁵My terms, the "Islam of the Oppressed" and the "Islam of the Oppressors," which are based largely on Khomeini's ideology, seem to correspond to James Bill's "Populist Islam" and "Establishment Islam," which are based on the perceptions of Arab consumers of Khomeini's ideology. See his "Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 63, no. 1 (Fall, 1984), pp. 108-109.

cleric, Ayatollah Ruhani, threatened to lead a revolutionary movement for the "annexation" of Bahrain unless the rulers of Bahrain adopted "an Islamic form of government similar to the one established in Iran." Faced with bitter reactions from Arab leaders, the embarrassed Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan denied responsibility for the "unauthorized" statement.

Second, Iran was accused of supporting a "coup plot" in December, 1981, to export revolution to Bahrain and other Gulf states. Iran vehemently denied any responsibility, while Bahrain asked Iran to recall its chargé d'affaires for his alleged involvement in the plot. Bahraini and Saudi authorities are convinced that Iran trained and armed 73 Shiite Arab "saboteurs," who belonged to the "Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain" located in Teheran. Some observers in the Gulf believe that the plotters were trained at a camp in Qum by Hojatolislam Moddaressi, who had lived in Bahrain in exile during the Shah's regime.

Third, Iran was accused of involvement in the multiple bombings in Kuwait in December, 1983. Western sources charged that the heavily armed plotters "entered Kuwait from Iran" by boat, and that the "final approval" for their operations "came directly from messages carried to Kuwait by a courier from Iran." Iranian President Sayed Ali Khamenei called the charges against Iran "a foolish and stupid lie"; the Iranian Foreign Ministry said that attributing the attacks to Iran was "part and parcel of a comprehensive plot by the United States and its agents against the Islamic Revolution."

Ayatollah Khomeini apparently believes that the best way to export revolution is by peaceful means. First, he considers the "Islamic behavior" of the Iranian people most important, and he has urged Iranians in general and Iranian diplomats in particular to observe "Islamic ethics" in their personal conduct and in the performance of their official duties. Second, he emphasizes the importance of revolutionary propaganda. His close clerical disciples most often use the age-old vehicle of the Shiite sermon, particularly on Fridays, as one of the most effective instruments of Islamic indoctrination and mobilization within Iran and other countries.

The third major instrument of exporting revolution is proselytizing through foreign religious leaders (*ulama*). In addition to receiving streams of individual foreign Muslim clerics, Iran organizes and hosts international congresses for them. For example, Iran gathered 500 foreign *ulama* in Teheran in May, 1983. During the final session of "the second global congress of the world Friday prayers leaders," Khomeini told them: "You should discuss the situation in Iran. You should call on people to rebel like Iran."⁶ In closing this meeting, its members resolved that they "accept Ayatollah al-Uzma ('the Great Sign of God') Imam Khomeini as having the necessary qualifications for the imamat [sic] (leadership) of Muslims, and

we will invite Muslims to follow his call."

Fourth, revolutionary Iran uses the pilgrimage to Mecca as one of the most powerful ways to export its revolution. Every year, some two million Muslims from around the world go on pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. This is a unique gathering and an extraordinary opportunity for some 100,000 to 150,000 Iranian pilgrims to advocate Khomeini's brand of Islam. Hojatolislam Khoiniha, the cleric who led the crowd that seized the United States Embassy in Teheran, is officially in charge of arrangements for visa, travel, housing and other matters of concern to the Iranian pilgrims. The recurrent dispute between Iranian and Saudi officials, ostensibly over these routine matters, camouflages the underlying conflict between Teheran and Riyadh over the behavior of Iranian pilgrims who have taken posters of Khomeini and revolutionary tracts with them to Mecca, staged political demonstrations, and shouted slogans against the United States, Israel and Iraq.

During the Saudi-Iranian dispute in 1981, for example, King Khalid wrote to Khomeini complaining about political agitation by Iranian pilgrims, and Khomeini replied by insisting that the purpose of pilgrimage is not, as the King stated, religious worship alone. Rather, it is political; the pilgrimage was "completely linked to politics" at the time of the Prophet Mohammed. Separation of the two, Khomeini said, is the idea of the superpowers.

Fifth, Iran hosts the headquarters of many revolutionary organizations from around the world, particularly from the Persian Gulf region. The revolutionary government adopted a "plan for an Islamic front" in 1981, which, according to Prime Minister Mir Hussein Mousavi, was to be "followed up" by Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs "because the fight against imperialism should take place all over the world." The Gulf revolutionary organizations include, for example, the "Islamic Revolution Movement in Iraq," the "Islamic Revolution Movement of the Arabian Peninsula," and the "Islamic Liberation Movement of Bahrain." The exact nature and extent of the relationship between these groups and the Iranian government are not known, but there is little doubt that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has an "Islamic liberation movement unit" that meets at times with the representatives of the Gulf groups.

The single most active revolutionary group is the "Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq" (SAIRI), which is led by Hojatolislam Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim. There are some 350,000 Shiites from Iraq in Iran today, including Iranian residents of Iraq who were expelled by the Iraqi regime at the outset of the war, the Iraqi refugees from countries other than Iraq, and Iraqi prisoners of war. SAIRI is closely linked to the Iraqi underground *al-Dawa* party; it publishes a bulletin that reports the activities of the Shiite dissidents in Iraq; it runs paramilitary training camps in Iran; and it dispatches Iraqi "warriors" (*majahidin*) to the war front. Khomeini instructs them, as he did on September 20, 1983, "to aim

⁶For the text see *Kayhan Hava'i*, May 23, 1984.

to form an Islamic government and to implement God's commands" in Iraq.

ARAB PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT

Arab leaders regard Khomeini's Iran as a far more formidable threat to their regimes than Muhammad Riza Shah Pahlavi's Iran. No matter how overbearing he was in Arab eyes, the Shah was seen as the main protector of the status quo in the Gulf region, while Khomeini is seen as trying to destroy it. His regime attacks their legitimacy and their pro-Western foreign policy, and at the same time tries to export its own type of Islamic government. What alarms the Arab leaders most of all, however, are the implications of Islamic resurgence among their own populations, most particularly among their Shiite Muslims.

There are three general reasons why the Arab leaders fear the possibility of uprisings in their Shiite communities. First, Khomeini's export-of-revolution policy is backed by the putatively most powerful state in the region, despite the material toll that the revolution and the war have taken. Second, Iran has the largest Shiite population of any Gulf country—in fact, of any state in the Muslim world. And third, nearly 200,000 Iranians are scattered in the Gulf Arab countries. To be sure, Khomeini's ideology claims to be nonsectarian, or "ecumenical," but that is no source of comfort to Arab leaders; they regard it as specifically Shiite and Iranian. Examples from specific countries may serve to identify the main features of the Shiite factor as it relates to the Arab fear of Islamic resurgence.

First, there is no simple correlation between the Arab perception of the threat and the percentage of Shiite populations in Arab societies. But a combination of the Shiite factor and other factors adds to the sense of the threat. In Bahrain, for example, the Shiites form 71.95 percent of the population, but this fact alone cannot explain the Bahraini fear. A combination of this factor with Iran's past irredentist claims to Bahrain, the Shiite coup plot in 1981 and, above all, Bahrain's own experience with recurrent instances of Shiite unrest worry the Al-Khalifah ruling family.

In contrast with Bahrain, for example, Iraq has fewer Shiite citizens (60 percent) and is also a much larger country. Yet the Iraqi sense of Shiite threat is greater because the Shiite factor combines with other crucial conditions: Iraq is Iran's closest neighbor, with which it shares some 550 miles of land and river boundaries and it has the most limited access to the high seas. Most important, Iraq has the oldest, the most rebellious, and the best organized underground Shiite opposition in the entire Gulf region. This Iraqi sense of Shiite threat was a major factor in Iraq's decision to invade Iran, although it was by no means the sole consideration.

On the other hand, Qatar has the largest percentage of Shiite Muslims (80 percent) of any Gulf Arab state, and yet it has had no experience with Shiite unrest similar to

that in Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Second, there is no simple correlation between the Arab perception of the threat and the percentage of Iranians living in Gulf societies outside Iran. But in countries where the Iranian factor combines with other factors, it makes a difference. In Kuwait, for example, the Iranian nationals form only 5.12 percent, as opposed to Qatar's 23.29 percent of the total population, but the Al-Sabah ruling family has had far more serious problems with Iranians, more than a thousand of whom have been expelled since the bombing attacks in Kuwait in December, 1983.

In contrast to other Gulf states, Saudi Arabia has the smallest percentage of Shiite Muslims (3.7 percent) and of Iranians (.13 percent), and yet the ruling family fears the Shiite threat for several reasons. Because of past discrimination by the Sunni majority against the Shiite minority, the Saudi Shiites nurture social, economic and political grievances. The Saudi Shiites are traditionally biased against the "Wahhabis," a term for Saudi Sunnis that the Shiites sometimes use pejoratively. In addition, the Saudi Shiites sit atop the oil-rich eastern province, and the Saudi giant oil terminal at Ras Tanura can be reached by Iranian fighter planes from Bushehr in about 15 minutes. And finally, since the Iranian Revolution there have been two major uprisings among the Saudi Shiite population at al-Qatif.

The sense of grievance in Gulf societies is not confined to Saudi Arabia; it is widespread. The social, economic and political conditions that underpin Shiite unrest vary from nation to nation. By and large, however, the living conditions of many Shiite families are less desirable than those of their Sunni compatriots. Most Shiite families live in economically depressed areas. This is true not only in countries where they form minorities, but also where they constitute a majority of the citizen population as, for example, in Bahrain and Iraq. To be sure, there are also affluent Shiite families and prosperous Shiite merchants, bankers, and businessmen. But it does not necessarily follow that they are opposed to Iranian influence. Some rich Shiites are said to finance pro-Khomeini activities in Dubai surreptitiously.

Finally, the Iranian Revolution has heightened political consciousness among all Muslims in the Gulf region. The Shiites as well as the Sunnis, the privileged and underprivileged classes, and Iranian and Arab expatriates alike aspire to social justice and greater independence from the perceived control of the superpowers, especially of the United States.

Yet, this increased social and political consciousness so

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"No hastily improvised policies can resolve the innumerable problems confronting the new National Unity government. Even massive economic assistance from the United States offers only temporary respite, buying time until Israel's economy is totally overhauled. Nor will evacuation from Lebanon bring permanent security in the north. Without long-term plans, the Palestinians will continue to be a source of unrest in the countries bordering Israel."

Israel Confronts Old Problems

BY DON PERETZ

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IN 1984, Israel's new ruling coalition—the National Unity government—faced several domestic and foreign crises. The struggles between Israeli secularists and Orthodox Jews and between diverse Jewish ethnic groups continued. Jewish settlements on the occupied West Bank and in the Gaza region caused friction in the coalition. Abroad, Israeli troops were under fire in south Lebanon; relations with the United States and with Egypt were uneasy; and the peace process had not yet been extended to other Arab countries, especially Jordan.

Yet threats of economic disaster overshadowed all these issues. In the last seven years of Likud (Unity) rule, the inflation rate had increased from less than 40 percent to more than 400 percent a year. Maintaining the 10,000-man occupation army in south Lebanon was costing the government about \$1 million a day. But large defense expenditures were not the only factor in the economic crisis. Israel supports one of the most extensive social welfare systems in the world, with a large public sector payroll. Over \$1 billion a year in interest payments on the \$20-billion foreign debt, and low rates of worker productivity (compared to other Western industrial nations) were also factors in the dismal economic picture.

Despite its gravity, the state of the economy was not a divisive issue in the July 23, 1984, Knesset elections, and during the campaign there was little difference in Likud and Labor's prescriptions. In the event, the elections produced a near standoff.

Likud won 41 of the 120 Knesset seats and Labor won 44. Since 61 seats are needed to govern, both Labor and Likud spent the next 7 weeks attempting to build a coalition. Finally, on September 14, the Knesset approved the 25-member government formed by Labor and Likud with the support of 7 smaller parties (see Table 1). Helping to cement the coalition was the decision to rotate the prime ministership. Labor leader Shimon Peres is serving as Prime Minister for 25 months; then Likud bloc leader Yitzhak Shamir (now foreign minister) will serve as Prime Minister for 25 months. Despite internal tensions, the new government, with its 97-seat majority, will deal with the country's problems with more strength than

a government led by either the Labor Alignment or the Likud bloc.

The government's first test was the economy's deterioration, which caused an immediate crisis. Besides the growth in inflation during Likud rule, the foreign debt increased by \$20 billion and the government's budget deficit by \$30 billion. Inflationary pressures raised interest rates to between 21 and 23.5 percent a month by September, 1984; after compounding, the rates soared to around 1,000 percent a year.

To protect themselves against inflation, many Israelis had invested in bank shares, but in late 1983 these shares collapsed, along with most other stocks in the local market. According to the *Jerusalem Post*, "the bubble had to burst sooner or later." Harsh reality finally "invaded the fools' paradise in which the banks had been living for years." Most Israelis' wages were still protected, however, by an indexation scheme that linked wages to inflation, resulting in a relatively small decline of purchasing power.

During the campaign, Labor and Likud proposed economic solutions that were not dissimilar. Labor, once a Western-type socialist party, promised to protect individual savings, lower government expenditures, end subsidies on many consumer items, and encourage export industries and foreign investment. The major differences between the two were Labor's promises to cut expenditures for Israeli troops in Lebanon, Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and state subsidies paid to institutions affiliated with Orthodox Jewish religious parties. Both Labor and Likud agreed to develop industry, to reduce spending in public and administrative sectors (including the military), to reduce private consumption, and to encourage savings.¹

Thus Prime Minister Shimon Peres's austerity program came as no surprise when it was announced in October. The public had been conditioned to expect severe belt tightening and a sharp decrease in living standards. The new measures called for an immediate \$1-billion cut in the \$23-billion budget, a one-time tax on cars and private boats and planes, a fee for once-free public education, taxes on child allowances, new medical fees, and levies on some pensions. A six-month ban on importing 50 luxury items, including whisky, was

¹For an abridged version of the National Unity government agreement, see the *Jerusalem Post* (JP), September 12, 1984.

Table 1: Israel's Eleventh Knesset

Party or Faction	Seats	Votes	1984 vote (percent)
Labor Alignment	44	724,074	34.9
Likud	41	661,302	31.9
Tehiya	5	83,037	4.0
National Religious	4	73,530	3.5
DFPE (Communists)	4	69,815	3.4
Shas	4	63,605	3.1
Shinui	3	54,747	2.6
Citizens' Rights (CRM)	3	49,698	2.4
Yahad	3	46,302	2.2
Progressive List (PLP)	2	38,012	1.8
Aguda Israel	2	36,079	1.7
Morasha	2	33,287	1.6
Tami	1	31,103	1.5
Kach	1	25,907	1.2
Ometz	1	23,895	1.2

Note: After formation of the National Unity government, the Labor Alignment split. Mapam, with six seats, joined the opposition and one member of the Labor party joined the CRM, leaving the Labor party with 37 Knesset seats. The government coalition formed by Labor and Likud consisted of 9 parties: Labor with its allies, Shinui, Yahad (Ezer Weizman), and Ometz with 44 seats; Likud and its allies, Shas, Morasha, Aguda Israel with 49 seats, and the NRP with 4 seats. The other 6 parties are Tehiya and Kach, the Communist Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE), the Mapam, the Progressive List for Peace (PLP), and Tami.

announced. Subsidies were removed from basic consumer items like frozen meat, cooking oil and margarine, gasoline and heating oil; and electric and water rates were raised. Price increases of up to 55 percent followed. The austerity measures were intended to soak up public purchasing power. But, Peres cautioned, it would be a year before Israelis could see the light at the end of the tunnel; during that time inflation might increase from 400 to 1,000 percent or more.²

The new austerity program was not without opposition. When Peres's advisers urged a two-month suspension of cost-of-living payments, the Histadrut, Israel's massive labor confederation, warned that it would not tolerate a decline in living standards. To ease matters, Prime Minister Peres said he intended to establish a joint economic council made up of government, industry, and union representatives to discuss taxes, interest rates, prices and wages. In addition, the government ordered a "giant industrial survey" as a prelude to the next phase, stimulating economic growth. Manufacturers were asked if they could double productivity and export rates, and if they would build new plants in the development towns where economic conditions were often the most harsh.

Pressures for austerity also came from the United States, Israel's major source of economic aid. The United States has given \$28 billion in aid to Israel since 1948. United States aid totaled only \$1 million in 1951, but

reached a peak of over \$4 billion in 1979. The quantum leap in aid came during the 1973 Israeli-Arab war, when the United States made large arms deliveries to Israel. Special aid packages were also part of the United States commitment in the Israel-Egyptian Camp David peace arrangements of 1978-1979. Since then, United States aid has averaged over \$2.5 billion a year, about one-fourth of total American aid disbursements.

In the months before the July election there had been a massive hemorrhage in Israel's foreign currency reserves. By election day reserves had fallen more than 10 percent below the \$3 billion considered "safe" by the country's economists; after the election reserves were depleted at an even faster rate. This led to appeals for United States emergency assistance above the \$2.6 billion promised for 1984-1985; some reports indicated that Israel was requesting grants totaling \$5 billion. These requests coincided with plans for a United States-Israel free-trade area in which all commercial transactions between the two countries would be duty free. In 1983, American exports to Israel, excluding military equipment, totaled \$1.7 billion, and imports, \$1.3 billion.³

Adding to Israel's difficulties was a report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) criticizing many Israeli banking practices and the government's management of the economy. The report pointed out that Israel has the highest per capita foreign debt in the world, and cast doubt on Israel's ability to repay its nearly \$23 billion in foreign loans.⁴

THE LEBANESE OCCUPATION

During the 1984 election campaign, the Labor party accused Likud of wasting both human and economic assets in Lebanon. The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon cost 300 fatalities, and since then the number of Israelis killed in Lebanon has doubled to 600, with total Israeli casualties climbing to more than 3,000. Many of the groups in south Lebanon who had welcomed Israel's troops in June, 1982, had become bitter antagonists; some even launched guerrilla attacks against the occupiers. Although Israeli forces had "cleaned" south Lebanon of Palestinian armed units that often preyed on the local population, the weary indigenous Lebanese wanted the Israelis to withdraw.

Like Labor, Likud had promised to "bring the boys home," but Likud set no date while Peres had promised to finish the job within six months. Withdrawal became a major priority of the new government, but shortly after he became Prime Minister Peres lengthened the evacuation period to nine months, "if possible."

In September the new government changed one of the basic requirements for leaving Lebanon when Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir stated that withdrawal was no longer conditional on the simultaneous removal of the 20,000 Syrian troops also entrenched in Lebanon. Instead, he called on the United States to facilitate an arrangement in which Syria could remain after Israel

²On October 20, 1984, *The Economist* (London) reported that Israel's annual inflation rate had increased to 900 percent.

³*Jerusalem Post International (JPI)*, no. 1,249 (October 13, 1984); *The New York Times*, August 19, 1984.

⁴*JPI*, no. 1,248 (October 6, 1984).

withdrew. Another about-face was the government's request for an increased United Nations force in Lebanon. In the past, all Israeli governments had suspected the UN and frequently accused the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) of an anti-Israel bias.

Both Labor and Likud placed great confidence in the newly formed South Lebanese Army (SLA), commanded by an ex-Lebanese army general sympathetic to Israel. The SLA is the successor to the militia led by the late Lebanese army Major Saad Haddad, a unit armed, equipped and, at times, trained by Israel. Although commanded by Lebanese Christian officers for the most part, ranks of the SLA include many Shiite and Druse villagers from the south.

THE WEST BANK

In establishing the National Unity government, Likud and Labor agreed to disagree about the future of the occupied territories. Likud's leaders were ardent Zionists whose ideological orientation called for the unification of historic *Eretz Israel* (Land of Israel). They were thus committed to annexing both the West Bank and the Gaza strip, and to increased Jewish settlement and development of the occupied territories.

Labor was divided on this issue. The left-wing Mapam party called for a complete halt to further Jewish settlement and opposed annexation. Other Labor "doves," like former Foreign Minister Abba Eban, feared that Israel's absorption of the West Bank and Gaza and their Arab population would undermine Israel's Jewish character and create a breeding ground for ethnic tensions. Zionism, argued Eban, meant the partition of Palestine, because Jewish national aspirations could be realized only if Jews and Palestinian Arabs had their own separate national territory. Others in the Labor party opposed any measures to halt further settlement in the occupied territories, some because they, too, were territorial nationalists, others for security reasons.

When the Labor government was in power between 1967 and 1977, its policy toward the West Bank was to "create new facts," that is, new Jewish settlements in strategic zones not heavily populated by Arabs. The Labor government also began to integrate the West Bank road network, the electricity grid, the water supply system, and agricultural production with Israel. Jewish business and commercial development was furthered by means of state subsidies and received legal protection from the government. As a result, there were dozens of Jewish outposts on the West Bank when Likud took over the government in 1977.

During the seven years of Likud rule, the process of integration accelerated, although Prime Minister Menachem Begin's government refrained from outright annexation (it did, however, annex the Golan Heights,

⁵Meron Benvenisti, *The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984).

which was captured from Syria in the 1967 war). By 1984, the number of Jewish settlements had tripled, from 36 to over 100, and the number of settlers had increased from about 5,000 to more than 30,000 (excluding former Jordanian Jerusalem). By 1983 all restrictions on Jewish urban settlement were removed and Jewish migration was encouraged to heavily populated Arab regions and urban centers like Hebron. New types of Jewish urban settlements were developed with government incentives, including inexpensive housing and low-cost, long-term mortgages. Housing estates were constructed only minutes away from major Jewish employment centers, including Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. With housing costs far lower than they were in large Israeli cities, many Jews seized the opportunity to obtain the new West Bank dwellings. Begin's government, in cooperation with the World Zionist Organization, envisaged a ten-year plan that called for the construction of facilities for 10,000 to 15,000 settlers annually at an estimated cost of \$1.5 billion.⁵

Likud's Jewish settlement policies were accompanied by the imposition of a tough military government on the Arab inhabitants and by government efforts to root out all support for Palestinian nationalism. Indeed, a major goal of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon was to end Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) influence in the West Bank.

As a result of government policies, overt opposition to the occupation increased, and by the 1980's, Arab violence was endangering travel in the West Bank. A handful of Jewish settlers who were critical of what they perceived to be the government's permissive attitude subsequently took the law into their own hands, organizing vigilante groups to seek retribution and to impose their version of law and order. Shortly before the 1984 election, 25 settlers were accused of organized terrorist activity; Israeli police accused them of a conspiracy to blow up mosques on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, the attempted murder of West Bank Arab mayors, the planting of bombs in five Arab-owned buses, and an attack on the Hebron Islamic College that left three Arabs dead. Several defendants were well-known leaders of West Bank Jewish settlement movements or Israeli army officers.

Most of the Hebrew press and all but a few politicians condemned the conspirators, although some right-wing leaders (like those in the Tehiya [Revival] party) compared them favorably with the Jewish underground that fought the British before Israel was established. These extremists refused to call the accused "terrorists," but saw them as misguided patriots. One leader of Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful), a militant settlers' organization, blamed the government for forcing settlers to "take the law into their own hands."

Both Labor and Likud called for the prosecution of the Jewish underground, and their agreement may have been the catalyst that facilitated new policy guidelines for the West Bank. Likud agreed to cut by approximately two-

thirds the number of settlements it had planned for the next few years; in return, Labor would refrain from any action to weaken existing settlements. The agreement stated that during the 50-month term of the unity government, "no sovereignty, Israel or other, will be applied to Judea, Samaria [West Bank] and the Gaza District."⁶ The timing of any new settlement activity would be decided by a majority of Cabinet ministers. Likud's agreement to suspend settlement temporarily was a major factor driving Tehiya (now the third largest party with five Knesset seats) into the opposition.

Israel's West Bank policies have had a far-reaching impact. They directly concern Egypt and Jordan and have influenced those nations' attitudes toward the peace process. Egypt was involved in discussions about the future of the occupied territories during the Camp David peace negotiations. The Begin government's West Bank policies were partly responsible for the later deterioration in relations between the two countries. Jordan, long perceived by Israel as the next most likely candidate for direct negotiations, regarded a West Bank solution as the key to peace with Israel.

But prospects for substantial changes in Israel's policy toward the occupied territories are not great. While some Labor leaders are willing to make concessions, they are overruled by party members who are closer to Likud on this issue. Even American pressure is unlikely to produce significant policy changes. The most hopeful pledge that United States Secretary of State George Shultz could obtain from Peres during their October, 1984, parleys in Washington, D.C., was a promise that the National Unity government would take steps to "improve the quality of life" in the West Bank.

MEIR KAHANE

Israeli attitudes toward Arab citizens of Israel and toward West Bank Arabs were brought into sharp focus by the election to the eleventh Knesset of Rabbi Meir Kahane, leader of the Kach (Thus!) party. After failing to win in previous elections, Kahane's party finally won a single seat, with nearly 26,000 votes. Because of his bizarre campaign tactics and his threats to rid the country of all Arabs, citizens and noncitizens alike, Kahane's party received media attention far exceeding the importance of his 1.2 percent of the vote. He captured the headlines for days by openly backing the Jewish terrorist ring when it came to trial and threatening to take his racist campaign to "purify" the country into the Arab villages.

Attempts by the Central Election Committee to ban the Kach party from the election were aborted by the Supreme Court, which insisted that all parties fulfilling the legal requirements were entitled to run (the Court also refused to ban the Progressive List for Peace, a new

Arab-Jewish faction that won two Knesset seats).

The Kahane phenomenon was significant because of the questions Kahane raised about the contradiction between democracy and the Jewish-Zionist character of Israel. Would it really be possible to maintain democracy, with citizenship rights for all, if Israel annexed the West Bank and its large Arab population? Could Israel remain a Jewish state when Arabs, already 17 percent of the population, outstripped Jews by virtue of high fertility rates? Should Jews and Arabs in Israel be permitted to intermarry and, if so, what would become of their "mixed-breed" offspring? Kahane openly articulated the anxieties and fears of many Israelis; he conferred legitimacy on factions like Gush Emunim and Tehiya, whose secret agendas were not so different.

Polls indicated that Kahane's ideas were popular among a far larger number of Israeli Jewish citizens than his vote reflected. One poll showed that 15 percent of all Jewish citizens supported the expulsion of the West Bank and Gaza Arabs, 43.5 percent would permit Arabs to live in Israel but without citizenship rights, and only 15.5 percent were willing to give Arabs in the occupied territories equal rights if the territories become part of Israel.⁷ Thus Kahane's campaign and election forced the issue of "racism" into the open and brought it before the Knesset. Several Knesset members subsequently introduced legislation outlawing "racism" and any activity that would generate tension between ethnic groups.

ETHNIC TENSIONS

The Kahane phenomenon was part of a larger picture that revealed increased polarization between Jews from Asia and Africa called Sephardi or Orientals, and those from Europe and America, called Ashkenazis. Polarization benefited the Kach and Tehiya parties as Oriental Jews dissatisfied with Labor and Likud turned to them. Kach was especially strong in the poorer sections of Jerusalem and in development towns with large Oriental Jewish populations. In contrast, Kach received little support from the more affluent Ashkenazi districts in the large cities.

The 1984 campaign saw less tension between Orientals and Ashkenazis than the 1981 campaign. But election results indicated that Orientals still perceived Labor as unsympathetic to their needs. Since the 1970's, there has been a steady shift of Oriental votes from Labor to Likud. Much of the rhetoric in the last two campaigns showed that Jews from Asia and Africa who are less affluent, less educated, and less well-placed in society regard Labor as

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⁶JP, September 12, 1984.

⁷Davar, August 3, 1984.

"Whenever the Lebanese ruling elements have been unwilling or unable to accommodate the grievances of opposition groups, they have directly or indirectly 'invited' the military intervention of an external power to change the status quo or to safeguard it. But the ultimate outcome has been to weaken the central government and its institutions, and has placed all the religious communities in Lebanon . . . at the mercy of the intervening external powers."

Lebanon's Continuing Conflict

BY MARIUS DEEB

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AMIN Gemayel was elected President by the Lebanese Parliament on September 21, 1982, a week after the assassination of his brother, President-elect Bashir Gemayel. During the first seven months of his term he enjoyed support that cut across sectarian lines. Those early months were also characterized by a sense of optimism that swept the country and was reflected in the many reconstruction projects, an active Beirut Stock Exchange market, and a stronger Lebanese pound vis-à-vis the United States dollar and other foreign currencies.

Several factors contributed to the undermining of Gemayel's "Salvation March" (*Masirat al-Inqadh*), namely, the relationship between his regime and both the Druse community and the Shiite slum-dwellers of the southern suburbs of Beirut, and in particular the Amal movement under the leadership of Nabih Berri.

The Druse community in Lebanon constitutes less than seven percent of the total Lebanese population, although in the Shouf and Alay regions the Druse constituted around 35 percent of the population in the early 1970's. In spite of their minority status in the Shouf and Alay, the Druse regarded these regions as their traditional strongholds and as the ancestral feudal fiefdoms of the Jumblat clan, which went back to the 17th century.¹ From the beginning of the civil strife in 1975, the Druse militia achieved control over these areas. In June, 1982, at the time of the Israeli invasion, the Christian Lebanese Forces entered the Shouf and Alay areas on the heels of the Israeli soldiers, and some politically active Christians, who had left these regions in 1975 (and later), returned.²

Understandably, the compact Druse community felt

threatened by the returning Christians and was unwilling to give up some of the political and military power it had achieved since the outbreak of the war, nor would it accept the domination of the Christian Lebanese Forces. In the eyes of the Druse, Christians had East Beirut, the regions of Kisrawan, the Northern Matn, and Jubayl, where they had reigned supreme since 1976, while the Druse had no other region to call their own but the Shouf and Alay. The Israeli invasion brought not only trouble to the Druse community, it also brought some benefits, namely, the reestablishment of links between the Lebanese Druse community and the Israeli Druse community. Those renewed links were used by the Lebanese Druse to offset any loss in military or political power incurred by the presence of the Christian Lebanese Forces in the Shouf and Alay.

By the late summer of 1982, it was clear that, unless the barracks established by the Christian Lebanese Forces were removed from the Shouf and Alay, a major confrontation between the two groups was inevitable. Fighting broke out in October, 1982, and the unsuccessful attempt on Walid Jumblat's life on December 1, 1982, portended an escalation of the war in the Shouf and Alay. Because Amin Gemayel did not control the Lebanese Forces at that time, he was unable to prevent the outbreak of the fighting. However, when faced with the impending Israeli withdrawal from the Shouf and Alay regions in the summer of 1983, Gemayel almost succeeded in reaching an agreement on the deployment of the Lebanese army there to replace the Israeli army.

A meeting was held in Paris on August 27-28, 1983, between Walid Jumblat and Gemayel's national security adviser, Wadi Haddad, which was attended by the United States special Middle East envoy, Robert McFarlane; both Lebanese and American officials later reported that an accord between Jumblat and Gemayel had been imminent.³ But Syria's attitude and developments on the ground impeded the conclusion of that agreement.

The new Lebanese government did not show any particular concern toward the Shiite slum dwellers of Beirut's southern suburbs. It sent government officials and internal security forces to demolish houses built ille-

¹Marius K. Deeb, "Lebanon: Prospects for National Reconciliation in the Mid-1980s," *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 38, no. 2 (Spring, 1984), pp. 276-278.

²The most prominent of those who returned then was Joseph al-Hashim, the head of the Shouf branch of the Phalangist party, who has been a member of the Lebanese Cabinet since September, 1984, when he replaced the late Pierre Gemayel, the founder of the Phalangist party.

³An interview with United States Ambassador Morris Draper, October, 1984; also an interview with a high-ranking Lebanese official who prefers to remain unnamed.

gally on privately owned or state-owned land; this left the squatters homeless and without alternative housing arrangements. Moreover, the Lebanese authorities were rather heavy-handed in their efforts to disarm unruly militias among the slum dwellers. It took Amin Gemayel over six months to make his first visit to the southern suburbs of Beirut in early April, 1983. Then he launched a campaign for the rehabilitation of the southern suburbs, utilizing the services of 600 Lebanese army regulars to remove debris, collect garbage, and repair power lines.⁴ However, Gemayel did not neglect the Shiite community of Lebanon as a whole; he developed strong political ties with traditional Shiite leaders like Kamel Asaad, the Speaker of the House, and the vice-chairman of the Islamic Shiite Higher Council, Sheik Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, both of whom were the bitter political rivals of Nabih Berri. It is not surprising that, as the leader of the Amal movement, a major Shiite organization, Nabih felt overlooked and became more amenable to Syrian overtures.

The Achilles' heels of the Gemayel regime were the Druse community and the Shiites of the southern suburbs of Beirut. They were both willing to use force to achieve their ends, and they were willing to ally themselves with Syria if necessary. Moreover, the Druse militias held a strategic position in the mountains east and southeast of Beirut and in its suburbs. Because of this strategic location they were able to shell the presidential palace in Baabda, the Ministry of Defense in Yarzi, the Beirut International Airport, and the city of Beirut and its hinterland.

The Shiites of the southern suburbs, on the other hand, were situated close to the airport and to all the locations where the contingents of the multinational force* were deployed. Thus the Shiite militia of the southern suburbs could, and did, overrun West Beirut, occupy the Prime Minister's office, and control the state-run television station and the state-owned radio broadcasting station.

Although Gemayel came to the presidency in the middle of a crisis, he operated as though Lebanese politics was business as usual during the first seven months of his term. In other words, he relied on political support that cut across religious lines instead of working to build a consensus. All political parties, political movements and the major political figures should have been consulted

*Editor's note: A peacekeeping force of American, French, Italian, and British troops that was deployed in Beirut at the government's request.

**Editor's note: For excerpts from the Fez proposal, see *Current History*, January, 1983, p. 33.

⁴*Monday Morning* (Beirut), vol. 12, no. 562 (April 18–24, 1983), p. 6.

⁵An interview with Ambassador Draper.

⁶Marius Deeb, "Lebanese–Syrian Relations in the Last Decades," *Politica Internazionale* (forthcoming).

⁷Marius Deeb, *The Lebanese Civil War* (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 137.

⁸*Ibid.* p. 141; Karim Baqraduni, *Al-Salam al-Mafqud*, 'Ahd Ilyas Sarkis, 1976–1982 (Beirut, n.d.), *passim*.

and drawn into the decision-making process, from the Lebanese Communist party on the extreme left to the Guardians of the Cedars on the extreme right, as long as they were willing to give up the use of violence to achieve their ends. Only that kind of consensus could have safeguarded the Gemayel regime from the interference of external powers; ultimately, that interference undermined all Gemayel's efforts to resolve the Lebanese conflict.

One of the major reasons Gemayel did not overly concern himself with the domestic situation during his first seven months in office was his belief that an agreement for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon, sponsored and guaranteed by the United States, would resolve the Lebanese conflict. He chose the American option and sought the backing of pro-Western moderate Arab states like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Morocco. Gemayel hoped that through political pressure and through negotiations the Syrians would be persuaded to withdraw. However, he ignored the fact that the military balance of power on the ground was not in his favor.

SYRIA'S ROLE

Perhaps there is some truth in the hypothesis that the Israeli–Lebanese negotiations lost momentum in the three-months delay (they began on December 28, 1982), and that the delay permitted Syria to rearm itself, with Soviet aid, after its humiliating defeat in the summer of 1982. In September, 1982, Syria had shown signs of moderation; it accepted the Fez peace plan proposed by Saudi Arabia's King Fahd in the reconvened Arab Summit held in Fez in September, although it had rejected this plan in the first inconclusive Fez Arab Summit of November, 1981.** Perhaps, as United States Ambassador Morris Draper contends, Lebanon and Syria could have reached a security agreement in the fall of 1982 if the Israeli–Lebanese negotiations had begun three months earlier.⁵

Nevertheless, Syria could have dragged its feet on the negotiations until it was able to reject the demand for the withdrawal of Syrian troops in exchange for a security agreement with Lebanon. It was necessary for Syria to keep its troops physically on Lebanese territory as the sine qua non for retaining its dominant position in Lebanese politics.⁶ It is difficult to imagine that Syria would have been willing to withdraw from Lebanon; by the end of 1976, it was "unquestionably the preponderant Arab power in Lebanon. Not even [Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser] at the peak of his power could boast of such influence on the internal affairs of Lebanon."⁷

Furthermore, during the period between 1977 and June, 1982, Lebanese President Elias Sarkis relied by and large almost entirely "on Damascus in making his major foreign and domestic political decisions."⁸ United States policy toward Lebanon from May, 1976, to June, 1982, was contingent on its support of Syria's role in Lebanon. Thus it is not surprising that Syria did not welcome the

shift in United States policy after June, 1982, in favor of the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon, including the Syrian army. It was therefore only a matter of time before Syria would act to undermine the new United States policy in Lebanon. With the bombing of the United States Embassy in Beirut, on April 18, 1983, it became clear that the whole thrust of United States policy was unacceptable to several elements in the region, including Syria, which were capable of sabotaging such a policy.

ISRAELI TROOP WITHDRAWAL

After more than four months of negotiations, the Israelis and the Lebanese reached an agreement for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon and for security arrangements to safeguard Israel's northern border. This agreement was officially signed on May 17, 1983. Although many Lebanese were not enthusiastic about the agreement, they believed that it was necessary to achieve an Israeli withdrawal. Opposition to the agreement was weak, and when it was discussed in the Lebanese Parliament during June 13–14, 1983, it was approved by 65 votes; 2 members voted against it and 4 others abstained.⁹

Only the members of the parliamentary blocs of former President Suleiman Franjieh and Prime Minister Rashid Karami absented themselves or voted against the agreement. Both Franjieh and Karami have been close to Syria, and their constituencies are in the Syrian-controlled regions of Tripoli and northern Lebanon. Walid Jumblat objected to the agreement because of the presence of the Christian Lebanese Forces in the Shouf and Alay and because he needed Syrian military and logistical support in those areas in case of a showdown with the Lebanese Forces. All the other leading political bosses,¹⁰ who controlled the major parliamentary blocs, supported the agreement.

The United States policymakers who agreed to link the Israeli withdrawal to a simultaneous Syrian withdrawal as the major condition for the implementation of the agreement (stipulated by the side letter exchanged between the United States and Israel),¹¹ gave Syria a virtual veto power. It would have been wiser if the United States had arranged for the implementation of the Israeli–Lebanese agreement on its own and had then assessed

the conditions for Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon after the Israeli withdrawal. In somewhat similar circumstances during the negotiations in January, 1974, for the first Egyptian–Israeli disengagement agreement, United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger rejected the Israeli proposal to link that agreement with the release of Israeli prisoners held in Syria because that condition would have provided Syrian President Hafez Assad with the power to veto the conclusion of the disengagement agreement.¹²

By the time the Lebanese Parliament began to discuss the Israeli–Lebanese agreement, Syria had already refused to withdraw from Lebanon; in the words of a Syrian Cabinet Minister:

Syria will not withdraw its troops from Lebanon until all Israeli troops have gone without any conditions or gains on Lebanese territory. Those who are betting on a change [in Syria's position] should save their breath, their time and their energy. We are staying in Lebanon.¹³

On July 23, 1983, the National Salvation Front was formed in Baalbak (in the Bekaa Valley) and Ihdin (in northern Lebanon), headed by Franjieh, Karami and Jumblat. Political parties that had been members of the Lebanese National Movement until its demise in the summer of 1982, like the Lebanese Communist party, the Organization for Communist Action, and the Syrian Social National party, joined the Front. And so did the Syrian-controlled Organization of the Baath party and the Arab Democratic Party.¹⁴ The charter of the newly formed National Salvation Front did not deal with political or social reforms, but focused on one issue only: the abrogation of the Israeli–Lebanese agreement of May 17, 1983.¹⁵

Syria and its allies in Lebanon had no reason to act in the summer of 1983 to block the Israeli–Lebanese agreement because it could not be implemented so long as Syria refused to accept the principle of simultaneous withdrawal. Nonetheless, the offensive against the Lebanese government and the Lebanese army was hastened for two reasons. First, as the date of the expected Israeli withdrawal from the Shouf and Alay came closer, the chances of reaching an agreement to deploy the Lebanese army in the two areas increased. Fearing that the presence of the Lebanese army in the Shouf and Alay would cut the Damascus–Beirut highway and thus block the supply route of arms to Lebanon's southern suburbs, Syria put pressure on Jumblat not to proceed in that direction.¹⁶

Suddenly, on August 28, 1983, West Beirut and the

(Continued on page 34)

⁹*Al-Nahar Al-Arabi wal-Duwalli*, vol. 7, no. 320 (June 20–26, 1983), p. 6.

¹⁰For the role of the political bosses or *Aqtab* in Lebanon, see Deeb, "Prospects for National Reconciliation in the Mid-1980s," p. 267.

¹¹George Bashir, Philip Abi 'Aql, and Fawzi Mubarak, *Umara' al-Tawa' if min Geneva ila Lausanne* (Beirut, n.d.), p. 393.

¹²Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), p. 832.

¹³*Monday Morning*, vol. 12, no. 570 (June 13–19, 1983), p. 52.

¹⁴George Bashir et al, *op.cit.*, pp. 368–369.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶An interview with a high-ranking Lebanese official who prefers to remain unnamed.

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"As 1984 drew to a close the Palestinian national movement in general and the PLO in particular were in serious disarray. Not since the aftermath of 'Black September,' 1970, . . . had prospects for the Palestinian cause appeared so bleak."

The Palestinians After Lebanon

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LAST rites are beginning to be said for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).^{*} In July, 1984, a Palestinian intellectual publicly questioned "what this whole [PLO] leadership generation is able to do." He added, "I wonder how much energy is left in them. . . . These guys are burnt-out cases. They're all children of the politics of the '50's and they're not really cultivating younger successors."¹ Around the same time, a United States State Department analyst wrote (in an unofficial capacity) that

for the foreseeable future the problems for [the] PLO . . . will remain insurmountable. And in the end . . . [the] Palestinians . . . may well be destined to join the ranks of the other unrequited national movements littering the historical landscape.²

In October, 1984, a British academic, noting that the PLO had been "tearing itself apart in futile factional infighting," asserted that "there is no evidence to suggest that the deep rifts within the organization can be repaired."³ The patient is not dead, but many political doctors believe that he is in critical condition.

Pursuing the medical metaphor, one might liken the PLO after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon to the victim of a series accident. Although young and strong, he may perish because of multiple complications resulting from his injury. In this case the external wounds have aggravated an internal malady, but the patient has been denied effective first aid from his neighbors and is now being forced to wait indefinitely for attention from the general hospital. The chief doctor there, however, would rather see the patient dead.

On the eve of Israel's June, 1982, invasion of Lebanon, the PLO was a well-established, functioning political system.⁴ To be sure, the Palestinian cause had not been

noticeably strengthened in recent years, but the "nation-building" processes within the Palestinian community were steadily advancing. The PLO governed and administered a fairly well-defined territorial entity in West Beirut and south Lebanon; it provided education, health care, pensions, and other social services; it facilitated communication and integration among the several far-flung Palestinian communities in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the Israeli-occupied territories, Kuwait and the other Gulf states, and Europe and the United States. It maintained a 15,000-man force, adequately supplied with light and medium weapons as well as some long-range artillery and missiles.

Although the PLO's budget was not known, it did not seem to be financially pressed in administering its extensive activities. During the 1970's its most notable advances had been made in the international arena, and it enjoyed widespread diplomatic support, especially from the Soviet bloc and the third world but also from Europe. But the PLO was about to suffer two catastrophic external shocks: the expulsion from Beirut in 1982 at the hands of the Israelis and the expulsion from Tripoli, Lebanon, in 1983 at the hands of the Syrians.

THE EXPULSION FROM BEIRUT

The events of the summer of 1981 and afterward apparently convinced Israeli General Ariel Sharon and others in the Israeli military-political leadership that the PLO had become unacceptably healthy. A renewal of Israeli attacks against PLO positions in south Lebanon in late May and early June escalated into a full-fledged border war marked by heavy artillery exchanges for a period of nearly two weeks in July. Although the PLO positions were nearly decimated, the Palestinians nevertheless succeeded in seriously disrupting life in northern Israel. The negotiations that ended the conflict, carried out under the auspices of United States special envoy Philip Habib, led to a de facto Israeli agreement with the PLO, contradicting Israel's basic stance toward that organization. But this agreement only exacerbated the Likud leadership's concern.⁵ Following the reelection of the Likud government in August, Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin appointed Sharon minister of defense.

At this point Israel apparently began to plan to cripple, if not liquidate, the PLO. Over the next eight months, the

^{*}I would like to acknowledge the help my research assistant, Bishara Doumani, provided for this article.

¹Herbert H. Denton, "Arafat Agrees to Rivals' Call to Limit Power," *The Washington Post*, July 1, 1984.

²Aaron Miller, "The Future of Palestinian Nationalism," *Middle East Insight*, vol. 3, no. 5 (July/August, 1984), p. 29.

³Stephen Harrison, "The Threat to Arafat from Within," *Middle East International*, October 12, 1984, p. 15.

⁴The best-informed recent analysis of the PLO is Helena Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

⁵On this shift toward belligerency in Israeli thinking, see Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 36-39.

PLO's ability to enforce observance of the agreement, thus enhancing its international credibility, may have further contributed to Israel's determination to destroy it once and for all. After at least two near-alerts and false starts, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon began on June 6, triggered by the attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador in London by a renegade Palestinian organization headed by Abu Nidal.

By June 16 the Israelis had pushed up the coast all the way to the edges of the airport south of Beirut, overcoming determined PLO and allied Lebanese militia resistance, especially in the refugee camps around Tyre and Sidon. In the central mountain sector, they had reached the presidential palace in Baabda east of Beirut, linking up with Christian militia forces and then moving into friendly East Beirut and the Maronite enclave to the north. In the eastern sector, Israeli troops engaged the Syrians, destroying their missile defenses and dislodging their ground forces. After a period of diplomatic activity and the bombardment of West Beirut, on July 2 the Israelis imposed a total blockade on West Beirut. There some 13,000 PLO fighters along with their Lebanese allies in the "Joint Forces" managed to hold the Israeli forces at bay for 70 days. On August 21, under an agreement engineered by Habib, the first of the PLO fighters were evacuated, and by September 2 the last Palestinian guerrillas had left, dispersed to six Arab countries—Jordan, Iraq, South Yemen, Syria, Sudan, and Tunisia.

The Palestinian fighters left in an atmosphere of triumph; they could say that they had fought creditably against a far more powerful adversary, holding out longer than any combination of Arab armies in past wars with Israel. They also thought they had secured American guarantees for the protection of the 400,000 Palestinian civilians left behind. Scarcely were the PLO fighters gone, however, when the guarantees they thought they had secured were proved worthless. On September 14, the day after the departure of the last members of the multinational force brought in to supervise the PLO exodus, Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel was assassinated. In quick succession, the Israeli army entered West Beirut and Christian Phalangist militiamen, with at least indirect Israeli support, entered the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps and massacred many hundreds of Palestinian and Lebanese residents.⁶

Controversy still surrounds the extent of Israeli involvement,⁷ but for present purposes it is more important to record that the massacres weakened Palestinian respect for the PLO leadership: many people criticized PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat for having trusted the Americans. The Sabra and Shatila massacres under-

scored the magnitude of the PLO defeat. Bereft of a territorial base and strategic position, its social and cultural institutions traumatized, its military capacity drained, and deprived of much of the political weight it had enjoyed in the Arab world and abroad, the PLO leadership was vulnerable to a second challenge: a rebellion by dissident leaders of Fatah (the major political-military organization in the PLO) actively supported by Syria's President Hafez Assad.

THE EXPULSION FROM TRIPOLI

It would be a serious oversimplification to equate the Israeli and the Syrian assaults on the PLO. The Israelis wanted to liquidate the "terrorist" organization and with it any organized Palestinian claim to the Israeli-occupied territories or to pre-1967 Israel. The Syrians, on the other hand, were "friendly" enemies, aiming to control, not destroy, the PLO and the Palestinian cause either by replacing Yasir Arafat as chairman or by sharply curbing his authority. The Syrian leaders were not alone in this objective: the shock of Beirut, the soul-searching that accompanied it, and Arafat's post-Beirut diplomacy had led a significant number of Palestinian activists and militants to demand changes in the PLO's leadership and policies. The Israeli invasion did not itself create these discontents—many of them already existed—but it strengthened them.

Today, both Syrian and Palestinian officials acknowledge that their relationship, despite their "unity of goals," has deteriorated. Their problems go back at least as far as 1970–1971 when the Syrians (from the Palestinian viewpoint) refused to provide the assistance the Palestinians needed to help them avoid defeat by Jordanian King Hussein's army. Worse still, in 1976 pitched battles broke out between Palestinian and Syrian army forces in Lebanon when Syria intervened to halt the PLO–Lebanese National Movement offensive against the Maronite militias. In the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the PLO leadership was bitter about Syria's acceptance of a cease-fire with Israel after only six days and its subsequent tepid diplomatic and material support. Personal animosity between Arafat and Assad further complicated the relationship.

In light of this history it is not surprising that Arafat decided to snub the Syrians by moving his base of operations to Tunis rather than to Damascus after the PLO expulsion from Beirut. In selecting Tunis, Arafat was placing a higher priority on PLO independence (since Tunisia was in no position to exert "tutelage") than on maintaining a strategic proximity to "occupied Palestine" and the major Palestinian population concentrations in and around it. The Syrians, for their part, were reportedly outraged; for them, the Palestinian question was (and is) too important ideologically and strategically to be left to the PLO under Arafat's leadership. Syria's strength and position were underlined by the fact that some 8,000 of the 13,000 Palestinian fighters evacuated

⁶For the official Israeli investigation of the massacre, see *The Beirut Massacre: The Complete Kahan Commission Report* (New York: Karz-Cohl, 1983).

⁷See, Schiff and Ya'ari, *op. cit.*, Amnon Kapeliouk, *Sabra et Chatila: enquête sur un massacre* (Paris: Seuil, 1982), and Noam Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle* (Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1983).

from Beirut were sent to Syria, and many of them returned to those parts of eastern Lebanon controlled by Syria.

Far more important than the location of Arafat's office in precipitating the current Syrian-Palestinian quarrel was Arafat's post-Beirut diplomacy. On September 1, 1982, United States President Ronald Reagan proposed an initiative for resolving the Palestine issue. It denied Israel's right to the occupied territories, but it also rejected the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and called for a Jordanian role in governing the occupied territories. Battered by the Israelis and squeezed by the Syrians, the PLO was now confronted—perhaps tempted as well—by this unexpected American effort to revive what had long been known as “the Jordanian option.”

During late 1982 and early 1983, Arafat and trusted colleagues like Khaled Hassan explored whether coordination with Jordan that might allow movement within the terms of the Reagan initiative was possible. The 1968 Palestine National Charter, the 1982 Arab summit meeting in Fez, Morocco (concluded just after the Reagan proposal was announced), and the February, 1983, meeting of the Palestine National Council (PNC) in Algiers had all insisted on the basic goal of self-determination and a sovereign Palestinian state.

Despite all this, and despite the fact that the Israeli government had immediately and categorically rejected the Reagan plan, Palestinian and Jordanian intellectuals studied various historical models of political association and integration (like the Austro-Hungarian empire) in search of a mutually acceptable Jordanian-Palestinian confederation that might satisfy the Americans. According to Abu Iyad, a member of the inner circle of Fatah/PLO leadership, Arafat was encouraged to pursue his discussions with the Jordanians because some of his advisers had convinced him that the United States was willing to play an active role, even to the point of pressuring Israel into a cooperative stance; the evidence was to be a successful United States effort to withdraw the Israelis and the Syrians from Lebanon.⁸

The United States effort with regard to Lebanon was moving much more slowly in February and March than the PLO leaders had anticipated, and Washington was refusing to issue even some symbolic statement of flexibility on Palestinian rights (despite Jordanian requests). Nonetheless, Arafat persisted to the point of initialing an agreement with King Hussein in April, 1983. But ever mindful of the need for consensus he took it back to Kuwait for the Fatah leadership's approval. When his colleagues refused to endorse his diplomacy, Arafat backed off and refused to sign. The collapse of his initiative left the PLO chief falling between two stools. By engaging in the dialogue with Hussein he had deepened the suspicion of the militants in Fatah and elsewhere in the Palestinian movement and he had further angered the

Syrians. But by breaking off talks he had lost credibility with Palestinian moderates and important international actors like Jordan and the United States, and even doves in Israel.

At the same time, Arafat's actions on the organizational level exacerbated tensions in the PLO. Aware that important figures long opposed to his leadership style were regrouping in the wake of Beirut, Arafat issued 52 directives, many designed to reward loyalists with influential new posts and strengthen his hold on the PLO's military and civilian bureaucracy. The promotion of two PLO officers who had abandoned their commands in south Lebanon as the Israelis approached may have precipitated the open rebellion in Fatah that broke out around May 9 in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley of Lebanon. It was the first time that sustained, organized military conflict had broken out in the core organization of the PLO. Repeated, frantic efforts to mediate the dispute failed.

Syria, officially neutral in what it declared was an internal Palestinian dispute, is widely thought to have assisted the anti-Arafat rebels; although it had the power to do so it certainly did not curb the rebels. Arafat himself went to Damascus but was publicly critical of the Syrians; thus on June 24, 1983, he was summarily ordered out of the country. As the rebellion persisted over the summer, Arafat secretly returned to Tripoli, Lebanon, in a surprise move in mid-September to lead his forces in person. Eventually Arafat and his men found themselves besieged in Tripoli and by December, the siege of Tripoli was looking uncannily like the earlier siege of Beirut, with the Syrians and their Palestinian surrogates ironically playing the role of the Israel Defense Force. Finally, on December 20, Arafat and his remaining followers managed to escape from Tripoli, with help from friendly Arab governments and the United Nations.

As if to show his enemies and the world that he was still capable of ripostes and surprises, Arafat headed straight for Egypt, where he met with President Hosni Mubarak. The leader of the only Arab country to have a peace treaty and normal diplomatic relations with Israel was embraced by the embattled leader of the PLO. It was a bravura gesture that won Arafat considerable admiration from Palestinian and Arab pragmatists and probably enhanced his personal authority. But it increased the hostility of his enemies in Syria and in the militant ranks of Fatah and other important PLO groups.

THE STRUGGLE TO RECOVER

In the opinion of many observers, 1984 was the year in which the PLO's future would become evident: either the patient would begin to recover or he would continue to sink into a terminal condition. A key indicator was whether the PNC would be able to meet. It was believed that Arafat was strong enough to force the issue and win a vote of confidence, but this might be a Pyrrhic victory if the rebels could win over influential organizations like the

⁸Personal interview with Abu Iyad, Kuwait, March 8, 1984.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), now grouped together in the "Democratic Alliance." The PFLP, led by George Habash, and the DFLP, led by Nayef Hawatmeh, both commanded considerable Palestinian respect.

Toward the year's end there were signs that Arafat was preparing to take the risk of convening a PNC meeting, perhaps in Amman, presumably in the belief that the PLO might achieve its twin goals. One was to preserve its independence of decision making; the other was to make at least some tangible progress toward Palestinian rights by aligning the PLO with Jordan, Egypt, and other "centrist" Arab regimes close to the United States instead of submitting to rebel and Syrian conditions for reconciliation—conditions that included Arafat's removal from power.

RECONCILIATION EFFORTS

Back in Tunis after his post-Tripoli visits to Egypt and North Yemen, Yasir Arafat immediately tried to reestablish his authority and reunify Palestinian ranks; he was more successful at the former than the latter. In January, 1984, the Fatah Central Council expelled Colonel Said Musa (better known as Abu Musa) and four other Syrian-backed Fatah rebels. Arafat dispatched delegations to Damascus and Riyadh to renew the dialogue with Assad. In February, Farouk Qaddumi, head of the PLO's political department, traveled to Damascus. Early in March, senior Fatah leaders were hearing from Syrian officials privately that Damascus was reassessing its support for the rebels, realizing that it might have driven Arafat to his meeting with Mubarak.

But repeated PLO-Syrian discussions during the year essentially failed, and by early October the impasse appeared to be total. President Assad presented three conditions for reconciliation: (1) an agreement between Fatah and the Fatah dissidents; (2) a commitment that the PNC avoid meeting for three months after such an agreement were concluded; and (3) Arafat's resignation before the PNC meeting. To Arafat and his followers three "impossible" demands made it clear that Assad had no immediate interest in settling the problem.

Arafat, for his part, continued to demonstrate his independence in a manner that the dissidents and the Syrians could only consider provocative. In March, he went to Amman and met with King Hussein, mending the rift resulting from the dramatic breakdown of talks the year before. He also was reportedly active in supporting the restoration of official relations between Egypt and Jordan

⁹For an excerpt from the text of the April 22 statement, see *The Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 13, no. 4 (Summer, 1984), pp. 208–209.

¹⁰See "Text of the Palestinian Political and Organizational Agreements," Palestine Information Office, Washington, D.C., July 13, 1984, summarized in *Palestine Perspectives* (Washington, D.C.: Palestine Research and Educational Center, August/September, 1984), pp. 4–5.

in September. Like his surprise meeting with Mubarak in December, 1983, Arafat's actions, designed to appeal to "moderate" Palestinian and international opinion, demonstrated to the militants that "the old man" (as he is affectionately called by many Palestinians) was not only unrepentant but was still flirting with the advocates of a "peace process," which (in their view) inevitably would prevent the achievement of the fundamental and sacred goals of self-determination and sovereign statehood.

Throughout 1984, most of the attention and organizational capabilities of the PLO were devoted to these fruitless efforts at reconciliation. This preoccupation inevitably weakened the PLO. Yet it was undoubtedly true, as Abu Iyad argued, that in the long run the PLO would have no power without unity. At the end of March, in Aden, South Yemen, four Damascus-based left-wing Palestinian organizations (with evident Syrian approval) met with Fatah loyalists. This was the first of a series of meetings that finally, in July, resulted in a formal agreement. These four groups—known collectively as the Democratic Alliance—consisted of the PFLP, the DFLP, the Palestinian Communist party (PCP), and the small Palestine Liberation Front (PLF).

Not taking part in these talks were the Fatah rebels of Abu Musa (known now as the *Intifada*, or "upheaval") and other groups controlled by Syria—the *Saiga* guerrilla organization, the Popular Front-General Command (PFGC) of Ahmad Jibril, and the small Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF); together, these groups were known as the National Alliance. It was the groups of the National Alliance that had taken up arms against Arafat's loyal units in Lebanon; the groups in the Democratic Alliance, however, had remained neutral, even though they shared many rebel complaints about Arafat's policies and leadership.

The March meeting in Aden did not result in agreement between Fatah and the Democratic Alliance, but the two groups did agree to meet again. At a second meeting in Algiers in April, the parties moved somewhat closer together: a joint statement on April 22 endorsed the resolutions of the last PNC meeting (in Algiers, February, 1983), rejected again the Camp David accords and the Reagan plan, and "stressed the need to escalate all forms of Palestinian national struggle, in particular armed struggle."⁹ Agreement on the main divisive issues still eluded the negotiators, but it was agreed that discussion should continue.

A comprehensive agreement finally emerged from two meetings, in Aden on June 26 and in Algiers shortly thereafter. The document, signed in Algiers on July 13, 1984, was hailed by Arafat's deputy, Abu Jihad, as "a new page" in the Palestinian struggle.¹⁰ The DFLP and especially the PFLP were more restrained in their evaluations.

The political provisions of the Aden/Algiers document called for intensifying the resistance in the Israeli-occupied territories; the document also criticized Arafat's

visit to Cairo, insisted that relations with Jordan not detract from the PLO's status as sole representative of the Palestinian people, condemned the resort to arms as a means of settling intra-Palestinian disputes, affirmed the necessity of good Palestinian-Syrian relations, and supported the "Lebanese nationalist-Palestinian-Syrian alliance" to guarantee the security of Palestinians and their rights to engage in political action in Lebanon. On the organizational level, an attempt was made to curb Arafat's freedom of action by asking the Executive Committee to elect two new deputy chairmen. The Palestine Communist party was recognized for the first time and would henceforth be represented in the PNC. It was also agreed that the seventeenth meeting of the PNC would be convened on September 15, 1984, "at the latest"; but two months later it had not been able to meet.

Three months after the Aden/Algiers agreement, observers were increasingly skeptical about whether a genuine accord had been reached. Arafat himself did not appear notably restrained, despite the criticism of his policies implicit in the document. He did not retract an important statement he had made to the European press in May calling for direct talks with Israel. Nor did he slacken the pace of his ongoing discussions with the Jordanian authorities. While the Democratic Alliance groups remained fairly silent, the National Alliance groups and the Syrian government continued their harsh criticism.

In an interview in *Le Monde* on August 2, President Assad reiterated Syria's special responsibility for the Palestinian cause and again criticized Arafat personally.¹¹ Moreover, the conditions for reconciliation conveyed by Assad to the PLO in September suggest that he was not satisfied with the apparent concessions Arafat made in the Aden/Algiers accord. The PLO's recovery, therefore, appeared to depend heavily on whether the all-important "swing bloc"—the Democratic Alliance—would swing clearly toward Arafat in Tunis or toward Assad in Damascus.

As 1984 drew to a close the Palestinian national movement in general and the PLO in particular were in serious disarray. Not since the aftermath of "Black September," 1970, when the guerrillas were expelled from Jordan, had prospects for the Palestinian cause appeared so bleak. On the political level, the Israelis had destroyed the PLO position and infrastructure in south Lebanon and Beirut. The Syrians had delivered a series of shocks, especially in the Bekaa Valley and Tripoli. The United States had maintained the anti-PLO hard-line established earlier by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Virtually without exception, the Arab states had shown themselves unwilling or unable to help the PLO in the siege of Beirut, and

PLO officials admitted privately that the organization's influence on the Arab regional scene had declined sharply.

On the organizational level, the issue of Arafat's leadership was far from settled. The PLO's dilemma was acute: drop Arafat—the hero of the siege of Beirut, who after two decades of leadership was an institution unto himself—and suffer a collapse of morale, financial support, influence, and probably independence; or keep Arafat and risk continuing internal polarization, conflict and external hostility from Syria. Despite his personal reputation, Arafat's management practices had been criticized long before the May, 1983, rebellion; many of his brightest young associates were disillusioned with what they saw as his impulsive, poorly organized, nonconsultative style. In addition, they felt that he and his closest colleagues had become overly enamored of the perquisites of leadership, too susceptible to the temptations and pressures of diplomacy, and less sensitive than they should have been to their Palestinian constituency. How frequently in recent years young Palestinians commented that the PLO had become "just another Arab regime."

A possibly ominous sign of the PLO's declining fortunes was Arafat's curtailment of military expenditures in June, 1983. All allowances (including cost of living allowances) for fighters beyond basic salaries were canceled; fighters who had enlisted after September, 1983, were released; and military recruitment was terminated.¹² Budget figures for the PLO are closely guarded, so it is difficult to ascertain whether these decisions indicate a financial squeeze or whether they are another tactical move on Arafat's part to promote his diplomatic approach and improve his leadership position. Whatever the explanation, however, the curtailments could hardly be seen as a sign of vitality.

From a Palestinian point of view, however, the picture was by no means entirely bleak. If the PLO had suffered setbacks, so had the Palestinians' principal enemies, the United States and Israel. The fiasco of United States policy in Lebanon, furthermore, suggested that the ability of the United States to manipulate conditions in the Arab world to suit its larger interests might be more limited than had been suspected. A corollary trend, the enhancement of Soviet influence in the region, was also welcomed by the Palestinians.

As for Israel, Sharon's adventure in Lebanon had

(Continued on page 38)

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¹¹Andre Fontaine, "An Interview with Syria's President Assad," *Le Monde* (Paris), August 2, 1984; excerpts reprinted in the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, August 12, 1984.

¹²See Ibrahim Abu Nab, "The PLO: Reconciliations?" *Middle East International*, July 13, 1984, pp. 7-9.

"The Mubarak regime seems to be stable, but continuity has been secured by sacrificing reform By shelving the issue of reform, the Egyptians may find themselves facing repression and the widening of the socioeconomic gap between the rich and the poor—the two dark sides of Nasserism and Sadatism."

Mubarak's Egypt

BY HAMIED ANSARI

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CONTINUITY and change have remained at the forefront of the political controversy in Egypt since Hosni Mubarak assumed power in 1981. The Nasserists and the leftists see continuity along the reformist lines that President Gamal Abdel Nasser initiated in the early 1960's to bridge the socioeconomic gap by redistributive and welfare-oriented policies. For the rightists among the prerevolutionary elites who gathered around the New Wafd party, continuity means strengthening the liberalization trends introduced by President Anwar Sadat in the mid-1970's, while avoiding the policies that led to repression and religious extremism toward the end of his rule.

These elements on the left and right of the political spectrum must be distinguished from the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic groups (*Jamaat*), who have advanced unrealistic notions about establishing a temporal authority patterned on Islamic ideals. In contrast, continuity for the power holders and vested interests in the huge government bureaucracy, the ruling party and the People's Assembly means the stability and legitimacy of the existing political order.

For the opposition, change means not only change in policy orientation to conform to some idealized notions of previous patterns of rule; it means change in the composition of state institutions. In fact, the opposition believes that the two are linked and that the attempts of government spokesmen to treat institutions and policy orientation as two separate issues have as their basic aim the safeguarding of entrenched interests.

The controversy over continuity and change is related to the nature of the political system and, more specifically, to the political formula that the army officers devised when they assumed power after a military coup in 1952.¹ Opposition to the military oligarchy has always been urban-based, while support for the various regimes established since then has come from rural areas. As a consequence, the institutions that emerged under military

rule came to reflect a rural bias. The single-party system under Nasser and the controlled multiparty system under Sadat mobilized the traditional elements in the rural areas, the village heads and rural notables, in support of the power holders at the center, while the prerevolutionary elites among the Wafd or the outlawed political movements like the Muslim Brotherhood were excluded.

This formula explains the continuity reflected in the composition of state institutions and the measure of stability, if not legitimacy, that the ruling elites continued to enjoy despite sudden shifts in policy orientation.

The political formula, however, set critical limits on the ability of the ruling elites to pursue their policy objectives. The failure of the socialist experiment under Nasser and the liberal experiment under Sadat can be understood in light of the tension in the relations between policy objectives and considerations of rule. The crises of political development in Egypt in the past 20 years have arisen when political considerations assumed ascendancy over declared policy objectives. The socialist crisis in the mid-1960's was a result of Nasser's failure to maintain economic growth and equity. In consequence, Nasser retreated from a policy based on radical solutions to a policy of social inequality, although rhetoric about the socialist transformation continued to dominate the 1960's.

The second crisis was brought about by Sadat's economic and political liberalization plans whose adverse effects were first manifest in the food riots of January, 1977. The reverses that the liberalization plans encountered climaxed in the suppression of the newly emergent New Wafd, the Bar Association, the press syndicate and, finally, the general clampdown on the religious and secular opposition in September, 1981. A month later, President Sadat was assassinated by an Islamic militant group.

Thanks to traditional support, both Nasser and Sadat were able to shift their political orientations with little threat to the continuity of their political order. Nevertheless, the alliance with traditional elites was maintained at the cost of social and economic reform. The crises are referred to by the Egyptians as *al-Tariq al-Masduq* (the blocked path) to dramatize the failure of the socialist and liberal orders.²

The consequences of the first crisis were concealed by

¹Leonard Binder, *In A Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power of the Second Stratum* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978).

²See Muhammad Asfur's comment on the "blocked path" in *al-Sha'b*, May 17, 1983. Also, Hasan Nafia in *al-Ahram*, February 25, 1983.

the trauma of Egypt's defeat in the 1967 June War. As a result of this war, Egypt lost the Sinai Peninsula to Israeli forces in a lightening strike that left Egypt's leadership paralyzed and the whole country vulnerable. The Suez Canal was closed, and Egypt gradually gravitated toward greater dependence on Soviet military aid and diplomatic support. Internally, Nasser turned from radical attempts to redress socioeconomic inequities through centralized planning and control, and reluctantly abandoned plans to dispossess the rich by means of nationalization, sequestration and confiscation.

The March 30 Statement (1968), which was meant to outline the program for rehabilitating a war-torn economy, settled for the time being the controversy over change and continuity by asserting that change in policy rather than change in the composition of state institutions was needed. In this statement, the regime promised to uphold the supremacy of the law, political participation and economic liberalization. This was the beginning of talk about the open society, *al-Mujtama al-Maftuh*, to dramatize the shift from egalitarian and welfare-oriented policies to a policy that tried to encourage savings and investment. With the withdrawal of American aid from Egypt and the dwindling of all Western aid to a trickle, Nasser had to abandon egalitarianism.

AFTER NASSER

Nasser died in September, 1970, and the hallowed principles of pan-Arabism and socialism—the main pillars of Nasserism—died with him. Most Egyptians who debated the causes of the 1967 war defeat agreed that absence of political participation had left vital national decisions in the hands of a single person. This led Anwar Sadat to pursue a policy of economic and political liberalization. Armed with the confidence generated by Egypt's self-perceived successes in the 1973 October War, Sadat began to implement his liberalization plans gradually and incrementally. His first step was the adoption of the Open Door policy, *Siyasat al-Infitah*, as the official doctrine of the new economic and political order. *Infitah* aimed at attracting foreign capital and removing some of the controls that had impeded the growth of the private sector. This Open Door policy was followed by the adoption of a controlled multiparty system to replace the single-party organization. The climax in Sadat's efforts to liberalize the political order was the 1978 formation of the New Wafd, led by the prerevolutionary elites whom Nasser had attempted to neutralize by means of political disenfranchisement and agrarian reform.

Despite its liberal outlook, the Sadat regime continued to pursue policies that ultimately derailed the liberal experiment. At the outset of his rule, Sadat nursed bitter feelings against his rivals, including Ali Sabri and the group that tried to invoke Nasser's legacy in order to control the new policies. Sadat crushed this rival group in the Corrective Movement in May, 1971. But thereafter he followed an ill-advised strategy; he tried to counter the

Nasserists and leftists in general by cultivating the urban Islamic *Jamaat* as well as his traditional rural support. However, Sadat was forced to stop encouraging the Islamic *Jamaat* when they began to turn their hostility toward the state. Sadat's economic liberalization schemes also seemed to contradict his repeated pledges to adhere to Nasser's socialist measures. The Sadat regime continued to announce its commitment to socialist gains, which included minimum wages, the ceilings on land-ownership imposed by the agrarian reforms, and provision for 50 percent representation for peasants and workers in all representative institutions.

The political formula based on traditional support in the rural areas persisted, despite Sadat's attempt at political liberalization, including the emergence of semi-competitive, albeit urban-based, political parties. Sadat's political formula explains why the opposition parties, including the newly emergent and reconstituted New Wafd, failed to provide a platform that would match the ruling party's overwhelming strength. In 1976, Sadat ordered the formation of three parties: the National Unionist Progressive party (Tajamu), the Liberal Socialist party, and the Socialist party (Hizb Misr) to represent the left, right and center of the political spectrum. The Socialist party enjoyed an overwhelming majority in the People's Assembly because it was identified as the party of the government and because the traditional elites and entrenched interests strongly supported it. Thus, when Sadat decided to create a party of his own—the National Democratic party (NDP), all the Socialist party members flocked to the new party and both the Socialist party and its leader, Mamdouh Salem, sank into political oblivion. The main threat to the political formula came from the New Wafd after its formation in 1978 and from the Bar Association, which was closely linked with the New Wafd. The formation of the New Wafd caused a great deal of excitement and received popular and traditional support, which was why Sadat hastily called for its dissolution (it lasted 100 days). To all intents and purposes, the ruling party came to reflect Nasser's single-party system behind a liberal mask.

Sadat's actions appeared to the public as the antithesis of Nasserism. Desequestration and the restoration of property to its former owners ran counter to the sequestration and confiscation inspired by the radical ideals that were dominant in the early 1960's. Sadat's regime approved the supremacy of institutions and the rule of law instead of the arbitrary exercise of power and repression. The concept of social peace came to replace the ideal of social justice.

Because of these contrasts, some Egyptian intellectuals began to draw unrealistic distinctions between the Nasser and Sadat regimes. President Mubarak himself believed that his actions were being judged in the light of the conflicting policies of his predecessors. He expressed his own dilemma in these words: "If I take one action, it would be interpreted as that of Nasser; if I take another, it

would be interpreted as Sadat's."³ To establish his authority, Mubarak had to prove that he was not a hostage of the past; he had to emerge from the shadow of both his predecessors. But the Egyptian public still sees Mubarak as the second-man, whose selection was determined by fidelity to his mentor and his lack of ambition.

MUBARAK'S LEADERSHIP

Still, Mubarak has the potential to assert his own leadership. He has fewer rivals to contend with and is encumbered by fewer obstacles than those that plagued Sadat. And he is free of the lingering effects of Nasserism. Mubarak is also fortunate that he does not have to face the reality of defeat and the Israeli occupation.

Nonetheless, Mubarak inherited difficult problems, including widening socioeconomic gaps between the rich and the poor, the steady influx of rural migrants into the cities that fuels the Islamic militant movement, and greater dependence on American and Western economic support. In addition, Mubarak faces the unenviable task of eliminating the negative impact of the Camp David peace accords, particularly Egypt's estrangement from the rest of the Arab world. Jordan's restoration of diplomatic relations with Egypt has recently opened the door a crack for a general rapprochement.

In the first few months of his presidency, Mubarak cultivated the illusion that he was on the side of all groups and classes, with the exception of the extremists in the Islamic *Jamaat* and the Coptic minority. He held out an olive branch to domestic opposition and invited the leading members of the secular and religious opposition (who had been imprisoned by Sadat in the wake of the September, 1981, crackdown) to the presidential palace on the day of their release from prison in November, 1981. Mubarak made it clear that there would be no return to repression. He promised that he would let the opposition express its legitimate interests and hold regular meetings. But with characteristic indecisiveness, Mubarak wavered over rescinding the laws that curtailed personal freedom, and he refused to end the state of emergency imposed in the wake of Sadat's assassination.

Mubarak also assured the entrenched interests in his administration and the foreign powers, including the Israelis, that he would honor and abide by the spirit of Camp David. He wanted to assure his Arab detractors that they must reconcile themselves to reality. Yet he began to discuss nonalignment in tones reminiscent of Nasser, paid official visits to nonaligned countries, attended the nonaligned conference in New Delhi, and withdrew the Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June, 1982. Mubarak

also continued to provide diplomatic and military support to Iraq in its war with Iran. He thus appeared to be currying favor with the moderate Arabs.

Internally, Mubarak began to distance himself from the influential members of the ruling party—the National Democratic party (NDP)—who had attracted notoriety because of the corrupt and illegitimate means by which they had amassed their wealth. Some members were Sadat's close relatives, including his brother, Essmat Sadat, Uthman Ahmad Uthman, the famous contractor, and Sayyid Mari, the former speaker of the People's Assembly. Under the slogan of *al-Tahara* (Purity), the new regime razed the rest houses that had been illegally constructed on the rich archeological site of the Pyramid Plateau in Giza, including Mubarak's own stone villa and the adjoining villa that had belonged to Sadat.

Mubarak's next step was to order the prosecution of the "fat cats" in the private sector and in his own ruling party. The first to be put on trial was Rashad Uthman, the NDP's secretary for food security in Alexandria and a member of the People's Assembly. The trial revealed that, by illegal means and through his connections with Cabinet ministers and the governor of Alexandria, Rashad Uthman had accumulated a personal fortune amounting to 50 million Egyptian pounds since the onset of the *Infitah*.⁴ Earlier, he had been a dockworker who had slowly worked his way up the economic ladder by such illegal means as smuggling and trafficking in hashish and other illicit drugs. After Rashad Uthman, Sadat's brother was also prosecuted and the names of key ministers and bureaucrats who had helped him were revealed. These revelations led to a minor Cabinet reshuffle in April, 1982; but only five ministers left the Cabinet, much to the disappointment of those who were clamoring for radical change.

Mubarak's fight against corruption coincided with a unique conference held in November, 1981, which was attended by 250 social scientists and experts to discuss hypocrisy as a widespread social and political disease.⁵ There were Nasserists who continued to espouse the hopes of reforms and social justice. There were also Wafdists, who believed that the panacea for all ills lay in the establishment of a democratic order. More ingenious Egyptians who identified themselves as social democrats expressed a firm belief in the possibility of reconciling Nasser's social justice with Sadat's liberalism.

Most opposition members, however, began to hope that Mubarak would distance himself from the rank and file of the NDP. The opposition believed that Mubarak should not identify himself with any party and should instead become an arbiter among all parties. The NDP's leadership responded that it was wishful thinking on the part of the opposition to hope to separate Mubarak from the party that he had helped create under the direction of Sadat.

For his part, Mubarak affirmed continuity on the path of Sadat. He warned against discarding the past, *Nabsh*

³In *al-Ahram*, October 5, 1982.

⁴*Mayo*, December 21, 1981.

⁵Statement by Usama al-Bazz in *al-Misa'*, November 23, 1981. See also the criticism levied by Ibrahim Saada against the hypocrites who change color with every new President in *Mayo*, March 15, 1982.

al-Madi, and rejected the opposition's insinuation that fighting corruption meant discarding the Open Door policy. He also affirmed his belief in the NDP when its rank and file convened a conference in January, 1982, to offer him the party leadership. Some of the opposition's hopes for an early end to repression were dissipated, and observers warned that the countdown for another September—an allusion to Sadat's crackdown on the opposition in September, 1981—had begun.⁶

A conference convened in February, 1982, reaffirmed the mixed nature of the economy. It recommended centralized control and planning, and emphasized the productive aspects of the policy of *Infitah* and curtailment of luxury imported goods. The subsidy system was to be maintained, but no attempt was made to make sure that subsidies went to those for whom they were intended. Today, the subsidy is available to everyone, including the affluent. With an increase in the urban population and declining agricultural production—Egypt imports about 40 percent of its food requirements—the direct subsidies amounted to \$2 billion in 1983, of which the wheat subsidy alone came to \$400 million.

Contradictions remain in the countryside. Agricultural production is impeded by parallel markets. One is a free market for cash crops, and the other is the traditional market, with government-regulated field crops whose prices are kept below the free market rate. Rent controls lead to tension between tenants and landlords. In sum, the socialist and capitalist modes exist alongside each other in an uneasy imbalance. The economic system needs reform but, as observers have cautioned, sound economic policies do not necessarily go hand in hand with sound politics.⁷

For the time being, Mubarak is following his predecessor's policy by maintaining both the *Infitah* and a welfare-oriented policy whose combined effects are reflected in severe balance of payments deficits that increase Egyptian dependence on American and Western support.

The contrast between a stable political order and unstable social and economic conditions becomes obvious when the political changes introduced by Mubarak are examined. The result of these changes is the affirmation of the existing political order. The changes are apparent in the new electoral procedures under which the elections to the People's Assembly were held in May, 1984. The new procedures shrank the electoral districts from 176 to 48, and for the first time proportional representation and voting by party slate were adopted instead of elections by absolute majority in the traditional two-member districts. The opposition parties viewed the new electoral procedures as a way to secure adequate representation in the Assembly elections in May, 1984, despite a clause that limited party representation to eight percent of the votes cast. As a result of these changes, the number of seats in the Assembly increased from 382 to 448. The distribution

of seats in the Assembly continued to reflect rural bias, but because of the introduction of proportional representation and voting by party slate, some observers formed the erroneous impression that the electoral system would no longer be subject to traditional influence.

Furthermore, after many court battles the Mubarak regime allowed the New Wafd to reconstitute itself under the leadership of the prerevolutionary elite guards. The regime continued to deny official recognition to the Muslim Brotherhood, but did not oppose the electoral alliance forged between the Brotherhood and the New Wafd. The other parties participating in the May elections were the ruling NDP, the Labor party, the Liberal party and the left-wing Tajamu. All four parties had been created by Sadat in the period between 1976 and 1979 and had never totally escaped the stigma of their origins. The major departure from previous patterns of Egyptian elections was the emergence of the New Wafd as a political force; this led some Egyptians to hope that Egypt was on the threshold of a far-reaching change.

The alliance between the New Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood was a marriage of convenience to improve the former's electoral chances, but it caused the defection of liberals and secularists. Judging from the results, the Wafdist leadership had miscalculated the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood among the urban lower middle classes and the rural migrants. Nonetheless, the Wafdist were not the only ones who found the appeal to religion too strong to resist. All the parties contesting the elections, including the NDP, committed themselves to uphold the *Shariah* (Islamic laws). The NDP further appealed to the ideals of the 23rd of July Revolution (1952) against the Pasha class and the bourgeoisie, who stood behind the New Wafd. During the campaign, Nasser's voice and pictures appeared in the government-controlled mass media after a long absence.

The results of the Assembly elections reaffirmed the political formula that the army officers had devised when they assumed power in 1952. The NDP won an overwhelming majority of 190 seats. None of the minority parties, including the Labor party, the Liberal party and the Tajamu, were able to secure eight percent of the votes cast nationally. The only opposition party to emerge in the Assembly was the New Wafd, in alliance with members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Together they won 58 seats, with the majority going to the New Wafd. Roughly half the Wafdist strength in the Assembly was derived from urban areas while the remaining seats were won in scattered rural areas.

The election returns were the subject of a valuable
(Continued on page 39)

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⁶*Al-Ahali*, May 11, 1983.

⁷*Al-Akhbar*, February 10, 1982.

"Soviet efforts to gain influence in the Arabian Peninsula have met with only limited success The . . . booming economies, internal stability, and internal security controls [of the Gulf States] have eliminated much of the incentive as well as the opportunity for revolution or other political change."

Soviet Policy in the Gulf States

BY MARK N. KATZ

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THE Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (founded in 1981) consists of six countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman, all of which have several common features. All are absolute monarchies; in each of them the ruler and his family exercise great authority, and National Assemblies or advisory councils (where they exist) have very little power. In addition, all of these states are basically pro-Western, although their rhetoric may not indicate this, and they have no desire to see Soviet influence increase. Finally, all of them have oil, though their resources vary; from the vast reserves held by Saudi Arabia to the very modest reserves in Bahrain.

Oil is the primary reason that the peninsula is important to the West; the GCC countries possess over 40 percent of the world's known oil reserves. Additional oil will undoubtedly be found in other countries, but unless new discoveries greatly exceed depleted fields, the world will come to depend more and more heavily on these countries.¹

Yet while Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states are so important to the West, they are also vulnerable. They are among the last few absolute monarchies left in the world, and their internal stability is in question. Their relatively small populations also make them vulnerable to outside attack. In addition, the Strait of Hormuz, through which most of their oil must pass, could be blockaded, and Iran has threatened to do so.

Because of their vital importance and their vulnerability, many observers in the West have come to fear that the Soviet Union may try to extend its influence over the GCC countries. The Soviet alliance with Iraq, the Soviet military presence in South Yemen and Ethiopia, and the invasion of Afghanistan have been cited as evidence of a Soviet plan first to surround the region and then to take control of it.

Why would the Soviet Union want to do this? In the mid-1970's, many Western observers speculated that oil production in the Eastern bloc would fall below oil consumption and that Moscow might seize the Gulf in order to ensure petroleum supplies for itself and its allies. Nearly a decade later, these predictions appear to have been excessively pessimistic; Soviet oil production has con-

tinued to remain well above its oil consumption, and the Soviet Union is a net petroleum exporter.

Another theory is that the Soviet Union wants to control the oil in order to be able to regulate or even deny oil to the West. Although there is no conclusive evidence to support this view, it is not difficult to see why the Soviet Union might want to control the region's oil. Since Japan, West Europe and, to a lesser extent, the United States are so dependent, being able to deny oil to them or to raise petroleum prices astronomically could weaken them economically and militarily.

Because of the possibility that the Soviet Union might try to extend its influence through an invasion, either directly or in conjunction with one of its allies, like South Yemen, deterring such an invasion has been a major justification for the American creation and deployment of a Rapid Deployment Force. However, while a Soviet attack on the GCC would be extremely damaging to the West, such an operation would be very dangerous for the Soviet Union as well. A Soviet invasion of an area so vitally important to the West would risk Western military intervention. This could lead to a wider superpower confrontation, with a possibility of nuclear war. Both in their thinking and in practice, Soviet leaders have tried to avoid a direct clash with the United States; for this reason alone, they are not likely to invade the GCC states.

There are, however, less dangerous means by which Soviet leaders might try to extend their influence over the GCC states: the promotion of revolution or other violent change to overthrow the present governments or the promotion of friendly relations between Moscow and the present governments. In the last 15 years, however, the Soviet Union has met with only limited success in spreading its influence.

SOVIET POLICY IN THE 1970's

At the beginning of 1970, a growing Marxist insurgency in Oman was fighting against both the British and the highly unpopular and repressive Sultan Said bin Taimur. Enjoying the full support of neighboring South Yemen, where a Marxist group had come to power in 1967, the rebels had captured nearly all of Oman's southern province, Dhofar, and had begun activities in northern Oman as well. These Marxists, known as the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG),

¹In 1983, the United States imported 33 percent of its total oil consumption, West Europe, 71 percent, and Japan 95 percent.

called for revolution not only in Oman, but also in Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States (which became the United Arab Emirates [UAE] on independence).

For its part, Saudi Arabia had experienced many internal problems in the 1960's, including a bitter power struggle between King Saud and Crown Prince Faisal that ended in 1964 when Faisal deposed Saud. There had also been several coup attempts in Saudi Arabia, including two by leftist soldiers in 1969. In addition, the borders between Saudi Arabia and its British-protected neighbors had never been properly defined; with the British about to depart, Riyadh began to press its claims. At that time, the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations only with Kuwait (which had become independent in 1961), but the Soviet diplomats hoped that once the British left, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE would seek friendship with Moscow as a form of protection against Saudi Arabia.

In the area surrounding the Peninsula monarchies, developments also seemed favorable to the spread of Soviet influence. Moscow's military aid to radical Iraq was growing, and in 1971 the two countries signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. The Soviet Union also had good relations with Iran's Mohammed Riza Shah Pahlavi; many Arabs were afraid that Moscow supported his territorial claims to Bahrain and his desire to increase his influence on the southern shore of the Gulf. In addition, American support to Israel in the June, 1967, war had led many Arab governments and publics to become anti-American and pro-Soviet; conservative regimes like Saudi Arabia with close links to Washington were very much on the defensive. Finally, during the 1960's, there were revolutions in both the Yemens. The republicans who came to power in North Yemen were moderate and willing to cooperate with the Saudis, but the South Yemeni rulers were avowedly Marxist and openly supported the export of revolution to all the countries of the Peninsula.

FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

At present, however, none of the opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence in the Peninsula seem nearly so promising as they did in the early 1970's. The insurgency in Oman was crushed in late 1975 and has shown no serious sign of revival. Leftist forces grew strong in Bahrain, but were suppressed in 1975 and have not revived. Revolutionary forces never gained any strength in Qatar or in the UAE.

Border disputes between Saudi Arabia and its smaller neighbors have all been settled, mainly in the latter's favor. While there have been internal disturbances in Saudi Arabia, like the seizure of the Grand Mosque at Mecca by religious zealots in 1979 and strikes and demonstrations by the Shiite minority in 1979-1980, they have been fewer in number since 1970 and all have ended

quickly. Of the six GCC countries, Kuwait is the only one with which the Soviet Union still has diplomatic relations.

In the area surrounding the GCC, Iraq still receives substantial Soviet military assistance, which Baghdad needs to fend off Iranian troops. However, Baghdad suppressed the Iraqi Communist party and has sought military assistance from the West, particularly from France. Because the GCC states provide substantial economic assistance to Iraq, Baghdad has no desire to threaten the GCC states on behalf of the Soviet Union or in any other way to risk losing their support.


Since 1979, Iran has been ruled by an anti-Western Islamic revolutionary government, but the Soviet Union has little desire to see Iran win the war against Iraq. The Teheran government is as anti-Soviet as it is anti-American, and if Iraq is defeated or the Baath is replaced by an Islamic government, the Soviet Union will lose an important ally.

North Yemen has received Soviet military assistance, but does not want Moscow's influence to grow.² North Yemen fought border wars with the South in 1972 and 1979 and defeated a South Yemeni-backed Marxist insurgency, which had lasted from 1979 to 1982. Since 1978, Soviet influence in South Yemen has grown very strong, but the Soviet Union has not supported South Yemen's attempts to export revolution to its neighbors. Indeed, Soviet leaders have encouraged the South Yemenis to pursue friendly relations with the GCC countries in order to induce these oil-rich countries to give them economic assistance. The Soviet Union believes that friendly GCC-South Yemeni ties will enhance Soviet efforts to establish ties with the GCC as well.

Soviet leaders have been largely unsuccessful in the GCC countries because they overestimated the prospects for revolution in the Peninsula in the early 1970's. The Soviet Union believed that because Saudi Arabia was a "feudal" monarchy, it would be ripe for revolution. It viewed Oman, the Trucial States, Qatar, and Bahrain as even more vulnerable because the rulers of these countries were supported by the British and the British were about to withdraw.

As for the Yemens, although the Soviet Union had helped the Egyptians to intervene in North Yemen to support the republicans against the Saudi-backed royalists and although the Soviet Union gave direct military assistance to the republicans when the Egyptians withdrew (after their June, 1967, defeat), Soviet leaders did not see the need for direct intervention on their part to help these revolutions succeed. The South Yemeni National Liberation Front received almost no Soviet support in its rise to power, and the Omani rebels seemed to be succeeding with South Yemeni assistance. Although London was directing the counterinsurgency operation, the Soviet Union predicted that the British would be no more successful in Oman than they had been in South Yemen.

²Soviet military assistance to North Yemen is balanced by Saudi economic aid.



But Soviet leaders did not foresee that the repressive Omani Sultan would be overthrown by his son, Qaboos bin Said, with British help, and that Sultan Qaboos would implement a series of reforms that would win not only the general population but also many of the rebels to his side. The Shah of Iran, increasingly worried (after the signing of the Soviet–Iraqi treaty) about the spread of Soviet influence in the region, also sent forces to help the Omanis. It was only just before their defeat in 1975 that Soviet leaders recognized that the Omani rebels were losing; and Moscow made a last minute effort to save them by sending advanced surface-to-air missiles. But it was too late. The Soviet Union hoped that the insurgency could be revived when the Shah was overthrown in early 1979 and the last Iranian troops were withdrawn from Oman, but apart from a few minor raids the guerrillas failed. Attempts to bring revolution to the other Peninsula monarchies were quickly suppressed.

The Soviet Union also failed to gain influence in the GCC states because of the oil embargo and the oil price rise that occurred at the time of the 1973 Middle East war. The Soviet Union believed that these events would lead to a permanent state of tension between the Arab oil-exporting countries (especially Saudi Arabia, without whose participation the price rise could not have been sustained) on the one hand and the West on the other. Thus, Moscow gave propaganda and military aid to the opponents of the GCC monarchies; at the same time, it launched a diplomatic campaign to establish friendly relations with the monarchies, hoping that they would look to Moscow for support when their relations with the West deteriorated.

But to Moscow's surprise, the West accepted the dramatic oil price rises. Relations between the United States and the Peninsula and the rest of the Arab world actually improved after the 1973 war, when Washington

made a concerted effort to negotiate Israel's withdrawal from Arab territory. Further, increased oil prices enriched the Peninsula monarchies, with their relatively small populations. These governments then undertook policies that spread the benefits of the oil wealth generally among the population, practically eliminating poverty as a reason for revolution. Oil riches also allowed them to build internal security systems that could quickly detect and suppress attempts at revolt, further reducing the opportunities for would-be revolutionaries. Instead of causing tension between the Peninsula states and the West, the rise in oil prices made the monarchies less vulnerable to Soviet-backed revolutionaries.

Indeed, by the mid- to late 1970's, the Soviet Union had concluded that the prospects for revolution in the Peninsula monarchies were extremely poor; thereafter, Soviet leaders have tried to establish friendly bilateral relations with the governments in power. The Soviet Union and the UAE (against which Saudi territorial claims were substantial) agreed to exchange embassies in early 1972; this did not take place because of Saudi pressure, Riyadh's agreement to settle the border dispute largely in the UAE's favor, and the UAE's fear that the Soviet Union would assist Marxists there (as they had helped them in Oman). By the mid-1970's, the Soviet Union had concluded that there was little hope of driving a wedge between Saudi Arabia and its smaller neighbors; if the Soviet Union were to gain influence there, it would first have to normalize diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia.

To accomplish this goal, Soviet leaders tried to exploit Saudi objections to the continued American support of Israel. The Soviet Union tried to persuade the Saudis that if they worked with Moscow, the Arab cause would be greatly strengthened and the prospects for creating a Palestinian state would improve. Soviet leaders argued that the establishment of relations between Moscow and Riyadh might force Washington to give less support to Israel and more to the Arabs. Finally, Soviet leaders pointed to their friendly relations with Kuwait as an example of mutually beneficial cooperation between states with different social systems and said that ties between the other GCC states and Moscow could be equally harmonious.

These arguments have so far failed to persuade Saudi Arabia, Oman, the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar to permit even diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. All these governments are wary of Soviet claims of friendship, because of previous Soviet efforts to promote revolution against them and because of continued Soviet media support for Marxist groups like the Saudi Arabian Communist party, the Bahrain National Liberation Front, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman. They fear that the Soviet Union would seize any opportunity to overthrow them and that the presence of Soviet diplomats and other officials on their territory would help Moscow do so.

And although Moscow says it wants friendly relations with these countries, the Soviet Union has not been willing to bring to a halt foreign policy actions that these five GCC states regard as threatening. Before 1970, Saudi Arabia regarded Soviet assistance to Egyptian intervention in the North Yemeni civil war as a threat to its own security. These five states regarded as threatening the growth of Soviet influence in South Yemen and Soviet support for the Omani rebels.

The five GCC states have also objected to Soviet and Cuban military aid to Marxist Ethiopia in its war with radical but Muslim Somalia over the Ogaden. Similarly, Saudi Arabia and its allies have backed the Muslim Eritrean rebels in their struggle for independence while the Soviet Union supports Ethiopia's efforts to crush them. Finally, they regard the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a direct threat and a demonstration of Moscow's hostility toward the Muslim world; and they have given political as well as financial support to the Afghan rebels.

KUWAIT AND THE SOVIET UNION

Why is Kuwait different? Since 1963, Kuwait has had diplomatic ties with Moscow and since the mid-1970's it has purchased a substantial quantity of Soviet weapons. However, relations were not always so friendly. In 1961, when Kuwait became independent, Baghdad claimed all of Kuwait. In 1973, Iraq claimed part of Kuwait's territory and attacked a Kuwaiti border post. On both occasions, the Iraqi government was closely linked to the Soviet Union, and Moscow appeared neutral, if not actually supportive of Iraq. In 1961, the British and later the Arab League forces arrived to protect Kuwait, but in 1971 the Anglo-Kuwaiti security agreement was terminated when Britain withdrew from the Gulf. When Iraqi forces moved into Kuwait in 1973, the Arab League did not act forcefully, as it had in 1961 to protect Kuwait. The Kuwaiti government reasoned that by establishing ties with Moscow (in 1963) and buying arms from the Soviet Union (beginning in the mid-1970's), the Soviet Union would come to value Kuwait's friendship and would have an incentive to restrain the Iraqis.

By maintaining friendship with the Soviet Union and other pro-Soviet countries and movements, Kuwait also hoped to persuade them not to support the leftist opposition inside Kuwait. So far, Kuwait has succeeded. The Soviet Union frequently refers to real or imaginary opposition movements in the other GCC states, but not in Kuwait, partly because Soviet leaders want to persuade Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states that there is

(Continued on page 41)

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In this sympathetic discussion, the authors note that "in foreign policy as in domestic policy, Iraq's revolution has been deflected by . . . a desperate fight for survival."

Iraq's Interrupted Revolution

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BETWEEN 1968 and 1980, Iraq's foreign and domestic policies emerged directly from the pan-Arab, socialist ideology of the governing Baath party. The central objectives of Baath ideology—unity, freedom and socialism—were pursued without compromise or constraint in both the internal and external arenas. However, the prolongation of the war with Iran has forced significant modification of Iraq's "ideological purity" in practice. In other words, as a result of the political, economic and social exigencies produced by the war, the revolution has taken a more compromising and constrained direction.

In the sphere of domestic development, economic policies reflected the Baathist attempt to build an independent economy based on a strong socialist infrastructure. The drive for economic independence had several dimensions: the establishment of sovereignty over oil resources and production; economic self-reliance in the internal market; and economic diversification in the world economy.

Iraq's nationalization of the oil industry in 1972 realized the first dimension. The significance of this was not only economic but profoundly political. Sovereignty over oil exploitation and production was based on Iraq's ideology:

The decisive battle for Iraq's independence was . . . to be focused on the struggle to wrest oil wealth—its planning, production and marketing—from the domination of the imperialist monopolies.¹

Economic self-reliance focused on replacing Iraq's dependence on imported goods with goods made in Iraq. Rather than importing the goods and services required by existing industries, the government gave priority to the creation of new industries that depended on locally produced raw resources. In this way, an industrial infrastructure independent of external suppliers was encouraged.

¹"The Political Report of the Eighth Congress of the Arab Baath Socialist Party in Iraq, January 1974," *The 1968 Revolution in Iraq: Experience and Prospects* (London: Ithaca Press, 1979), p. 51.

²*The Economy of Iraq: Development and Perspectives, 1958–1976–1980* (Baghdad: Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Information, 1980), p. 75.

Another important feature of Baath industrial development was the priority placed on filling the needs of the local market. The Baath government attempted to transform industrial development from industries dependent on external suppliers and the vicissitudes of the international market to industries vertically and horizontally integrated in an economically self-reliant framework.

Between 1968 and 1971, Iraq's total domestic product of processing industries grew at the rate of 46 percent in current accounts. The percentage of the industrial sector's participation in national income amounted to 12 percent. The value added in the processing sector rose from 103 million Iraq dinars (ID) in 1969 to ID154 million in 1972. The activity of the processing industries grew at an average rate of 14 percent during the 1969–1974 period. This growth was reflected in the average of employed manpower, which increased from 2.4 million in 1969 to 2.87 million in 1974, an average annual growth of 3.7 percent. The rate of growth achieved in the construction sector was 9.9 percent; water and electricity, 7.3 percent; and processing industries, 6 percent. In addition, the general quantitative unit number of industrial production in 1972 rose by 8.3 percent over that of 1971, and by 35.5 percent over that of 1969.²

Besides these projects geared primarily to the internal market, the Baath government undertook large-scale development projects. Iraq's rich sulfur resources were developed with the creation of a sulfur extraction and refining industry. The first phase of this project was completed in 1971, and by 1980 the annual productive capacity of the sulfur industry was one million tons. In addition, Iraq's abundant phosphate resources were being developed in the framework of a fully integrated industrial project. At a cost of ID350 million, the government planned to mine and process phosphate into phosphatic and synthetic fertilizers, making use of other natural resources—sulfur, natural gas and ammonia.

Another project was the creation of a petrochemical industry. A contract for the execution of the first phase of this project was signed in 1976 at the cost of ID325 million. Hence, unlike many raw resource-rich countries in the third world, Iraq was deliberately moving away from its role as a raw resource exporter in the international

al economy and was developing a fully integrated, diversified industrial base.

The socialist transformation of the economy occurred in conjunction with the drive for economic independence and self-reliance. Baath socialist ideology does not prohibit private enterprise, but it places such activity after state enterprise. Financed by the wealth produced by the oil sector, the socialization of industry in Iraq progressed rapidly under the Baath. While there was virtually no viable socialist sector when the Baath came to power in 1968, by 1978 it was a dominant sector.

AGRICULTURAL REFORM

Agricultural reform was another pillar of Baath economic ideology. Agrarian Reform Law 117, issued in 1970, introduced the principle of ownership ceilings based on land fertility, irrigation, and type of produce in an effort to break up large landholdings and weaken the ability of landlords to impede redistribution. By 1977, 7,425,938 meshara of land had been distributed to 235,593 recipients.³ While allowing private ownership of small and medium-size farms, the Baath government tried to socialize agriculture and pool the technical and material resources of the farming communities. The number of collective farms increased from 6 with a total of 490 members in 1972 to 79 with a total of 8,540 members in 1977. In this period, the total area under cultivation in collective farms increased from 24,160 meshara to 723,405 meshara.

Together with collectives, cooperatives and state farms form the socialist sector in agriculture. The number of cooperatives increased from 443 with 6,037 members in 1968 to 1,721 with 267,720 members by 1976. In 1976, the total area under cooperative organization was 853,004 meshara. In addition, there were 8 state farms in 1976 that encompassed an area of 71,977 meshara.

In the social sphere, Iraq's efforts to build an independent socialist economy with a self-sustaining rate of growth have been complemented by social policies aimed at transforming the semitribal, semifeudal relations of production entrenched by centuries of exploitation, colonialism and imperialism. Ideologically, the transformation of social relations from a tribal-feudal framework to a

modern industrial socialist framework is the objective of social development. Social policies in the areas of education, health care, labor relations, and family and social services reflect these goals.⁴

Unlike other third world states committed to socialist transformation, until the initiation of the Iraq-Iran war in 1980 Iraq's development strategies were not curtailed by scarce resources or the domestic and international constraints scarcity places on government action. Thus, from 1968 to 1980, Iraq pursued socialist development with a capital surplus, unhobbled by the capital shortages that confound development strategies in most third world states. Iraq's experience represents a case of the affluent revolution—a revolution uncompromised and unconstrained by the contingencies of realpolitik that dampen the practice if not the rhetoric of revolutionary regimes.

However, the prolongation of the Iraq-Iran war has drastically changed this. Iranian military action in and around the Shatt al-Arab waterway and the closure by Syria (in support of Iran) since April, 1982, of the Syrian portion of the Kirkuk-Mediterranean pipeline have severely curtailed Iraq's ability to export oil. The level of Iraqi oil exports fell from an average of 3.2 million barrels per day in the first nine months of 1980 to a low of between 700,000 and 800,000 barrels per day in the first few months of 1984. Because oil exports represented roughly 60 percent of Iraq's prewar (1979) gross national product, this was a serious economic blow. Moreover, the direct material cost of the war to Iraq was estimated to have reached about \$1 billion per month by 1983.⁵ The net result was the transformation of Iraq from a capital surplus nation into a debtor nation and a foreign aid dependent. It is estimated that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates gave Iraq financial assistance of about \$40 billion over the first four years of the war.⁶

Wartime statistics on the pace and direction of Iraqi social development policy since 1980 are difficult to obtain. Nevertheless, it is clear that while the implementation of development projects has continued (albeit at a slower rate), the ideological fulcrum of development strategy—self-reliance and independence—has been checked.⁷ In fact, the effort to sustain development during the war increased economic and political dependence on external sources. This is most evident in the movement away from ideological principles to practical and pragmatic considerations of regional and international policies.

In the period 1968 to 1980, Iraq's foreign policy represented the application of Baathist ideological principles in the Iraqi national context. Because of the relative freedom in foreign relations that Iraq's capital surplus situation provided, its government was able to pursue foreign policy principles unfettered by the kinds of constraints that prevent most third world states from acting independently in international relations.

The Baathist world view is founded upon a conception of world order imposed by power relationships. Under

³Central Statistical Organizations, *Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1977* (Baghdad: Ministry of Planning, 1978), p. 70. One meshara equals 2,500 square meters.

⁴Jacqueline S. Ismael, "Social Policy and Social Change: The Case of Iraq," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, vol. 2, no. 3 (Summer, 1980), pp. 235-248.

⁵*Al-Majallah* (London), no. 208 (February 4-10, 1984), p. 45.

⁶*Le Monde* (Paris), September 23, 1984.

⁷A summary of publicly announced civilian development projects for 1983 produced by *Middle East Economic Survey* provides some support for the general observation that the pace of Iraqi development has continued to slow, with the value of such projects falling from \$3,977 million (1982) to \$670 million (1983). The data, however, is far from exhaustive. *Middle East Economic Survey*, vol. 27, no. 41 (July 23, 1984), p. A12.

the imperialist order, strong powers have consolidated and expanded their power by the exploitation and division of weaker nations. Only nationalist resurgence through revolution and unity can break the pattern of power relationships imposed by imperialism. Following the October, 1973, Arab-Israeli war, the official organ of the Baath party in Iraq assessed the relationship between imperialism and Zionism on the one hand and Palestine and Arab liberation on the other. Accordingly:

An increase in the strength of the Arab struggle against Zionism is corollary to an escalation of the struggle against imperialism and the growing isolation of reactionaries. Any cessation of the struggle against Zionism, then, will negatively affect the struggle against imperialism and Arab reactionaries to their benefit.⁸

This view of the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its relationship to Arab liberation led to the Baathist policy of rejecting an imposed settlement. At the outbreak of the 1973 war, Iraq moved quickly to nationalize the Basrah Petroleum Company, and mobilized all its forces and sent them to Syria to fight in coordination with the Syrian army. Iraq boycotted the Algiers conference in November, 1973, because of the Syrian and Egyptian decision to negotiate with Israel by recognizing the United Nations cease-fire resolutions and by agreeing to attend the Geneva talks on troop separation and disengagement.

Consistent with its whole conception of the Palestine issue, Iraq denounced United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy throughout 1974. On the practical side, in 1974 and 1975, Iraq undertook to unify the so-called Rejection Front through continuous dialogue and meetings with Libya and Algeria and the four Palestinian organizations that rejected peaceful settlement.

Iraq's rejection of the Camp David accords was consistent with its rejection of imposed settlements and its view of imperialism. In response to the Camp David accords, Iraq organized a summit conference of all Arab governments (except Egypt) in November, 1978. The conference may be considered a landmark of unanimity among Arab governments.

In a very concrete sense, the Palestine issue was the ideological arbiter of Iraq's foreign policy. The issue served as the measure of nations on the continuum from enemy to friend, and Iraq responded to each state according to its position on this continuum. Because of the close United States association with Israel, the United States and its allies were identified as the principal enemies of the Arab people. Nonetheless, a political report noted

⁸*al-Thawra, Qadaya wa Tasa'ulat Mashru'ah* (Issues and Legitimate Questions) (Baghdad, 1973), p. 58.

⁹Eighth Regional Congress of the Arab Baath Socialist Party-Iraq, *Revolutionary Iraq: 1968-1973* (Baghdad, 1974), pp. 224-225.

¹⁰*The 1968 Revolution in Iraq*, pp. 130-131.

¹¹*Al-Thawra, The Arab Region: What is it and Where is it Going?* (Baghdad: Arab Baath Socialist Party, 1977), pp. 74, 76.

that "our opposition to the imperialist countries does not prevent us from dealing with them in matters which are in our national interests."⁹ Relations with the socialist bloc were measured on the same standard.

WAR WITH IRAN

It is in this same ideological context that Iraq perceived its conflict with Iran. As early as 1974, the political report of the eighth congress of the party drew a parallel between Palestine and the Gulf: it saw the center of the conflict as a struggle between Arab nationalism on the one hand and Zionism and Persian nationalism on the other. Iranian immigration to the Gulf region and Iran's occupation of the three Arab islands in the Gulf were seen as part of an imperialist plot whose objective was to "circumscribe centers of revolution, primarily Iraq, and to work for their enfeeblement and fall."¹⁰

Iraq's conflict with imperialism aroused serious concern about changes in the Gulf: the Iranian revolution was viewed as another imperialist attempt to destabilize Iraq and bring about the downfall of Iraq's regime. The escalating conflict with Iran was subsequently seen as an act of national defense, to keep the area free from imperialist encirclement.

The rationale underlying Iraq's foreign policy was its effort to fulfill the role of a vanguard Arab state in the struggle against imperialism and reactionary Arab regimes. As a result of the war, however, Iraq has become dependent for political, strategic and financial support on those states it had identified from a ideological perspective as reactionary. Thus, during the 1970's, *al-Thawra* (the official party publication) denounced Jordan as a "puppet government" and Saudi Arabia as "an American imperialist base."¹¹

However, by 1983, a decade later, Iraq was closely allied with Saudi Arabia and Jordan, as well as the conservative Gulf emirates. In fact, today Iraq is heavily dependent on them because of their financial, political and strategic support in its war with Iran. In addition to their direct financial assistance, Iraq hopes to circumvent the blockage of its oil exports by Iran and Syria by constructing new oil pipelines through Saudi Arabia and

(Continued on page 39)

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BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE MIDDLE EAST

FROM NATIONALISM TO REVOLUTIONARY ISLAM. *Edited by Said Amir Arjomand.* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984. 256 pages, notes and references, \$14.95.)

The essays in this volume explore the growth of Islamic fundamentalism and nationalism in the Middle East in the last two decades. Why Islam has surpassed nationalism as the primary social force in the region is discussed from various perspectives. The essays by Richard Cottam, Rashid Khalidi and Shaul Bakhash are especially informative. W.W.F.

A PALESTINIAN STATE: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL. *By Mark Heller.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983. 190 pages, notes, maps, bibliography and index, \$16.00.)

Heller's book has been criticized for being too clinical in its treatment of this subject, but this alleged defect is the book's virtue: dispassionate, reasoned analysis of the status of the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza strip is difficult to find. According to Heller, a Palestinian state in the occupied territories would alleviate the political and military problems Israel faces from the Palestinians and the Arab world. Detailed proposals are presented on how Israel could ensure its security and what the political makeup of the new state might be. An excellent series of hand-drawn maps accompany the text. W.W.F.

BETWEEN BATTLES AND BULLETS: ISRAELI MILITARY IN POLITICS. *By Yoram Peri.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 344 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$39.95.)

The role of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in the Israeli political process and the implications of that role for continued democratic rule in Israel are the subject of Peri's book. Peri examines the growth of the civil-military relationship during the Labor party's rule, the increase in the number of ex-military officers holding office, and the military's preeminent role in Israeli society as the defense force and security police/political administration in the occupied territories. Peri does not see the Israeli military devolving to a pressure group; he does foresee the military playing a pivotal role if ethnic tensions among Israelis lead to political upheaval. W.W.F.

THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANISATION: PEOPLE, POWER AND POLITICS. *By Helena Cobban.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1984. 305 pages, notes, appendices and bibliography, \$29.95.)

The author is a journalist who was stationed in Beirut from 1976 to 1981. Her study focuses on the main PLO organization, Fatah, and its leader, Yasir Arafat. The book is well written and the author's first-hand accounts of various recent episodes in Lebanon provide new information. An index should have been included. W.W.F.

THE REIGN OF THE AYATOLLAHS: IRAN AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. *By Shaul Bakhash.* (New York: Basic Books, 1984. 276 pages, notes and index, \$18.95.)

Nearly six years after the revolution, the goals and accomplishments of the Iranian government remain unclear to most people. Shaul Bakhash's narrative account of the revolution and its aftermath is a penetrating explanation of both these aspects. Bakhash's background as a scholar and a journalist makes for a well-written book; the author is also attentive to detail. W.W.F.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SAUDI ARABIA. *By A. Reza S. Islami and Rostam Mehraban Kavoussi.* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1984. 124 pages, notes, bibliography and tables, \$9.95.)

Islami and Kavoussi argue that while the Saudi Arabian monarchy maintains a tight grip on the country, rapid economic growth and social change have begun to erode the government's authority. The book is a short, informative guide to the country's recent history. W.W.F.

THE CONFLICT OF TRIBE AND STATE IN IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN. *Edited by Richard Tapper.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 463 pages and index, \$35.00.)

A collection of 16 essays, this is a study for the professional ethnographer, political anthropologist, and sociologist. Grounded in solid historical analysis of the tribal configuration in Iran and Afghanistan and heavily oriented toward the social probing of tribal history, the essays provide a great deal of information and insight, helping to explain the Afghan resistance to the Soviet Union. Alvin Z. Rubinstein

University of Pennsylvania

THE PERSIAN GULF AND AMERICAN POLICY. *By Emile A. Nakhleh.* (New York: Praeger, 1982. 151 pages, bibliography and index, \$22.95.)

The bulk of this study provides focuses on Bahrain, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Saudi Arabian views of the Palestinian problem, with some commentary on United States policy. The somewhat choppy coverage weakens the net effect of the several solid individual chapters. A.Z.R.

ISRAEL, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND U.S. INTERESTS. *Edited by Harry S. Allen and Ivan Volgyes.* (New York: Praeger, 1983. 174 pages and index, \$27.95.)

The 12 essays in this volume provide a sound historical and political evaluation of some of the leading problems facing the Middle East, exploring the foreign policies of Israel, the United States, and the Soviet Union. A.Z.R.

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR: NEW WEAPONS, OLD CONFLICTS. *Edited by Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi.* (New York: Praeger, 1983. 210 pages and index, \$25.95.)

The most thorough overview that we have so far, this set of ten papers provides an expert assessment of the origins, dynamics and critical components of the Iran-Iraq war. A.Z.R.

THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL: INFLUENCE IN THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP. *By Bernard Reich.* (New York: Praeger, 1984. 237 pages, bibliography and index, \$27.95, cloth; \$14.95, paper.)

This study considers the convergent and divergent interests between the United States and Israel. It deals with the period since the 1973 war—the peace process, the aid relationship, and the domestic factors that influence United States policy. Attention focuses on the mutually interactive and extensive character of the United States-Israeli relationship. The coverage of the Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan presidencies is balanced and informative. The book is a welcome contribution to the literature on the contemporary Middle East and United States policy. A.Z.R.

NEGOTIATING FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AN ARAB VIEW. *By Ismail Fahmy.* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. 331 pages, chronology and index, \$25.00.)

One of Egypt's most distinguished diplomats, Ismail Fahmy was foreign minister from 1973 to 1977. In this informative and valuable memoir, he provides his views of the events and personalities of that period, focusing on the complex negotiations that led to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's dramatic decision to go to Jerusalem in November, 1977, and to Fahmy's own decision to resign in protest. His assessments are stern, but command attention. A.Z.R.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: PERSPEC-

TIVES. *Edited by Alvin Z. Rubinstein.* (New York: Praeger, 1984. 221 pages, bibliography and index, \$27.95, cloth; \$14.95, paper.)

This study is composed of six original essays, each devoted to one facet of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The collection evaluates the conflict in historical perspective and in a highly readable form, apt to challenge an intelligent, nonspecialist audience. The chapters deal with the historical roots of Jewish and Arab nationalism; the seven Arab-Israeli wars; the external influences, like oil, the United Nations, and the United States-Soviet rivalry, that affect the conflict; the evolution of Israel's policy; the Palestinian dimension; and the causes that make for escalation and for relaxation. A well-conceived and valuable contribution to the literature on the subject. O.E.S.

THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN. *By R.K. Ramazani.* (New York: Praeger, 1982. 179 pages, selected books and index, \$19.95, cloth; \$9.95 paper.)

This study assesses the Shah's era and the domestic and external considerations that have shaped Iranian policies and interactions with the United States. The author discusses the role of United States oil companies, arms transfers, trade, strategic cooperation, power projection in the Persian Gulf, and Soviet-American rivalry. An epilogue carries the analysis beyond the 444-day hostage crisis. A very literate and valuable contribution. A.Z.R.

ALSO ON THE MIDDLE EAST

THE MIDDLE EAST REMEMBERED. *By John S. Badeau.* (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1983. 271 pages and index, \$25.00.)

THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE. *By Majid Khadduri.* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. 256 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$25.00.)

THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE CAMP DAVID. *Edited by Robert O. Freedman.* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. 263 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$25.00.)

THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD: IRAN'S ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. *By Cheryl Bernard and Zalmay Khalilzad.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984. 240 pages, notes and index, \$25.00.)

IRAQ AND IRAN: THE YEARS OF CRISIS. *By Jasim M. Abdulghani.* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. 270 pages, notes, appendices and index, \$28.50.)

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ARABIAN PENINSULA. *By Aryeh Y. Yodfat.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 191 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$25.00.)

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LEBANON'S CONTINUING CONFLICT

(Continued from page 15)

southern suburbs witnessed an outbreak of fighting between Amal and the Lebanese army. As the latter moved to occupy the headquarters of Amal, army positions, the state-run television station and the state-run radio station were occupied by Amal militiamen. The Druse militia joined in by shelling the presidential palace in Baabda and the Ministry of Defense in Yarzi. This marked the first attempt to divide the army and keep it bogged down in West Beirut so that it would not be deployed in the Shouf mountains. The maneuver was a dress rehearsal for what was to happen in February, 1984.

Another reason for the timing of the offensive against the Lebanese government was the rebuilding of the Lebanese army, which had begun in December, 1982, with United States military officers actively involved in the training program. It is interesting to note that the United States officer in charge of the Lebanese army modernization program claimed in June, 1983, that "the Lebanese army [was] stronger than any militia in the country and [was] willing and able to respond to any attack by a foreign force."¹⁷ He also claimed that with six or seven months more of training the Lebanese army would be capable of controlling all of Lebanon; however, "with outside interference, it would probably take several years to build up the army to that point."¹⁸ Therefore it became imperative for Syria and its allies to act swiftly.

Between August 28 and 31, 1983, the first attempt to control West Beirut and divide the Lebanese army failed when three brigades of the Lebanese army recaptured West Beirut, stopping short of reoccupying the southern suburbs. A deal was struck with Amal leader Nabih Berri to spare his stronghold, because Lebanese army officers hoped that this would bring him to the negotiating table.¹⁹ It was also in late August, 1983, that the United States Marine contingent of the multinational force suffered its first casualties and was drawn into the fighting. In the eyes of many Lebanese opposition groups, the Americans had ceased to be nonpartisan.

The war that was fought between the Druse militias (with Syrian logistic support) and the Christian Lebanese Forces raged for three weeks after the Israelis withdrew from the Shouf and Alay on September 4, 1983. A ceasefire was finally arranged on September 25, 1983, by the Saudi mediator, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the United States. The Christian Leb-

†Editor's note: On October 7, 1984, it was reported that Israel had dropped its demand that there be a mutual withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian troops.

¹⁷ *Monday Morning*, vol. 12, no. 570 (June 13–19, 1983), p. 52.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 58.

¹⁹ *Monday Morning*, vol. 12, no. 582 (September 12–18, 1983), pp. 12–13.

²⁰ For an account of the war from a Druse perspective see *Harb al-Jabal fi Lubnan, Difa 'an 'an al-Wujud wal-Karamah* (Beirut, 1984).

anese Forces were defeated, and most of the Christians of the Shouf and Alay fled or were evicted from their villages.²⁰ As the Druse militia began to fight against the Lebanese army (after defeating the Christian Lebanese Forces), Druse soldiers and officers in the army left their units, refusing to fight their coreligionists. The same thing happened again in February, 1984, when Shiite soldiers and officers refused to fight Amal militiamen and retreated to their barracks. Thus the Lebanese army became divided, to a large extent along religious lines.

Between September, 1983 and February, 1984, the military balance of power on the ground shifted increasingly in favor of Syria and its Lebanese allies. Syrian arms and logistics gave the Druse militias and the Shiite militias of the southern suburbs the strength to undermine the Lebanese government and the Lebanese army, and to force the withdrawal of the multinational force, a withdrawal ultimately achieved by mid-February, 1984. Under *force majeure*, Gemayel had to bow to Syrian demands; he abrogated the Israeli-Lebanese agreement on March 5, 1984.† Thereafter Syria's hegemonic aims became clearer, in the National Reconciliation Conference in Lausanne during March 12–19, 1984, in the formation of the new Lebanese Cabinet headed by Prime Minister Karami on April 30, 1984, and, more recently, in the election of the Speaker of the House on October 16, 1984, an election that successfully ousted Kamil Asaad.

CONTINUED CONFLICT

With the failure of Gemayel's attempt to resolve the Lebanese conflict, Lebanon has returned to continued conflict, but with new factors added. First, there was a direct Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon, not just an enclave controlled by an Israeli proxy, like Major Saad Haddad between 1978 and 1982. Second, the Western powers formerly most concerned with Lebanon's future, namely, the United States and France, had been forced out of the political scene. Third, Saudi Arabia, the leading Arab mediator during the Lebanese crisis, closed down its embassy after its consulate in Beirut was sacked and burned in August, 1984, and is no longer playing an active role in Lebanese politics. Fourth, the Lebanese army is again ineffective and is also divided largely along sectarian lines. Fifth, the Lebanese government's reliance on Syria has reached unprecedented levels. Not since the period of the French mandate have all the major decisions in Lebanon been made not in its capital but in Damascus.

In conclusion it might be noted that whenever the Lebanese ruling elements have been unwilling or unable to accommodate the grievances of opposition groups, they have directly or indirectly "invited" the military intervention of an external power to change the status quo or to safeguard it. But the ultimate outcome has been to weaken the central government and its institutions, and has placed all the religious communities in Lebanon, in one way or another, at the mercy of the intervening external powers. ■

UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

(Continued from page 4)

in grateful humility. It wants to prove to the other Arab states that they cannot get along without Egyptian protection and leadership. To achieve this, the Egyptian leadership believes that it must prove that it can deliver benefits from the United States and concessions from Israel. As yet Egypt has not been able to do either, and it has had to defend itself against accusations that it has sold out the Arab and the Palestinian causes in order to feed its people. In consequence, Egypt tries to avoid the appearance of being completely under American influence. Egypt has refused to grant permanent bases to the United States military. It has withdrawn its ambassador from Israel until Israeli forces are withdrawn from Lebanon. And it has renewed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

The United States has demonstrated a sympathetic understanding of the Egyptian predicament, with perhaps somewhat less sympathy for Egypt's hegemonic aspirations. Although the Reagan administration is no doubt uneasy about the renewal of diplomatic relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union, it can and will increase the amount of assistance granted to Egypt. But there does not seem to be any dramatic American favor that would have a revolutionary effect on Arab and Islamic public opinion.

Originally, Egypt hoped that the United States would force Israeli concessions on Palestine. But since Syria has gained control of a large segment of the Palestinian movement and since King Hussein has renewed diplomatic relations with Mubarak's Egypt, the situation has changed. Yasir Arafat has approached both Hussein and Mubarak, so the stage is apparently set for a solution that conforms to the general outlines of the Reagan plan. The solution will have to have the blessing of the United States; it will have to link a Palestinian entity to Jordan in some manner; it will have to be guaranteed by Egypt; and, of course, it will have to satisfy Israeli security concerns while coping with the issue of the Israeli settlements.

Such a solution will be bitterly opposed by Syria and by a substantial number of Palestinians. At this moment, it is impossible to predict what formula for the West Bank and Jerusalem could possibly satisfy Israel and still offer Jordan and Egypt enough advantage to allow them to claim to have protected the interests of the Palestinians. Meanwhile, Hussein's recognition of Egypt promises that Egypt's isolation may end without the precondition of a Palestinian solution. Clearly Egypt's price for cooperation with the United States and with Israel will be higher if and when it is no longer isolated from the other Arab states.

The foreign policy of the Reagan administration is often described as focused primarily on the Soviet Union

and only secondarily on peripheral regions like the Middle East. In the Middle East, it is widely believed that Soviet influence has dwindled and should not be allowed to grow. For its part, the Soviet Union has not made a serious effort to challenge American influence in that region, nor has it pressured any Middle East government. The Soviet Union maintains good relations with Libya, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Syria. As its relations with Iran have deteriorated, the Soviet Union has given important military assistance to Iraq.

From the point of view of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, the Soviet role in the Persian Gulf has become less threatening if not benign, and so they have begun to explore the possibility of a prudent improvement in relations. In Afghanistan, despite continuing difficulties, the sovietization of that country continues more or less according to plan. Some observers feel that the Soviet government is about to launch a campaign of friendship and cooperation in order to win access to the more moderate countries of the region. At the same time, Soviet policy seems to be unequivocal on the preservation of friendly governments against any military threat. Soviet leaders are apparently ready to offer vigorous military support not only to the regime in Afghanistan, but also to Libya, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Syria, and maybe even Iraq.

It is unlikely that Soviet leaders will weaken their commitment to their allies in return for access to the more moderate states of the area, but the pattern of Soviet-Iraqi relations may become a model. In that instance, the Soviet leaders have come to the aid of the Iraqis despite important political differences and without asking the Iraqis to make any concession on domestic policy. Nevertheless, the Iraqi government has become sufficiently uneasy about the situation to start speaking openly about renewing diplomatic relations with the United States. The Soviet Union has signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with North Yemen, and the political tension between the two Yemens may subside for a while. Egypt has renewed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union with the acquiescence of the United States. And it is expected that some of the GCC states and Jordan will purchase arms from the Soviet Union without extending formal recognition at this time.

If the Soviet Union is seeking a friendly and nonthreatening reentry into the Middle East, that effort is no doubt linked to repeated Soviet statements to the United States that the Soviet Union wants to be involved as a full participant in any Middle Eastern settlement. Soviet leaders have not insisted on particular solutions, but they have argued two points: they prefer a comprehensive solution rather than a piecemeal solution in the region; and they wish to return to the Geneva Conference formula whereby both the United States and the Soviet Union were chairmen and all parties (including the Palestinians) were to be represented. Beyond these two points, Soviet leaders have expressed their sympathies for the

PLO and for Syria, but they have not taken sides in the current dispute. It has sometimes seemed that the Soviet Union was promising to deliver the Syrians at such a peace conference, but at other times the Soviet leaders appeared to have to support the Syrians in their own skillful maneuvering.

The Soviet leadership may expect or hope that an agreement on arms limitation, or even an agreement to discuss arms limitation, will produce a friendly enough atmosphere to permit a new superpower arrangement in the Middle East. However, it does not seem likely that the world is on the threshold of another era of détente, and it is difficult to see what the Soviet Union can offer the United States to induce such a profound change in American policy. True, Syria can play a very disruptive role, but its role can hardly be sustained against a combination that includes Egypt, Jordan, Israel and Arafat's loyalists. Nor does it seem likely that the United States can offer the Syrians enough to induce them to abandon their Soviet patron. Nor can any solution to the Palestinian problem be imagined that will strengthen rather than weaken the Palestinians. It follows that there is only a slim possibility of a viable compromise on the Palestinian question, either with or without the Soviet Union.

Conventional wisdom has long held that the continuation of this stalemate works against the United States and for the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Maybe this is what Soviet leaders are counting on in their new efforts to expand their influence. But the consequences of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the fortunes of the Gulf war may have upset Soviet calculations. Whatever the shape of emerging politics in the region, two rather general conclusions stand out: the United States will have to reconsider its position with regard to the more active Soviet policy in the Middle East. And moral considerations rather than considerations of political advantage are likely to become more relevant in the pursuit of a solution to the Palestine question. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

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MISCELLANEOUS

THE ILLOGIC OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR STRATEGY. By Robert Jervis. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984. 203 pages, notes and index, \$19.95.)

Jervis's goal in this short book is to refute the argument that the United States needs to adopt a countervailing strategy (that is, a nuclear strategy to defeat the Soviet Union at every level of conflict) in order to deter the Soviet Union successfully. His method is to analyze the key concepts that make up the countervailing strategy and show their logical structure and the illogical conclusions that stem from them. Along the way, nearly every topic of importance in the nuclear debate comes up for discussion.

According to Jervis, the fundamental problem with the countervailing strategy is its unstated premise that nuclear war can be fought and military objectives can be gained just as in past conventional wars. This "conventionalization" fallacy informs all the components of the strategy, especially the ideas of limited nuclear war, counterforce targeting, escalation dominance, protracted nuclear war, and prevailing in a nuclear war. The conventionalizers fail to appreciate how nuclear weapons have radically altered the use of military force to gain political objectives; the pain of war can no longer be offset by the possibility of victory, since even the "loser" in a nuclear war can still inflict devastating blows on the cities of the winner.

This nuclear "revolution," as Jervis calls it, thus invalidates the countervailing strategy. Only mutual assured destruction and the risks a country is willing to take short of nuclear war will dictate whether deterrence will hold. Jervis uses this proposition to argue against the deployment of United States intermediate-range missiles in Europe and against the deployment of MX missiles. According to Jervis, neither deployment can be justified as an attempt to bolster deterrence. W.W.F.

ISRAEL

(Continued from page 12)

the establishment party, the party of privilege and of Israel's "aristocracy."⁸

Even after his resignation as Prime Minister, Menachem Begin remained the folk hero of Orientals because of his charisma and his challenge to Labor.⁹ When asked for whom they would vote, many Orientals said Begin, meaning Likud, even though Begin refused to participate in the election. Except for ex-President Yitzhak Navon, who was also Oriental, Labor had no leaders to compete with those in Likud like Begin, David Levy (a Moroccan leader of Herut), or Ariel Sharon, the ex-general and former minister of defense known for hard-line attitudes toward Arabs. Shimon Peres received low ratings even among Ashkenazis, who suspected his motives as well as his abilities.

The two largest parties, Labor and Likud, are apparently becoming "ethnic," i.e., tending to represent either Orientals or Ashkenazis.¹⁰ Still, each party retains a mixed constituency and each has made efforts to avoid polarization. Despite the shift of votes from Labor, it has increased the number of Orientals in higher party echelons and in its Knesset delegation; Likud still has a

⁸Don Peretz and Sammy Smooha, "Israel's Tenth Knesset Elections—Ethnic Upsurgence and Decline of Ideology," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 35, no. 4 (Autumn, 1981).

⁹The following discussion is based on Don Peretz, "Israeli Policy," in Robert O. Freedman, ed., *The Middle East Since Camp David* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 144–147.

¹⁰Peretz and Smooha, *op. cit.*

majority of Ashkenazis in its leadership and Knesset delegation.

RELIGIOUS BLOC FRAGMENTATION

The "Oriental Revolt" against Labor spread in 1984 through the bloc of parties representing Israel's Orthodox Jews. Over one-third of Israel's Jewish population strictly observes Orthodox tradition and laws, but less than half of these Orthodox Israelis vote for the religious parties. Until 1981, the National Religious party (NRP) usually held 10, 11 or 12 Knesset seats. Together with the smaller ultra-Orthodox Aguda Israel, the two factions constituted a powerful religious bloc, the third largest in the Knesset. It has been a member of nearly every government coalition since 1948. During the 1981 election, the NRP split when several of its Oriental members, dissatisfied with their standing in the party, formed a new Oriental Jewish faction called Tami (Movement for Israel's Tradition). As a result of the split, the NRP lost half its Knesset strength in 1981; Tami emerged as a new Orthodox party, with 3 seats.

During 1984, the Orthodox bloc was even more factionalized by Oriental-Ashkenazi divisions. The split spread to Aguda Israel when its Orientals left to form the new Shas (Sephardi Torah Guardians). Shas surprised all observers by winning four seats, twice as many as the parent Aguda Israel.

The Orthodox bloc was further divided by disagreements within the NRP over policy in the West Bank. A more militant faction, led by a rabbi who was an ardent supporter of Gush Emunim, left NRP to form Morasha, advocating immediate annexation and the removal of all obstacles to Jewish settlement.

The Orthodox factions still hold a respectable 13 Knesset seats, but the bloc is now segmented among 5 different parties, none with more than 4 seats. Thus, their influence and the number of Cabinet posts they held were greatly reduced when the new government was formed in September, 1984.

Before this government was formed, the Orthodox groups used their political clout to impose certain Orthodox Jewish practices on the community as a whole: interurban public transportation was banned on the Sabbath; only religious marriages and divorces were authorized; and only kosher food was served in public facilities. When it seemed that Orthodox support would be required to form either a Labor or Likud government before the National Unity talks were completed, the religious

*Editor's note: The Israeli "law of return," which entitles any Jew to immediate Israeli citizenship, does not define the term "Jew"; but according to the Orthodox definition, only an individual born of a Jewish mother or formally converted by an Orthodox rabbi is entitled to recognition as a Jew. See *The Christian Science Monitor* article on Judaism, October 17, 1984, pp. 18-19.

¹¹Sammy Smootha, *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), chapter 7, "Oriental-Ashkenazi Inequality."

politicians attempted to increase their influence and asked for more government funds for their institutions.

The most sensitive but controversial issue was the Orthodox insistence that the government accept a strict definition of a "Jew." The exclusive Orthodox definition would not recognize as Jews many members of large Conservative and Reformed Jewish communities in the United States, communities that provide extensive economic and political support to Israel.* Most Israelis were not overly exercised about the issue; but many believed that the Orthodox exclusivity might threaten Jewish immigration from Western countries and from the Soviet Union to Israel. However, the religious bloc failed to form a cohesive Knesset bloc; this undermined its power in the new Cabinet and it received only 3 of the 25 posts, all ministries with little influence.¹¹

FOREIGN POLICY

Beyond Lebanon and the West Bank, foreign policy was not a major issue in the 1984 campaign. Neither Likud nor Labor would recognize or negotiate with the PLO; both opposed the creation of a Palestinian state between Israel and the Jordan River; both considered the Camp David agreements the basis for further extension of the peace process; and both appealed to Egypt to revive diplomatic relations. Both regarded the United States as the kingpin of Israeli foreign policy and the ultimate source of economic and military security.

Prospects for reviving negotiations with Egypt were more likely under a Labor than a Likud Prime Minister. Relations with Cairo had never been broken, although they had cooled as a result of Begin government actions: bombing the Iraqi nuclear reactor; annexing Jerusalem and the Golan Heights; and tough policies in the West Bank. Egypt's ambassador to Israel was withdrawn after Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. But each country maintained its embassy; low-level trade continued; postal, air and telecommunication services survived; and the border remained open. There were even periodic visits of low-level officials between Egypt and Israel.

Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak seemed more favorably disposed toward Labor than to the Likud bloc and even invited several Labor leaders to visit Cairo when the party was in opposition. Because Labor seemed more eager to end the debacle in Lebanon, Mubarak was more likely to reopen the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations that had been terminated because of Egypt's sharp differences with the Likud government.

Close Israeli ties with Egypt could facilitate the peace process. Egypt's reentry into the Arab League, the Islamic Conference, and the third world bloc might allow it to become an intermediary for Israel. But any Arab-Israeli negotiations would probably be long and laborious, and Israel would have to demonstrate that the Arab countries had something to gain.

No hastily improvised policies can resolve the innumerable problems confronting the new National Unity

government. Even massive economic assistance from the United States offers only temporary respite, buying time until Israel's economy is totally overhauled. Nor will evacuation from Lebanon bring permanent security in the north. Without long-term plans, the Palestinians will continue to be a source of unrest in the countries that border Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza. Failure to confront the Palestinian issue also keeps tensions high between Israeli Arab citizens and the Jewish population. Until Jewish-Arab relations are stabilized, the questions asked by Meir Kahane and his sympathizers will continue to be relevant.

The uncertainties in Israeli-Arab relations, which in turn contribute to economic instability and invite sympathy for militant nationalists, threaten the strong democratic ethos that was once the hallmark of Israeli society. Israel's situation has led to "an annulment of the individual's value, of the importance of individual happiness, well-being and rights in the name of land, blood, nation and God," according to Shulamit Aloni, leader of the opposition Citizens' Rights Movement (CRM), now represented in the Knesset by four members.

These are the sentiments of many in Israel's liberal opposition, now composed of the CRM, Mapam and PLP. Their dozen Knesset seats may not give them much political power, but they almost equal the Orthodox bloc, whose influence also far outweighs its numbers. Many Israelis on the liberal fringes of the Labor party, intellectuals in Israel's universities, and liberal writers share these concerns. But some liberals support the National Unity government anyway, because they hope that it will be able to confront Israel's apparently intractable problems intelligently, without partisan bickering. ■

THE PALESTINIANS AFTER LEBANON

(Continued from page 20)

turned out to be costly, indeed—financially, militarily, strategically and politically. Particularly significant was the flawed performance of the Israeli army in the campaign and its inability to break through the defenses of Beirut. Mired in the hostile environment of southern Lebanon, the Israeli army had suffered 600 fatalities by October, 1984. While the press attributed most of these casualties to Lebanese guerrillas, PLO sources indicated that the Palestinian role in the resistance, particularly logistic support, was significant. There was reason to suppose, therefore, that conventional perceptions of Israel's strategic importance might gradually be reevaluated. Israel's political and economic troubles also inspired optimism among Palestinians.

Moreover, in spite of all the PLO's difficulties, its legitimacy among the Palestinians under Israeli occupation remained very much intact. Given the seemingly inexorable Israeli exploitation of the occupied territories, the basic grievances of Palestinians remained, providing a favorable context for resistance by a new generation born

under the occupation. That, too, could serve a PLO organizationally capable of taking advantage of the situation. Although militarily weakened, external Palestinian organizations were still able to carry out acts of violence in Israel and the occupied territories. On February 28, 1984, responsibility for an explosion in Jerusalem was claimed both by the DFLP and the Abu Nidal group, an anti-Arafat organization outlawed by the PLO. Three Israelis were killed and nine wounded on March 7 when a bomb exploded on a bus; responsibility was claimed both by the PFLP-GC (part of the anti-Arafat rebel coalition) and by the Abu Nidal group. The DFLP and the Abu Nidal group announced responsibility for the hijacking of an Israeli bus south of Tel Aviv on April 12-13. Yet to many observers (among them Palestinians) these scattered incidents were indicative of weakness rather than strength.

RADICAL ISLAM

The Palestinians also benefited from the strengthening of radical Islamic tendencies throughout the region. Although problematical in many ways for the PLO, radical Islam was a welcome development insofar as it weakened regimes whose support for the Palestinian cause was less than enthusiastic. Some PLO strategists argued that a Jordanian connection would be less damaging to PLO independence than a Syrian connection because the power of Palestinian nationalism in Jordan and the occupied territories would be sufficient to prevent a Jordanian takeover of the Palestinian cause. Favorable developments were also taking place in Lebanon. Following the resurgence of Shiite, Druse, and "progressive" forces in February, 1984, Palestinian organizations were busy rallying more than 300,000 Palestinians and rebuilding the organizational base that the Israelis had destroyed two years earlier. A significant feature of this development was the enhanced role of the PFLP and the DFLP, the two main left-wing organizations in the Democratic Alliance "swing bloc."

Finally, despite its internal troubles, the PLO showed that it still had the capacity to act on the diplomatic front. Arafat took a significant step forward when, in interviews with *The Observer* (London) on April 29, 1984, and *Le Nouvel Observateur* (Paris) on May 4, he called for direct talks with Israel under United Nations auspices, thus implicitly accepting the two-state solution for the Palestinian problem.

The question remained, however, whether the PLO could surmount its leadership and organizational problems to continue to play an important role in Middle East developments. At the beginning of 1985, three basic alternatives presented themselves. First, there was the possibility that the present situation would continue without any major changes for the main parties. The eventual outcome of this scenario would probably be the steady decline in the importance of the PLO; it would disappear with a whimper, not a bang, and management of the Palestinian cause would revert to Jordan, Egypt, Syria,

and compliant West Bank notables. Second, it was conceivable that the impasse would be broken by Arafat, who might successfully convene the PNC with the participation of the important Democratic Alliance groups, especially the DFLP and PFLP, and with the Syrians agreeing not to sabotage the reconciliation in exchange for effective curbs on Arafat's leadership. Such a course would also require a PLO commitment not to join in a "Jordanian-Egyptian-Reagan Plan" initiative and would mean a reaffirmation of the comprehensive Geneva conference approach, with Soviet participation.

The third scenario envisaged Arafat throwing down the gauntlet to the rebels and the Syrians by convening a loyalist PNC, jettisoning even the Democratic Alliance swing bloc, and thrusting the PLO into a strictly diplomatic strategy consonant with the "Camp David plus" pathway, in which confederation with Jordan, support from Egypt, dialogue with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, and neutralization of uncritical American support for Israeli expansionism would be the primary features.

If the first scenario were the most likely, given the inertia of the situation it would probably also be the most debilitating for the PLO, which would be hard pressed to remain a major actor on the scene. The second alternative showed little likelihood of yielding tangible gains for the Palestinians vis-à-vis Israel, although it might substantially increase Palestinian solidarity. The third prospect, while theoretically offering a substantial improvement in the plight of the Palestinians under occupation, involved at least two major dangers: the prospect of active and ruthless countermeasures from Syria and the militant Palestinians, and the lack of sufficient American pressure on Israel to bring about a minimally adequate solution.

At this writing, reports of the demise of the PLO are premature; however, the patient still needs intensive care. But whether or not the PLO survives, the Palestinian issue remains very much alive and is likely to continue to be the main cause of instability in the Middle East. ■

IRAQ

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Jordan. Furthermore, Iraq is repairing relations with Egypt, in spite of Egypt's continued commitment to the Camp David accords. While Iraq led the movement to ostracize Egypt from the Arab world in 1978, it has been among the first to welcome Egypt back into the Arab fold. This, too, is a result of Egypt's support for Iraq in the war.

In the international sphere, Iraq has even sought to improve relations with its main ideological enemy, the United States. On March 12, 1984, *The New York Times* reported that:

American diplomats pronounce themselves satisfied with relations between Iraq and the United States and suggest that normal diplomatic ties have been restored in all but name.

On November 26, 1984, Iraqi Foreign Minister and Dep-

uty Prime Minister Tariq Aziz met with United States President Ronald Reagan in Washington, D.C.; afterward, it was announced that formal diplomatic relations had been restored.¹²

Thus, in foreign policy as in domestic policy, Iraq's revolution has been deflected by the necessities imposed by a desperate fight for survival. Iraq may have entered the Iraq-Iran war bearing the Baath standard of unity, freedom and socialism. In the heady days of capital surplus, this was indeed the standard against which its domestic and foreign policies were formulated. However, in the bitter realities of a stalemated war that provides a lucrative arms business and a strategic diversion for many powers, the only standard is survival. ■

EGYPT

(Continued from page 24)

study by Ali al-Din Hilal in *al-Ahram's* Institute for Political and Strategic Studies.⁸ His study shows that the opposition derived its strength primarily from the urban areas. Of the votes cast, the opposition received 38 percent in Cairo, 36 percent in Suez and 32 percent in Alexandria. These are the same areas that registered low voter turnout: 20 percent in Suez, 23 percent in Cairo and 28 percent in Alexandria. By contrast, voter participation was strongest in the rural areas. Of the densely populated areas, Minufiyya had the highest voter turnout (55 percent) followed by Qalubiyya (53 percent), Beni Suwayf (49 percent), Beheira (48 percent), Gharbiyya (47 percent) and Qena (47 percent).

There is no doubt that the overwhelming victory of the NDP was caused by the support it received in rural areas. Behind this victory was the NDP's mobilization of the traditional elites. There was a noticeable increase in the number of voters belonging to the traditional elites, some of whom were the direct descendants of prerevolutionary parliamentary members going back as far as the nineteenth century. This increased turnout may be attributed not only to the mobilizational strategy of the NDP but also to the fact that the New Wafd was competing for the same constituency. There is even evidence to suggest that members of elite families were split over party competition for their votes and support. Nonetheless, the NDP won the support of the majority of the rural notables because these notables believed it was the government party. Neither changes in the electoral procedures nor the reemergence of the New Wafd seemed to affect the political formula based on traditional support in the rural areas.

The Mubarak regime seems to be stable, but continuity has been secured by sacrificing reform. At this writing, the People's Assembly is considering a 19-month extension of the state of emergency that was imposed after Sadat's assassination. The urgency with which this measure is contemplated is a consequence of the food riots in Kufr al-Duwwar, Egypt's industrial complex roughly 17

¹²*The New York Times*, November 27, 1984.

⁸See Ali al-Din Hilal's article in *al-Ahram*, June 16, 1984.

miles south of Alexandria. The direct cause of the riots was a small rise in the government-set price of bread, but the popular reaction was strong enough to force the government to beat a hasty retreat, almost identical to the way Sadat's government had reacted. By shelving the issue of reform, the Egyptians may find themselves facing repression and a widening of the socioeconomic gap between the rich and the poor—the two dark sides of Nasserism and Sadatism. ■

IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND THE PERSIAN GULF

(Continued from page 8)

overwhelmingly expressed in Islamic terms today should not be exaggerated. Arabism and nationalism in individual Arab countries are not dead. Although these forces are overshadowed by Islam, they continue to coexist with Islam. Except for extremists, there is little or no Arab interest in importing the Iranian example of the Islamic revolution. When the Iranian Revolution erupted, the appeal of that example was powerful indeed, but it has declined over the past six years. To be sure, the observable excesses of Iran's revolutionary regime in Iran, including summary executions, are one reason for this decline. More important, Iran's drive to export its revolution angers most Arabs. Although there are Sunni as well as Shiite Arabs who would be happy to see Iran win the war against Iraq, they do not want to have an Iranian-type government in their own country. Paradoxically, the very Iranian Revolution that first heightened the Arab social and political consciousness among Sunnis and Shiites alike has begun to intensify Arab consciousness vis-à-vis the Iranians.

ARAB CONTAINMENT OF THE THREAT

All Gulf Arab regimes today strive to contain Iran's export of revolution. Iraq is fighting a war. Saudi Arabia pursues a containment policy of "conciliation and deterrence." And the Saudi lead Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) along essentially the same conciliatory, cautious policy lines through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Besides these external policies, all Gulf Arab regimes pursue domestic policies aimed at the containment of the Iran-directed Islamic revolution. Consider the case of Iraq.

Although Saddam Hussein decided to attack Iran initially more for the aggrandizement of his power than the containment of the Islamic revolution,⁷ today he aims at containment for two reasons. First, since July 13, 1982, when Iran carried the war into Iraqi territory, it has been trying to export its revolution rather than defend its territory. Second, Iran's uncompromising demand for the overthrow of Hussein and the Baath party also as the precondition of a negotiated settlement reinforces the

widely held belief that Iran is continuing the war in pursuit of its policy of exporting revolution.

Iraq has failed to end the war; yet the Islamic revolution has so far been contained. Such unscrupulous Iraqi war tactics as creating oil spills, using chemical weapons, and attacking centers of civilian population have not yet dented Iran's determination to launch its ever-postponed "final offensive," but that offensive may well be triggered by a crippling Iraqi attack on the hitherto well-defended vital Kharg Island oil terminal. Whether it is mutual incompetence or mutual restraint that prolongs the war of attrition, one thing seems certain: Iran still believes that Hussein's regime will eventually crack internally if Iran continues the pressure by massing troops on the war front. Iran will probably launch its final attack from the partially Iraqi-held Majnoon Island. This probability involves the Saudi containment policy.

THE TANKER WAR

Saudi Arabia and its GCC partners did not abandon the cautious and conciliatory diplomatic policies they had pursued ever since the start of the war until after the capture of Majnoon Island in February, 1984, and the start of the tanker war in earnest in April. Although Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have bankrolled Iraq and have given it logistical aid all along, they and other GCC states tried to persuade the warring parties to negotiate a settlement through the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) and a myriad other organizations and individual countries. The GCC itself always used the least offensive language about Iran in its many comments on the war. Even after the Iranian forces penetrated Iraqi territory in July, 1982, the GCC did not condemn Iran as an "aggressor."

But the GCC did do so in no uncertain terms on May 20, 1984, in a most unusual meeting of the Arab League. For the first time, the League forsook its usual public unanimity and overruled the Syrian and Libyan objections to the condemnation of Iran. The GCC states also carried their unusually tough stand into the halls of the United Nations Security Council, where they supported a Council resolution adopted on June 1, 1984, that criticized Iran's attack on oil tankers without mentioning it by name and without mentioning Iraq, which had started the tanker war.

More important, the tanker war led to an air battle between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Saudis shot down an Iranian F-4 fighter plane on June 5, 1984. Iran protested the next day, contending that its plane had been attacked over "international waters," while the Saudis said that the plane had been downed in "Saudi territorial waters." A dogfight in the air is not a battle, let alone a war. And although the Saudi F-15's that downed the Iranian plane were flown by Saudi pilots, United States AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) planes and American aerial refueling were involved. But what was far more important than the display of Saudi military power in this incident was a demonstration of

⁷See R. K. Ramazani, "Iraq-Iran War: Underlying Conflicts," *Middle East Insight*, vol. 3, no. 5 (July/August, 1984), pp. 8-11.

Saudi political resolve. Saudi Arabia has spent billions of dollars over the years to create a credible air defense as the centerpiece of the Saudi defense system. In the Arab League and in this incident, the Saudis have proven that they dare to use military force.

No less important, the oil tanker crisis may have brought the GCC as a whole closer to its much-discussed desire to create an integrated air defense system. First, as a result of the crisis the Saudi-Kuwaiti AWACS data-sharing has been formalized with United States approval; Kuwait is the most vulnerable country of the GCC to Iranian air attacks, partly because of its close proximity to the war zone. Second, United States emergency military assistance to Saudi Arabia, including Stingers, a fuel tanker and other military equipment, has enhanced Saudi deterrent capability. And third, if the recommendations of the GCC chiefs of staff (June 23, 1984) are adopted and implemented, the GCC states may finally have a "semiunified command," a better monitoring system for navigation in the Strait of Hormuz through strengthened Omani capability, and "a Gulf rapid deployment force."

The GCC leaders as well as Iraq's Hussein believe that their defense efforts are vital to containing revolution internally. At the height of the tanker war crisis, there was a widespread belief in the Gulf region that an Iranian victory would drastically embolden the pro-Iranian Muslim extremists, Shiite and Sunni alike, encouraging them to revolt.

For this reason, the Gulf Arab states have also tightened domestic security measures. Despite the repeated GCC failure, so far, to create a collective internal security system, all the Arab states, including Iraq, continue to pursue a variety of "carrot and stick" domestic policies to counter the attraction of the Iranian revolutionary example. More than other Gulf leaders, Hussein uses coercive measures to control opposition, including arbitrary arrest, harassment, torture, and execution. Members of the Iranian-supported underground *al-Dawa* are his principal target.

On the other hand, the amount of money Hussein spends for welfare is second only to Saudi Arabia's expenditure (about \$500 million a month) and he spends this money particularly in Shiite holy cities, for projects like housing, water and sewage works, and Shiite shrines. In the long run, the usefulness of such policies as substitutes for genuine and fundamental social, economic and political reforms is highly questionable.

DREAM AND REALITY

Iranian leaders believe that the export of their revolution is necessary for the survival of the Khomeini regime. Above all, that survival must be protected in the Persian Gulf region, where the superpowers and the regional states are trying to destroy the Iranian regime because they regard it as the principal threat to their interests.

Given its Muslim-populated southern borderlands, the

Soviet Union fears the contagion of the Islamic revolution in its territory as it fears Iran's support of the "warriors" (*mujahidin*) against Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan. Given the dependence of its NATO allies on Gulf oil supplies, the United States fears the threat of the Islamic revolution to Western domination on the Arab side of the Gulf. And given their "subservience" to the United States, the "reactionary and corrupt" Arab regimes fear the triumph of the *Islam of the oppressed* over the *Islam of the oppressors*.

So far, Iran's doctrinal commitment to the export of revolution has, on balance, outweighed pragmatic considerations in its policy in the Gulf region, although pragmatic considerations have not been ignored. For example, despite Iran's repeated threats to close the Strait of Hormuz if its oil exports were crippled, it has so far "impeccably" observed the principle of freedom of navigation, partly because its own self-interest is at stake. Iran has also accepted the United Nations-sponsored moratorium on the bombardment of civilian targets and, by everyone's admission, Iran has retaliated with exemplary restraint to the Iraqi-initiated tanker war. It may even have "underresponded." Yet Iran continues to insist on Hussein's removal as the precondition to a negotiated settlement, an insistence that has already made the Iraq-Iran war the longest, the bloodiest, and the costliest war in the modern history of the Middle East.

As long as Khomeini rules, Iran will try to export its revolution. But various political factions in Iran disagree on this issue. Thus it is possible that in post-Khomeini Iran the present overemphasis on dogma and doctrine will give way to more pragmatic considerations. The Khomeini-favored *Maktabi* approach to foreign policy is said to be opposed by the *Hojjatieh* approach, which either disavows export of the revolution or accords it a low priority. The post-Khomeini leaders may fail to domesticate their revolution, to wake up from their chiliastic transnational dreams, and to strike a balance between the requirements of ideology and reality. If they fail, they will be affirming one of the most ancient and tenacious tendencies in Iran's political culture—the adoption of unrealizable goals and inappropriate means. ■

SOVIET POLICY

(Continued from page 28)

nothing to fear from normal ties with the U.S.S.R. However, the Soviet-Kuwaiti relationship is limited, because Kuwait is a conservative emirate despite its sometimes leftist foreign policy rhetoric. Kuwait's primary foreign policy ties are to the other GCC states.

Thus, Soviet efforts to gain influence in the Arabian Peninsula have met with only limited success. Nor does the Soviet Union appear likely to be any more successful in the foreseeable future. The GCC states' booming economies, internal stability and tight internal security controls have eliminated much of the incentive as well as the opportunity for revolution or other political change. ■

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of November, 1984, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance)

Nov. 1—The economic alliance led by the Soviet Union ends its annual meeting in Havana, Cuba.

European Economic Community (EEC)

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

Nov. 30—The annual assembly ends in Geneva; the 9 members agree to study whether service industry trade can be brought under the scope of the GATT.

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

Nov. 27—The 5th annual meeting of the GCC opens in Kuwait; the Emir of Kuwait, Sheik Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah, asks Iran to end its war with Iraq.

Nov. 29—The GCC members announce that they have agreed to establish a rapid deployment force to defend the region; the force will have a unified command and will be made up of 10,000 to 13,000 troops.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(See also *Canada*)

Nov. 9—NATO officials report that a new counterattack doctrine known as Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) has been adopted by the organization; the new doctrine calls for the use of high technology nonnuclear weapons to bottle up Soviet forces deep inside East Europe in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack.

Organization of African Unity (OAU)

Nov. 12—Morocco quits the OAU to protest the OAU's decision to recognize the Western Sahara guerrillas; this is the 1st time that a member has withdrawn.

Nov. 15—A 4-day meeting of the organization ends in Addis Ababa; resolutions adopted during the meeting call for increased food and economic aid to African countries suffering from drought and for renewed talks at the United Nations on a "new world economic order."

Organization of American States (OAS)

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 13—In a speech before the OAS's annual meeting in Brasília, Mexican Foreign Minister Bernardo Sepúlveda Amor indirectly criticizes the U.S. for "maneuvers aimed at weakening or frustrating" the Contadora group's peacekeeping effort in Central America.

United Nations (UN)

(See also *OAU; Mozambique; U.K., Great Britain*)

Nov. 1—The General Assembly votes 89 to 9, with 54 abstentions, to approve a resolution that calls on Britain and Argentina to resume negotiations over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands.

Nov. 3—Edouard Saouma, director general of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, says that "the worst is yet to come" for the countries of Africa suffering from drought.

Nov. 6—U.S. Ambassador to the UN Jeane Kirkpatrick tells

the General Assembly that African nations have become dependent on food imports because "state-controlled programs . . . failed where market incentives might have succeeded."

Nov. 7—Ni Zhengyu becomes the 1st Communist Chinese to serve on the World Court since the People's Republic of China was admitted to the UN.

Nov. 15—The General Assembly votes 119 to 20, with 14 abstentions, to approve a resolution that calls for the withdrawal of "foreign troops" from Afghanistan.

Nov. 26—The World Court rules that it has the authority to hear the case Nicaragua has brought before the Court; Nicaragua charges that the U.S. is violating international law by supporting military attacks against Nicaragua; the U.S. has argued that the Court lacks jurisdiction, and that Nicaragua has never filed an official certification accepting the authority of the Court.

AFGHANISTAN

(See also *Intl, UN*)

Nov. 13—Western diplomats in New Delhi report that 870 Afghan children have been sent to the Soviet Union for at least 10 years of "indoctrination."

ANGOLA

(See also *South Africa*)

Nov. 2—U.S. officials report in Washington, D.C., that Angola has offered to reduce the number of Cuban troops in Angola from 30,000 to 10,000 if South Africa grants independence to Namibia.

Nov. 9—Jonas Savimbi, the head of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), a guerrilla group trying to overthrow the government, says he should be included in peace talks between Angola and South Africa; South Africa has provided political and material support for UNITA.

ARGENTINA

(See also *Intl, UN*)

Nov. 14—The 8 remaining judges on the military's highest court resign; 1 judge resigned earlier this week. The judges resigned to protest Defense Minister Raúl Borrás's refusal to defend the court from criticism that it is intentionally delaying the trials of military officers accused of human rights abuses.

Nov. 25—Partial returns from yesterday's referendum show that 81 percent of the Argentines approve a treaty with Chile that will end the dispute over the Beagle Channel in Tierra del Fuego.

Nov. 29—In Rome, Argentine and Chilean representatives sign a treaty that settles their dispute over the Beagle Channel; the treaty was mediated by the Vatican.

BOLIVIA

Nov. 14—Most of Bolivia's public and private sectors are closed down during a general strike called by the Workers Federation; the union wants the government to improve economic conditions for the nation's workers, who face inflation of over 1,000 percent a year.

CANADA

- Nov. 5—Prime Minister Brian Mulroney tells Parliament that he wants “to restore a spirit of goodwill and true partnership between Canada and the United States.”
- Nov. 13—After accepting the Albert Einstein International Peace Prize in Washington, D.C., former Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau condemns NATO’s “macho posturing” and calls on the Western nuclear nations to adopt the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons.
- Nov. 22—5 Quebec provincial Cabinet ministers who belong to the Parti Québécois resign; the ministers are demanding a stronger party stand on independence for Quebec.

CHAD

(See also *France; Libya*)

- Nov. 8—In London, Amnesty International accuses the government of responsibility for hundreds of executions and random killings in the last 2 months.

CHILE

(See also *Argentina*)

- Nov. 5—All 16 Cabinet members resign; Interior Minister Sergio Onofre Jarpa reportedly resigned because of the military government’s authoritarian response to last week’s demonstrations.
- Nov. 6—President Augusto Pinochet imposes a state of siege; he says martial law is necessary to “save democracy.”
- Nov. 8—The government imposes censorship on all media, bans 6 opposition magazines, and bans all political meetings; it will not allow the head of the Roman Catholic Church’s human rights office to return to Chile.
- Nov. 10—Soldiers arrest over 2,000 men in a poor neighborhood in Santiago; by afternoon all but 323 are released.
- Nov. 13—103 people are sent into internal exile, bringing the total for November to 352. Under the state of siege, the government can order anyone into internal exile for an indefinite period.
- Nov. 14—Archbishop Juan Francisco Fresno of Santiago issues a pastoral letter criticizing the government for the state of siege.
- Nov. 15—Army and air force troops arrest thousands of men and teen-aged boys in a sweep of another poor neighborhood in Santiago; those arrested are taken to the city’s soccer stadium for questioning and identification checks.
- Nov. 23—In Concepción province, the government reports that left-wing guerrillas killed a soldier. In Santiago, the government announces that 9 leftists have been sent into internal exile.
- Nov. 28—Opposition leaders say that today’s nationwide strike against the government failed because of the military’s widespread presence and censorship of any news of the strike.

CHINA

(See also *Intl, UN*)

- Nov. 1—Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang calls for improved ties with India.
- Nov. 3—The Foreign Ministry says that the Sino-Soviet talks that ended yesterday in Beijing were “useful”; a 6th round of talks is scheduled for April, 1985.

CUBA

(See also *Intl, COMECON*)

- Nov. 1—*Granma*, the government newspaper, reports that Cuba and the Soviet Union have signed an agreement that calls for close economic cooperation between the 2 countries until the year 2000.

EGYPT

(See also *Israel*)

- Nov. 12—Osama el-Baz, President Hosni Mubarak’s senior foreign policy adviser, says that Mubarak will not meet with the Israeli Prime Minister until Israel withdraws from Lebanon.
- Nov. 17—Mubarak announces that an assassination plot against Abdul Hamid Bakkush, a former Libyan Prime Minister living in Egypt, has been foiled; yesterday, after he received photographs of the faked assassination, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi announced that Bakkush had been killed.

EL SALVADOR

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Nov. 14—Leftist guerrilla representatives and a government minister debate in Los Angeles, California.
- Nov. 16—Guillermo Ungo, head of the Democratic Revolutionary Front, the political wing of the guerrillas, says that the guerrillas are prepared in principle to take part in elections but will not take part in municipal elections scheduled for March, 1985.
- Nov. 19—The Salvadoran Supreme Court announces that Lieutenant Isidro López Sibrián, who was accused of ordering the killing of 2 U.S. labor advisers in 1981, has been cleared of the charges.
- Nov. 23—President José Napoleón Duarte announces that he will not attend the next meeting with guerrilla leaders; he also says there can be no cease-fire until the guerrillas become part of “the democratic process.”
- Nov. 29—A close aide to President Duarte reports that Duarte has ordered Lieutenant López Sibrián discharged from the army for “military reasons.”
- Nov. 30—Guerrilla and government representatives meet for a 2d round of talks in Ayagualo; the guerrillas propose a 3-day peace plan, including a cease-fire and the integration of the guerrilla forces into the Salvadoran army.

ETHIOPIA

- Nov. 16—Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam says that although he is grateful to the U.S. and Europe for their massive aid effort to help relieve famine in Ethiopia, relations between the U.S. and Ethiopia will not improve.
- Nov. 17—Relief officials and Western diplomats in Addis Ababa tell *The New York Times* that at least 600,000 metric tons of grain will be needed for the next 12 months to relieve the famine; about half that amount has already been pledged by the U.S. and European nations.
- Nov. 27—All 108 hostages on a hijacked Somali airliner are released unharmed in Addis Ababa.

FRANCE

(See also *Libya*)

- Nov. 10—The Defense Ministry announces that joint military observers have confirmed that French and Libyan troops have completed a total withdrawal of forces from Chad.
- Nov. 14—Renaud de La Genière, the head of the central bank, resigns; Michel Camdessus will replace him.
- Nov. 15—President François Mitterrand meets with Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi in Crete; they agree to keep their troops out of Chad.
- Nov. 16—Mitterrand tells reporters that Libya has not completely withdrawn its troops from Libya; the U.S. reported on November 13 that, contrary to French reports, Libyan troops were still in Chad.
- Nov. 20—In Washington, D.C., Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson says that the U.S. and France disagree on France’s approach toward Libya.

Nov. 21—Chief Rabbi René Samuel Sirat announces that he has been invited to visit with Chief Rabbis in the Soviet Union with the permission of the government; it has been almost a decade since the last official visit by a Western Chief Rabbi to the Soviet Union.

Nov. 28—At a press conference at the end of his 3-day visit in Syria, Mitterrand says he welcomes any contribution Syria can make to ending the Lebanese civil war.

New Caledonia

Nov. 18—34 seats in the new 42-seat National Assembly are won by the Republican party, which is opposed to independence; indigenous Kanakas from the Front for the Liberation of Kanak try to disrupt the voting.

Nov. 25—Kanak separatists announce that they have set up a provisional government; violence that started on November 18 continues.

GERMANY, WEST

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 5—Philipp Jenninger is elected to replace Rainer Barzel as Speaker of the Parliament; Barzel resigned because he was involved in a scandal.

Nov. 7—Chancellor Helmut Kohl tells a parliamentary subcommittee that he accepted \$53,000 in gifts from the Flick industrial company between 1977 and 1979; he says there were no strings attached to the money.

Nov. 8—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher denies taking any money from Flick; he also denies using his political influence to secure tax favors for the company.

Nov. 9—The government demands that Romania recall 5 of its diplomats from Bonn because of activities "irreconcilable with their diplomatic status."

Nov. 19—*Der Spiegel*, the German newsmagazine, reports that former Agriculture Minister Josef Ertl, a member of Kohl's Free Democratic party, was involved in illegal party financing in the 1970's.

Nov. 24—428 Poles have abandoned cruise ships in West German ports in the last 2 weeks; 126 Poles left their ship in Travemünde today and are seeking political asylum.

GHANA

Nov. 11—Ghana state radio reports that the ruling Provisional National Defense Council has named new ministers of industry, education, information, agriculture and trade.

GREECE

Nov. 14—The government announces that it will buy 40 U.S. F-16G jet fighters and 40 French Mirage-2000's; the announcement follows more than 2 years of talks.

Nov. 19—In an interview with a pro-government newspaper, *Ta Nea*, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou says that his government pursues a moderate policy toward the U.S. and that frictions with the U.S. arise because Greece does not want to become a U.S. satellite.

HONDURAS

(See also *U.S., Administration*)

Nov. 23—The Honduran ambassador to the U.S. denies that the government seeks a fleet of U.S. F-5 jet fighters; he says Honduras does not want to promote an arms race with Nicaragua.

Nov. 29—In Washington, D.C., Chief of Staff of the Honduran armed forces Colonel Efraín González says that a permanent U.S. military base in Honduras would be acceptable to Honduras.

INDIA

(See also *China; U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 1—Rioting continues in New Delhi and 8 other Indian cities following yesterday's assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by 2 Sikh bodyguards; troops have been ordered into the 9 cities to quell the rioting.

Nov. 3—Gandhi's body is cremated in New Delhi; government officials report that at least 1,000 people, mostly Sikhs, have been killed in the last 3 days of rioting, 500 in New Delhi alone.

Nov. 5—Most stores reopen in New Delhi as violence begins to subside throughout the country.

Nov. 6—The new Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, meets with a group of Sikh leaders to reassure them that the government will protect them.

Nov. 12—In his 1st nationwide speech, Prime Minister Gandhi says he will pursue his mother's policies of socialism at home and nonalignment abroad.

Nov. 13—Gandhi calls for general elections on December 24 and 27; elections will not be held in Assam and Punjab because of past and continuing violence there.

Nov. 27—Percy Norris, the British deputy high commissioner for western India, is assassinated in Bombay by 2 members of a group called the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims.

IRAN

Nov. 2—President Hojatolislam Ali Khamenei commemorates the 5th anniversary of the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Teheran; he says Iran will not hesitate to strike at U.S. interests anywhere in the world as long as the U.S. "conspires against this nation."

IRAQ

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

ISRAEL

(See also *Egypt; Lebanon; South Africa; Syria*)

Nov. 4—The Cabinet approves a 3-month plan that freezes prices and holds down wage increases; both labor and business groups have agreed to the austerity plan.

Nov. 11—Prime Minister Shimon Peres announces that he has asked Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to meet to discuss ways of improving relations.

Nov. 22—Israeli soldiers kill an Arab demonstrator on the occupied West Bank; this is the 2d killing of an Arab demonstrator in the last 2 days.

JAPAN

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 13—The Defense Agency reports that 32 Japanese jet fighters were scrambled today after 7 Soviet bombers flew close to Japanese airspace.

Nov. 14—Director of the Fishery Agency Hiroya Sano denies U.S. reports that Japan has agreed with the International Whaling Commission to end all commercial whaling by 1988.

JORDAN

Nov. 22—Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasir Arafat convenes a 5-day meeting of the Palestine National Council in Amman; King Hussein delivers a speech to the opening session, offering a Jordanian-Palestinian initiative for peace in the Middle East.

Nov. 28—Arafat rescinds his offer to resign as chairman of the PLO.

KAMPUCHEA

(See also *Thailand*)

Nov. 14—Thai military sources in Bangkok report that Vietnamese troops have overrun a major Cambodian rebel base near Thailand's border.

KOREA, NORTH

(See also *Korea, South; Uganda*)

Nov. 27—The government calls off economic talks with South Korea scheduled for next week because of the November 23 Panmunjom incident.

KOREA, SOUTH

Nov. 3—About 1,500 students at Yonsei University in Seoul clash with riot police during a demonstration calling for campus autonomy.

Nov. 15—At Panmunjom, North and South Korean officials meet to discuss broadening economic ties between the 2 countries.

Nov. 23—A Soviet citizen visiting in Panmunjom defects to the South Korean side; 2 North Korean and 1 South Korean soldiers are killed in a firefight during the Russian's escape; 1 American soldier is wounded.

KUWAIT

(See *Intl, GCC*)

LEBANON

(See also *Syria*)

Nov. 3—Government troops take control of the Beirut and Tripoli harbors.

Nov. 8—Lebanese and Israeli officials meet in Naqura, Lebanon, to discuss the withdrawal of Israeli troops from south Lebanon.

Nov. 10—The government announces that it is suspending talks with the Israelis until 13 Muslim Shiite leaders are released from Israeli custody.

Nov. 12—A general strike closes down most major cities and towns in south Lebanon to protest the arrest of the Shiite leaders.

Nov. 14—After Israeli military authorities release 3 Shiite leaders, the government announces that it will return to the troop withdrawal talks.

Nov. 15—At the troop talks, Lebanese officials demand that Israel pay between \$8 billion and \$10 billion in war reparation for damages caused by the Israeli invasion and occupation.

Nov. 22—President Amin Gemayel calls for a new national charter between Christians and Muslims.

LIBYA

(See also *Egypt; France*)

Nov. 22—Foreign Minister Ali Abdel Salam Turayki tells reporters in Athens that Libyan troops will leave Chad; he acknowledges there has been "some delay" in their withdrawal.

MEXICO

(See also *Intl, OAS*)

Nov. 1—Energy Minister Francisco Labastida Ochoa and the head of the national oil company Petróleos Mexicanos, Mario Ramón Beteta, announce that Mexico will reduce oil exports by 6.6 percent in November to keep oil prices stable.

Nov. 17—President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado announces the 1985 budget, including a proposed spending increase of 54 percent and projected economic growth of 3 to 4 percent.

Nov. 20—Government officials report that at least 300 people were killed and 500 wounded in yesterday's explosions at the

government's oil refinery plant in Mexico City; the toll is expected to rise. 100,000 now homeless residents of a neighboring slum have been evacuated.

MOROCCO

(See *Intl, OAU*)

MOZAMBIQUE

Nov. 14—UN officials in Maputo tell *The New York Times* that severe famine is unavoidable in Mozambique; in 1983-1984, over 100,000 people starved.

NEW ZEALAND

Nov. 29—Former Prime Minister Sir Robert Muldoon is removed as head of the National party in voting today; Jim McLay is the new party head.

NICARAGUA

(See also *Intl, UN; U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 7—Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto Brockman denies that Nicaragua is about to receive advanced MiG fighter planes from the Soviet Union; the U.S. has reported that the aircraft are en route to Nicaragua.

Nov. 8—An unidentified Nicaraguan government official tells news reporters in Managua that only helicopters were aboard a ship the U.S. claimed was possibly carrying MiG's.

Nov. 12—The Defense Ministry announces that tanks have been deployed around Managua and the armed forces have been put on alert in preparation for a U.S. invasion.

Nov. 14—Official results show that Daniel Ortega Saavedra won 63 percent of the vote in the November 4 presidential elections; the Sandinistas won 61 of the 96 seats in the new National Assembly.

Nov. 19—Talks between U.S. and Nicaraguan officials begin in Mexico City.

Nov. 21—Adolfo Calero, the head of the largest U.S.-backed anti-Nicaraguan guerrilla group, tells reporters that his forces have not seen evidence in the field of a large Nicaraguan military buildup.

Nov. 24—A Roman Catholic radio station in Managua says that the government has reintroduced censorship over the station.

PAKISTAN

Nov. 11—The military government reiterates that it will hold national elections in March, 1985, but says President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq has not yet decided whether political parties will be allowed to participate.

PERU

Nov. 18—17 Peruvians working for a U.S.-financed drug eradication program are killed by drug traffickers in an ambush in Monzón.

Nov. 28—The government declares a state of emergency; all constitutional rights will be suspended for 30 days because of worker unrest.

Nov. 29—300 people are arrested during a nationwide strike to protest the government's economic policies.

PHILIPPINES

Nov. 6—President Ferdinand E. Marcos says he will run for reelection in 1987; Marcos has been President for 19 years.

Nov. 14—Mayor Cesar Climaco of Zamboanga, on the island of Mindanao, is killed by gunmen; he is the 2d leading opposition figure killed in the last 2 months.

POLAND(See also *Germany, West*)

- Nov. 2—The government announces that an autopsy has confirmed that a pro-Solidarity priest, the Reverend Jerzy Popieluszko, was murdered last month. 2 Interior Ministry officials and a general have been ordered detained in connection with the murder; 3 other ministry officials are already under arrest.
- Nov. 3—Over 200,000 Poles attend a mass for Popieluszko conducted by Josef Cardinal Glemp, the Polish Primate.
- Nov. 6—The Politburo announces that it is asking Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski to head the Interior Ministry.
- Nov. 13—The government announces that it will "take steps" against civilian groups that have been set up to report on police violence; it says the groups are an attempt to reactivate illegal dissident groups and the banned labor union Solidarity.
- Nov. 19—The Foreign Ministry announces that foreign reporters who attend news conferences held by civilian police-monitoring groups face prosecution.
- Nov. 28—Jaruzelski says that Popieluszko's death "has done [the government] a lot of harm."

ROMANIA(See also *Germany, West*)

- Nov. 22—Nicolae Ceaușescu is reelected to another 5-year term as Secretary General of the Romanian Communist party; this is his 4th successive reelection since 1965.

SOMALIA(See *Ethiopia*)**SOUTH AFRICA**(See also *Angola*)

- Nov. 5—Foreign Minister Rocard F. Botha meets privately with Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir in Jerusalem.
- Nov. 6—At least 16 blacks have been killed in the last 2 days of civil rights strikes in black townships south of Johannesburg.
- Nov. 8—Police raid the offices of the United Democratic Front and the Federation of South African Trade Unions in Johannesburg and detain 6 leaders suspected of organizing a 2-day work boycott, in which 24 people were killed.
- Nov. 13—Bishop Desmond Tutu, the 1984 Nobel peace prize winner, is elected the 1st black Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg.
- Nov. 14—3 whites and 3 blacks who belong to groups opposed to apartheid are arrested by police under a security provision that does not require formal charges or a trial for detention.
- Nov. 16—In the last 2 days, 2,300 blacks have been arrested by police in the black township of Sebokeng, south of Johannesburg; a police spokesman says they have been arrested for nonpayment of rent and other civil offenses.
- In Johannesburg, talks between Foreign Minister Botha and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester A. Crocker on U.S.-mediated negotiations between South Africa and Angola end.
- Nov. 30—Official results in Johannesburg show that the ruling National party will keep the 3 parliamentary seats at stake in yesterday's elections; far-right white supremacist candidates challenged National party candidates.

SPAIN

- Nov. 18—At least half a million Spaniards march in Madrid to protest a law that imposes state controls on private schools.

SRI LANKA

- Nov. 20—Police say that at least 16 policemen were killed today by separatist guerrillas when they attacked a police

station in the northern district of Jaffna.

- Nov. 30—The government reports that at least 42 people were killed today by Tamil separatists in attacks on 2 prison farms.

SYRIA(See also *France*)

- Nov. 1—First Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam says that Syria welcomes talks between Israel and Lebanon on the removal of Israeli troops from south Lebanon; he says Syria cannot guarantee the security of Israel's northern border after the Israeli withdrawal.
- Nov. 4—Khaddam meets with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy in Damascus to talk about Lebanon.
- Nov. 26—Rifaat Assad, President Hafez Assad's brother, ends his "exile" and returns to Damascus from Paris; 2 months ago the Syrian defense minister said Rifaat was persona non grata in Syria.

THAILAND

- Nov. 26—A Thai military spokesman says that Vietnamese troops have crossed into Thailand from Kampuchea in attacks on Kampuchean rebel bases.

UGANDA

- Nov. 15—Diplomats in Kampala report that at least 200 North Korean soldiers have arrived to help the government eradicate an insurgency; the total number of Korean soldiers in Uganda is now between 500 and 700.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Afghanistan; China; Cuba; France; Japan; Korea, South; Nicaragua; U.K.; Great Britain; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Nov. 1—Newspaper reports on Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's assassination yesterday insinuate that the U.S. was involved in the assassination; the U.S. State Department protests the insinuation.
- Nov. 2—Svetlana Stalin, the daughter of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin, returns to the Soviet Union after living in the West for 17 years.
- Nov. 5—President Konstantin Chernenko tells a meeting of Soviet-bloc youth leaders in Moscow that the Soviet Union is ready to match the U.S. in arms if the U.S. continues its military buildup.
- Nov. 15—The Foreign Ministry accuses the U.S. of meddling in Nicaragua's internal affairs.
- Nov. 16—In a written reply to questions from a U.S. news correspondent, Chernenko calls on U.S. President Ronald Reagan to return to détente, which would lead to "a more secure world."

A speech by Chernenko criticizing the nation's economic performance is published in most Soviet newspapers; Chernenko scores substandard work, laziness and a shortage of consumer goods.

- Nov. 27—The government announces that it is increasing its defense budget for 1985 by 12 percent to keep pace with the West.

At a meeting of the Communist party Central Committee, Nikolai K. Baibakov, the head of the State Planning Commission, says that industrial production is expected to increase by 4.4 percent this year over 1983.

UNITED KINGDOM**Great Britain**(See also *Intl, UN; India; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Nov. 6—Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher announces that Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Soviet President Chernenko's possi-

ble successor, will visit Britain next month.

Queen Elizabeth II reads the annual Speech from the Throne, which outlines the government's legislative agenda for the next year; the plan calls for continuing privatization of state-owned companies.

Nov. 12—Thousands of striking coal miners battle with police in northern England and Wales; police say 54 people have been injured in the massive protests.

Nov. 22—The government announces that it is withdrawing from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) next year unless the agency makes radical changes in its policies.

Nov. 28—The government's \$4.7-billion sale to private investors of 50.2 percent of Telecom, the state-owned telephone company, ends.

UNITED STATES

Administration

Nov. 1—Comptroller of the Currency C. Todd Conover says that 29 limited service banking offices of 13 bank holding companies may operate in areas beyond their home states.

In Miami, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrests 3 people on charges of plotting to assassinate Honduran President Roberto Suazo Córdova; 5 others are arrested on cocaine-smuggling charges (the cocaine was to have been used to finance the assassination attempt).

Nov. 5—The Labor Department rescinds a 42-year-old ban on commercial home knitting but will require home knitters to register with and receive a certificate from the Labor Department to ensure the enforcement of minimum wage and child labor laws.

Nov. 6—President Ronald Reagan and Vice President George Bush are reelected (see *Politics*).

Nov. 7—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) announces that Senator Jake Garn (R., Utah) has accepted an invitation to become the first public official to ride as a passenger in the space shuttle.

Nov. 8—Education Secretary T. H. Bell resigns his post effective December 31, 1984.

Nov. 13—The governing board of the U.S. Postal Service announces that Postmaster General William Bolger will retire at the end of 1984 and will be succeeded by Paul N. Carlin.

Nov. 14—Administration budget officials forecast a budget deficit of some \$200 billion for fiscal 1986, some \$30 billion more than predictions made in the summer of 1984.

Nov. 20—The White House drug abuse policy adviser and officials representing the FBI and the Drug Enforcement Administration announce a new youth education program to try to reduce drug use by 50 to 75 percent over the next 5 years.

NASA announces its new "Commercial Use of Space Policy" for the private enterprise exploitation of space ventures.

Nov. 23—While Congress is in recess, President Reagan appoints 11 individuals to the Legal Services Corporation's board of directors; all 11 failed to receive Senate confirmation earlier; in these recess appointments the appointees can serve through the next congressional year without Senate confirmation.

Nov. 27—The Treasury Department gives President Reagan a projected reform of the nation's tax structure; the proposal would lower and simplify tax rates and reduce or eliminate many current deductions, but would not generate additional tax revenue. The President says many changes may be made before he proposes tax reform legislation to Congress.

The FBI arrests Czechoslovak Karl Koecher, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) contract employee, on

charges of supplying U.S. national security information to the Czechoslovakian intelligence service.

Nov. 29—President Reagan names Lee Thomas to succeed William Ruckelshaus as Environmental Protection Agency administrator; Ruckelshaus resigned yesterday.

Economy

Nov. 2—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate of 7.3 percent remained unchanged in October.

Nov. 8—The Commerce Department reports that the U.S. foreign trade deficit in the 3d quarter of 1984 was \$33.3 billion.

Nov. 9—The Labor Department reports that its producer price index fell 0.2 percent in October.

Nov. 11—In the first draft of a Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy, a committee of Roman Catholic Bishops asks for great changes in the U.S. economy to aid the poor; it terms the inequalities in income and wealth in the nation and the world "morally unacceptable."

Nov. 20—The Commerce Department reports that the nation's gross national product (GNP) slumped to an annual rate of 1.9 percent in the 3d quarter of 1984.

Nov. 21—The Labor Department reports that its consumer price index rose 0.4 percent in October.

The Federal Reserve lowers its discount rate from 9 percent to 8.5 percent.

Nov. 28—Most major banks follow yesterday's action of the Chase Manhattan Bank and lower their prime rate to 11.25 percent, the 6th drop since September.

Nov. 29—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators fell 0.7 percent in October.

Nov. 30—The Commerce Department reports that the U.S. foreign trade deficit for October was \$9.2 billion.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl*, *OAS*, *UN*; *Canada*; *El Salvador*; *Ethiopia*; *France*; *Greece*; *Honduras*; *Iran*; *Japan*; *Nicaragua*; *South Africa*; *Syria*; *U.S.S.R.*)

Nov. 1—White House spokesman Larry Speakes reports that President Reagan today approved \$45.1 million in emergency food assistance for Kenya, Mozambique and Mali.

In an October 25 letter to Congress, CIA Director William Casey claims that the purpose of the CIA manual for Nicaraguan rebels (which discussed assassination and kidnapping as methods of fighting) was "on the whole, quite different from the impression that has been created in the media." He claims that the object of the manual was "to make every guerrilla persuasive in face-to-face communication . . ."

Secretary of State George Shultz heads the U.S. delegation leaving today to represent the U.S. at the funeral of India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

Nov. 2—The State Department says that for the last 3 weeks it has temporarily banned all but essential travel by U.S. officials to El Salvador; private travel there has been discouraged for a number of years.

Nov. 3—Secretary Shultz meets with new Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi; he also confers with Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov.

Nov. 7—State Department spokesman John Hughes reports that Soviet officials in Washington and Moscow have been warned that the U.S. cannot tolerate the delivery of advanced Soviet fighter aircraft to Nicaragua; the State Department claims that a Soviet freighter now docking in Nicaragua might have such planes on board.

Nov. 8—The U.S. Navy says that from November 1 until November 19 the U.S. is operating a Composite Training

Unit 1-85 in the Caribbean, which involves some 25 warships and possible liaison with Air Force units.

Secretary Shultz indicates that both Nicaragua and the Soviet Union have denied the presence of Soviet fighter aircraft aboard a Soviet ship that is now unloading in Nicaragua.

Nov. 10—A statement issued in the name of White House spokesman Larry Speakes says that 2 government investigations found "no violation" of the law in the preparation of a CIA manual for Nicaraguan guerrillas, although there may have been "lapses in judgment" that may require some discipline.

Nov. 12—Secretary Shultz arrives in Brazil for a meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS); he says the U.S. should provide "a security shield [for other Central American countries] against the aggression that has been launched from Nicaragua against its neighbors."

Nov. 13—Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige announces an agreement with Japan to end all Japanese whaling by 1988.

Nov. 14—Administration and congressional sources report that 6 mid-level CIA officials who were disciplined for their role in the issuance of a CIA manual for Nicaraguan guerrillas have refused to accept the discipline, claiming they are being made "scapegoats."

Nov. 20—The Commerce Department reports that under the Trade Act of 1984 the U.S. will ban all imports of steel pipe from European Economic Community countries between November 29 and December 31 of this year.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service says that the U.S. will allow some 125,000 Cubans (who fled to the U.S. by sea in 1980) to apply for permanent residence status beginning December 3.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane J. Kirkpatrick says that she will "return to private life" after the current General Assembly session ends in December.

Nov. 22—National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane announces that Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko will begin arms control talks in Geneva on January 7 and 8.

Nov. 26—In Washington, D.C., the State Department announces that the U.S. and Iraq have agreed to resume full diplomatic relations, broken off in 1967.

Nov. 27—The State Department reports that a possible plot by Lebanese supporters of the Islamic Holy War to bomb the U.S. embassy in Rome was foiled when 7 men were arrested by Italian police.

Nov. 28—In an address to the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger enunciates U.S. military policy and insists that the U.S. will not be drawn gradually into combat in Central America or elsewhere.

White House spokesman Larry Speakes says that President Reagan will meet with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at Camp David on December 22.

Nov. 30—In Washington, D.C., President Reagan meets with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl; they agree that NATO should strengthen its conventional weapons in West Europe to reduce the chances of nuclear war.

Labor and Industry

Nov. 26—The Department of Transportation announces that the General Motors Corporation will recall 3.1 million mid-size 1978-1980 model cars for "inspection" and possible repairs; the Ford Motor Company will recall 445,000 1984-1985 model cars for possible repairs; the Chrysler Corporation will recall 344,000 1984-1985 model cars for inspection and possible repairs.

Legislation

Nov. 9—President Reagan signs legislation calling for stricter federal standards on toxic waste disposal; he also signs legislation providing copyright-style legal protection for computer chip manufacturers, a \$104.7-billion appropriation bill for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services and Education, a measure increasing the federal payment rate for hospices treating the terminally ill under Medicare; and he pocket vetoes a bill that would have permitted U.S. courts to award legal fees to small businesses and individuals who win successful suits against the government.

Nov. 28—The Senate Republican Caucus selects Senator Robert Dole (R., Kansas) as majority leader of the Senate and Senator Alan Simpson (R., Wyoming) as majority whip.

Military

Nov. 7—Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger signs a directive that will restrict all public disclosure of technical material with military or space applications valuable to the Soviet Union; until now, much of this information has been publicly available.

Nov. 21—The National Research Council urges the U.S. Army to work out plans to destroy the Army's stock of aging chemical warfare weapons.

Politics

Nov. 6—With 99 percent of the vote counted, President Reagan and Vice President Bush are reelected; the President and Vice President win 53,428,357 votes (59 percent), while Democratic challengers Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro receive 36,930,923 votes (41 percent), winning only in Minnesota and the District of Columbia. The President wins 525 electoral votes; Mondale wins only 13.

53 Republicans and 47 Democrats win Senate seats in the 99th Congress, a gain for the Democrats of 2 seats. 251 Democrats and 180 Republicans are elected to the House of Representatives, a Republican gain of 12 to 14 seats, with 4 seats undecided.

The Republicans make a net gain of 1 in the state gubernatorial contests, and now hold 16 governorships.

Science and Space

Nov. 16—The space shuttle *Discovery* completes 8 days in orbit and lands at Cape Canaveral after successfully retrieving 2 errant satellites that had malfunctioned previous to this mission.

URUGUAY

Nov. 26—Official results show that Julio María Sanguinetti of the Colorado party won 38.8 percent of yesterday's vote to become Uruguay's 1st elected President in 11 years; Alberto Sáenz of the Blanco party wins 33 percent of the vote.

Nov. 30—The military government releases Wilson Aldunate Ferreira, the head of the Blanco party; Ferreira was arrested in June when he tried to return from Argentina.

VATICAN


(See *Argentina*)

VIETNAM

(See *Kampuchea; Thailand*)

ZIMBABWE

Nov. 26—Police report that Jini Ntuta, a senior member of the opposition Zimbabwe African People's Union, was assassinated in Matebeleland yesterday; the government claims guerrillas killed Ntuta. ■



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